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Glossary
Action An activity or a plan. A set of steps that the character can execute that are visible to a player.
Activity (See also top-level activity) A collection of plans and sub-goals that are used to achieve a
high level plan that constitutes doing “something” within the domain. Once finished, success
can be determined using evaluation. For instance, one activity could be “make something”. A
plan within that activity could be “make bread”.
Adaptation The process by which behaviour changes over time. It is a simple form of learning based
on experience. In our model this is done using a form of self-reinforcement via reinforcement
learning, in particular the reinforcement comparison technique, see Section 3.2 (page 82).
Adaptive Can change behaviour over time. Uses adaptation.
Agent The reasoning part of a character (as compared to the visual aspects of a character). That is,
the part that decides what to do and how to evaluate itself.
Appraisal of (coping) choices Used synonymously with decision-making, see Section 3.2.1 (page
87). The way that appraisal of choices is used within our model matches to secondary (not
primary) appraisal in the cognitive appraisal model (Lazarus, 1991) (see literature survey
Section 2.1.1.3, page 27). Reappraisal is implemented as evaluation.
BDI Beliefs, Desires, Intentions. Used in reference to the BDI paradigm that agents are embodied
in their virtual world (see literature survey Section 2.1.1.1, page 21). Agents can hold beliefs or
knowledge about their world and have desires of what they would like to achieve. An agent’s
intentions are a list of the current plans it is using to achieve its desires. Intentions should be
non-conflicting.
Behaviour Manner of acting; the observable actions and reactions of a person. Always considered
over a specific time period. Behaviour is used as a measure of effectiveness of the model to
test criteria for success (see Section 4.2.3.1, page 124). Measured in our implementation by
counting the number of times characters choose different actions (activities and plans) over a
fixed output time period.
Beliefs From the BDI paradigm (see literature survey Section 2.1.1.1, page 21), knowledge (facts and
subjective opinions) that the agent has or stores about others and the environment.
Case A scenario used for testing. In each Case, the characters are given different soft goal personality
templates. See Section 4.2.4.2 (page 135) for a listing of Cases.
Character The visual appearance combined with an agent, i.e. what a game player sees.
xix
GLOSSARY
Conflicting goals Goals that cannot both be achieved at the same time. For example, you cannot
have your cake and eat it too.
Context The perceived current situation of a character. Current level of achievement of soft goals that
the agent is pursuing, regardless of importance, see Section 3.1.1.2 (page 75). This value is not
based on the agent’s history, it is simply what the agent is achieving now. For each soft goal
the agent is pursuing, the achievement level is converted to a single letter representing: high
(close to achieving this goal), medium and low (this goal is not being achieved well currently).
The letters are combined based on the alphabetisation of the soft goal name to create the
context. For example, if the soft goals are “have friends” and “have money”, the context “LH”
represents the state where the agent has hardly any friends and a lot of money.
Context-aware Characters who’s behaviour depends on their perceived situation. In our model this
is, behaviour based on knowledge of current context, in terms of the soft goals the agent is
trying to achieve.
Coping According to the cognitive appraisal model of emotions (Lazarus, 1991) (see literature survey
Section 2.1.1.3, page 27) coping is a mechanism that we engage in to improve our overall
emotional wellbeing. Coping can be physical actions in the real world, such as running away
when scared, or an emotional re-evaluation, such as realising there is no need to be scared in
the first place. In our model, coping refers to the domain-dependent plans that the agents can
use to act within the world in order to improve their overall wellbeing based on achieving their
soft goals.
Criteria for Success The minimal set of tests (shown in Table 1.1, page 16) that must be satisfied
for the implemented model to be considered to have addressed the testing-based research
sub-questions. The criteria test whether the characters generated by the model are adaptive,
context-aware and individual. The criteria are measured based on the quantitative values of:
behaviour, reward and individuality.
Domain-dependent Knowledge Beliefs (facts and opinions) specific to the implemented domain. In
the theoretical model, they are used to calculate achievement levels of soft goals, and therefore
individual soft goal rewards, which leads to personal reward. In our implemented domain, the
beliefs are opinions - happiness, attraction towards others and facts - attraction from others,
location, insults said and told.
Emotion Related to feelings. There are many types of emotion, such as happiness, anger, fear etc...
In our model we use the term to relate to any or all of these types. In our implementation we
use the term to refer to a happy/sad scale that represents how close the agent is to achieving
all their soft goals.
Emotionality A set of values that represent how the agent reacts to events, the thresholds above or
below which they define “good” and “bad’, and other learning related parameters, see Section
3.1.3.3 (page 81). Used in a similar sense to Ortony (2002) (see literature survey Section
2.1.2.3, page 35).
Evaluation The process by which personal reward is determined, see Section 3.2.2 (page 90). Dur-
ing this process the following are updated: achievement levels, context, somatic markers and
emotion. This process is an implementation of reappraisal according to the cognitive appraisal
xx
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model of emotions (Lazarus, 1991) (see literature survey Section 2.1.1.3, page 27) and occurs
after every activity has been completed.
Execution of a plan Plans are like simple functions, they are executed consecutively line by line.
The execution of a plan is simply following the steps in the plan and ensuring that none of the
individual steps fail.
Facts Beliefs that cannot be changed by an individual agent (i.e. different from opinions). It is a
belief that is based on information given to the character by the environment or from other
characters.
Goal/Plan Hierarchy From the BDI paradigm (see literature survey Section 2.1.1.1, page 21).
In particular, see the generic figure for the goal/plan hierarchy, Figure 2.1 (page 22). The
goal/plan hierarchy is a representation of hard goals and the plans that can be used to directly
achieve these goals. The hierarchy begins with a hard goal placed at the top. Underneath this
are a number of plans that can achieve this goal. Each of these plans can post a number of
sub-goals that each must be achieved for the plan to succeed. This leads to a hierarchy, for
example domain-dependent hierarchies see Figure 3.2 (page 78) and Figure 4.2 (page 106).
Goals Something that an agent wants to achieve or maintain. There are a number of different types
of goals in the literature (see Section 2.1.1.2, page 24). In our model, we use hard goals and
soft goals. Hard goals are implemented in the goal/plan hierarchy. Soft goals are part of an
agent’s personality template in the form of an agent’s soft goal personality. Soft goals can be
conflicting, whereas hard goals cannot. Agents are given no knowledge of how to achieve soft
goals, but achievement of hard goals is explicit within the goal/plan hierarchy.
Hard goals Concrete goals within an explicit goal/plan hierarchy. The designer must explicitly state
how an agent can achieve these goals. For example, to achieve the goal “make something”, an
agent can choose a plan such as “make bread”.
Importance Used for soft goals, also known as weight. This is a number on a scale of [0, 1], where
1 represents a soft goal that the agent really wants to achieve, and 0 is one they do not care
whether they achieve or not. It is part of soft goal personality, see Section 3.1.3.2 (page 80).
Individual Different from others based on observable behaviour. A property a character can pos-
sess. In our model, an individual character is comprised of a number components and be-
liefs. Primarily the components and beliefs include personality template, somatic markers and
domain-dependent knowledge. The extent to which a character is individual is measured using
individuality.
Individual Soft Goal Reward The reward for a single soft goal based on the soft goal achievement
level and the distance to the ideal soft goal value from an agent’s soft goal personality, see
Section 3.2.2.1 (page 91).
Individuality In the general sense, individuality is what makes each of us unique and different from
other people. To test our model we needed a quantitative measure of individuality to compare
characters to each other based on their patterns of behaviour over the entire running time.
The quantitative measure of individuality is a count of the number of differences between
characters based on whether the behaviour (action choices) are significantly different for the
top-level activities ( see Section 4.2.3.3, page 126). Individuality is used as a measure of
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effectiveness of the model to test criteria for success. Individuality can relate to a specific
character (number of characters that character is different from) or to an entire run (total
number of characters different from each other).
Learning Feedback Loop Also known as the adaptation process. After completing an activity the
agent evaluates the personal reward for the activity and then feeds this back into the point
where the decision was made to do that activity, see Section 3.2 (page 82). In our model,
feedback is based on personal reward and updates somatic marker preferences.
Measure of Effectiveness Observed data from testing that is used to determine whether criteria for
success are satisfied. Three measures are used: behaviour (based on a count of the number of
times characters chose actions), reward (based on personal reward calculations for characters),
individuality (a count of differences between characters based on behaviour).
Mode A scenario used for testing. The different modes cause the characters to use random choice
when making decisions (‘adaptation off’); or do not allow the characters to distinguish between
contexts when they are learning (‘context off’); or using the full model (from Chapter 3) where
characters use the methods specified (‘normal’). See Section 4.2.4.1 (page 134) for further
explanation of modes used for testing.
Opinion A belief that has a value judgement attached. For example, a character can store “I like
Anna a lot”. The values on opinions can be changed by the character, if so desired.
Past Experience A lookup table of preferences based on past rewards. See somatic markers.
Personal Reward Also known as self-reinforcement value. The agent’s personal evaluation of how
“good” it thinks the last activity was. This represents how close the agent is to achieving all
of its soft goals, with more importance placed on different goals according to the agent’s soft
goal personality (see calculation step in Section 3.2.2.2, page 93). Reward is used as a measure
of effectiveness of the model to test criteria for success.
Personality Personality is the set of observable characteristics that make an individual themselves. In
our model, we restrict the term to relate to observable behaviour. A character’s final personality
is a combination of their initial personality template as well as their learnt preferences, or
somatic markers.
Personality Template In the general sense a personality template represents the basic genetic set-up
of an individual, actual personality emerges through life experience. In our model, a personality
template is made of three components: a domain-dependent goal/plan hierarchy, a soft goal
personality and emotionality values. See Section 3.1.3 (page 78).
Plan A set of instructions or recipe that the agent can execute. A plan can result in observable
actions in the virtual world or can change its beliefs.
Player A human participant in the game or simulation.
Preference Value See somatic marker preference.
Reference Reward A value that is representative of all past personal rewards. Used to determine
whether a personal reward for a particular activity was “good” or “bad” compared to all other
activities that have been executed. To see how the reference reward is used see Section 3.2.2.3
(page 94); to see how reference reward is updated see Section 3.2.2.5 (page 97).
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Reinforcement Comparison Technique A simple reinforcement learning technique (from Sutton
& Barto (1998)) that compares the current reward received with all other rewards that the
agent has received, using a reference reward, see literature survey Section 2.1.4.2, page 40).
The technique specifies how to update decision-making selection policy. In our model, it is
used to update somatic markers, see Section 3.2.2.3 (page 94).
Reinforcement learning Learning that is based on maximising reward from an external agent based
on trial and error, i.e. punishment and reward, see literature survey Section 2.1.4.2 (page 38).
In our model, we use learning based on self-evaluation (personal reward), not an external agent,
and use the reinforcement comparison technique to update selection policy (somatic markers).
Research Questions For this thesis, the three research questions relate to developing, implementing
and testing a model of personality that is adaptive, context-aware and individual. Introduced
in Section 1.2 (page 14).
Research Sub-questions Detailed questions that breakdown the research questions into smaller
parts. The sub-questions are also divided into model-based (relating to the development of the
personality model) and testing-based (relating to how to determine success of the implemented
model). The testing-based sub-questions are considered answered when the criteria for success
have been satisfied. Introduced in Section 1.2 (page 14).
Reward A measure of merit of an activity, i.e. “good” or “bad”. In our model there are three
types of reward: individual soft goal reward which is reward for a specific soft goal based on its
achievement level; personal reward which is based on combining all individual soft goal rewards
based on an agent’s soft goal personality template (used as a measure of effectiveness of the
model); and reference reward which is a running average of all previous personal rewards.
Soft goal equations The domain-dependent functions used to determine the achievement levels of
the soft goals. For a description of how they are used generically see Section 3.1.1.1 (page
74); for the specific soft goal equations used in our implementation see Section 4.1.2.3 (page
115). For example, if the soft goal is “have friends”, the equation to determine the quantitative
achievement level could be based on such beliefs as: number of people the agent likes, number
of people who like the agent, or a combination of these beliefs.
Soft goal personality The soft goals this agent is trying to achieve, the importance levels it places
on the goals, and the ideal value of each goal, see Section 3.1.3.2 (page 80). Once set for an
agent, this will not change. For example, in one domain the agents may be able to have the soft
goals “not be hungry” and “have money”. One possible soft goal personality is that the agent
places a high importance on “not be hungry” and a medium importance on “have money”.
Importance is a number on a scale of [0, 1], where 1 represents a soft goal that the agent really
wants to achieve, and 0 is one they do not care whether they achieve or not. For each of the
soft goals that the agent is trying to achieve, an ideal or maximum value is specified. For
example, one agent may consider “have money” achieved when they have $100,000, another
may believe they need $1 million.
Soft goals Soft goals are a set of potentially conflicting goals that the agent is attempting to achieve at
every step, see Section 3.1.1 (page 73). Plans may contribute partially to achieving a number
of different soft goals. Some examples of soft goals are: have friends, have money and not
being hungry. Agents do not initially know how to achieve their soft goals, they must learn.
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For example, if the soft goal is to “have friends”, the designer developed domain-dependent
goal/plan hierarchy does not need to have a plan that can directly achieve this, i.e. there is
no need for a plan called “make friends”. Plans such as “interact” or “give away something”
may improve the achievement of the soft goal, but this can only be learnt based on feedback
from trial and error.
Sub-plan Some plans require more hard goals to be posted to finish the plan. These goals will be
handled by sub-plans. These are plans that are beneath the originating plan in the goal/plan
hierarchy. For example, to achieve “make something” the goal “choose what to make” is
achieved by implementing a sub-plan such as “make bread”, see Figure 3.2 (page 78).
Top-level Activity A plan that is very high up in the goal/plan hierarchy. It should be something
that has a long enough duration that the agent’s domain-dependent beliefs will have changed
and the agent can perform an evaluation of what has happened. For example, it would be
difficult to perform an evaluation after a small step, such as choosing who to talk to. A suitable
top-level activity would be a longer interaction, such as actually having an entire conversation
with a character. In our implementation, the agents have three top-level activities: “move”,
“insult” and “wait”, see Figure 4.2 (page 106).
Weight Used for soft goals, also known as importance. This is a number on a scale of [0, 1], where
1 represents a soft goal that the agent really wants to achieve, and 0 is one they do not care
whether they achieve or not. It is part of soft goal personality, see Section 3.1.3.2 (page 80).
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Abstract
Personality is a key component of characters that inhabit immersive vir-
tual environments, such as games and virtual agent applications. In or-
der to be distinguishable from other characters in the environment, each
character should have its own personality in the form of different observ-
able behaviour, not solely in its physical appearance or animation. Pre-
vious work in this field has mostly relied on time-consuming, handcrafted
characters and static, trait-based approaches to personality. Our goal is a
method to develop complex, individual personalities without handcrafting
every behaviour. Unlike most implemented versions of personality theories,
cognitive-social theories of personality address how personality is developed
and adapts throughout childhood and over our lifetimes. Cognitive-social
theories also emphasise the importance of situations in determining how
we behave. From this basis, we believe that personality should be individ-
ual, adaptive, and based on context. Characters in current state-of-the-art
games and virtual environments do not demonstrate all of these features
without extensive handcrafting.
We propose a model where personality influences both decision-making and
evaluation of reward. Characters use their past experiences in the form
of simple somatic markers, or gut-instinct, to make decisions; and deter-
mine rewards based on their own personal goals, rather than via external
feedback. We evaluated the model by implementation of a simple game
and tested it using quantitative criteria, including a purpose-designed in-
dividuality measure. Results indicate that, although characters are given
the same initial personality template, it is possible to develop different per-
sonalities (in the form of behaviour) based on their unique experiences in
the environment and relationships with other characters. This work shows
a way forward for more automated development of personalities that are
individual, context-aware and adapt to users and the environment.
1
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As virtual worlds become more complex and visually believable, there is an expecta-
tion that the characters that inhabit these worlds likewise evolve to match their world.
Personality is a key component of believable characters (Mateas, 1997). Often person-
ality is approached from an animation point of view (e.g. Stuart, 2007) to the exclusion
of considering how personality affects behaviour or reasoning. Visual appearance of
a character can give the false impression of an underlying difference between charac-
ters. However, over time, character differences will only be noticed if they result in
differences to observable behaviour. Personality should affect the way a character eval-
uates its personal success, makes decisions and, as a direct result, how the character
behaves in the world. Within the field of games and virtual agents, there are many
implementations of personality. Usually these implementations require handcrafting
each individual character in a way that is not suitable for large numbers of characters,
or rely on a set of fixed archetypes where every character within the type is exactly
the same. As a result, environments with large numbers of characters often develop
characters that do not withstand close inspection. We aim to develop a method of
automatically generating individual characters with their own unique personalities in
order to create more believable characters in virtual environments with large numbers
of interactive characters.
Personality should be unique for each character, i.e. individual. Cognitive-social
theories of personality address how personality is developed throughout our lifetimes.
According to these theories, two essential components of personality are that it should
be able to adapt or change; and that situation or context is important in determining
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how we behave. That is, in real life, people react differently in different contexts based
on their past experience and the underlying goals they are trying to achieve. The term
context could relate to a physical location or other participants in the activity. We will
be looking at the case where context relates to how close the character believes it is to
achieving its goals. For example, one context could be that the character has achieved
one of its goals, but not another. Over time people adapt their behaviour based on past
experience of different contexts. People will adapt and change their own behaviour, and
to some extent their personality, based on other people they interact with and changes
in the environment. Characters within current state-of-the-art games and virtual agent
environments do not demonstrate all of these features unless explicitly handcrafted to
do so. We will be concentrating on observed personality as a sufficient requirement
instead of “actual” personality. We do this because human users interacting with these
characters can only distinguish characters based on their observed behaviour. From
this basis of cognitive-social personality theories, we believe that personality should be:
individual, adaptive, and based on goal context. We now present our motivation for this
thesis followed by a description of the research questions that will be addressed within
this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
This thesis addresses important issues about how to make game characters and virtual
agents more realistic or believable by using cognitive-social personality theories. We
begin motivation by discussing two examples. The first is from a television series and
the second is a more concrete example that will be used throughout the thesis to explain
concepts and the model. These examples represent the ideal goal of our work. After
these examples have been presented, we discuss where the theories that motivate this
work have come from, as well as why games and virtual agents are in need of the work
presented here.
Our first example come from the new version of Battlestar Galactica (by the SciFi
channel) which is about a future war between humans and Cylons. Cylons are similar
to robots and have been built by humans according to the back story. Some Cylons
have been built to look like humans externally. There are 12 different “models” of
these human-looking Cylons. A model includes the physical appearance of the Cylon
4
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(a) Boomer (b) Athena (c) Number Eight (d) Copies of Model 8
Figure 1.1: Model Eight from Battlestar Galactica (produced by the SciFi channel):
There are many copies of model Eight (also known as Sharon Valerii). Each copy is
generated from the same template, and yet takes on its own unique personality1.
and some personality characteristics. There are many Cylon copies built of each of the
models, so that externally each of these Cylons can appear to be the same “person”
at first glance, e.g. Figure ??. However, each individual Cylon, or copy, from the
same model is able to build up their own memories based on their experience and this
changes their future behaviour and eventual personality.
We look at the example of model number “Eight”, Sharon Valerii, see Figure ??.
Within the series we are introduced to this character without realising she is a Cylon. In
fact, she does not realise herself that she is a Cylon until later in the story. As the series
progresses, we are introduced to other copies of number Eight. Each copy has her own
experiences and after many episodes we are able to distinguish at least three different
“Sharons”. The first Sharon we meet is nicknamed “Boomer”, Figure 1.1(a). Boomer
has a romantic relationship with the chief human engineer but eventually sides with
Cylons against the humans. Next is Athena (figure 1.1(b)), who has always known
she was a Cylon, unlike Boomer. Athena fights on the side of the humans, is in a
relationship with a human and has a child with him. There are also many copies who
remain with the main Cylon attacking force. Mostly these copies are indistinguishable
from each other. However, as the series progresses the “head” of the number Eights
shows increasing interest in Athena, to the point that she downloads Athena’s memories
1Figures a and c taken from http://www.thescifiworld.net/interviews/grace_park_02.htm;
Figure b from http://www.imdb.com/media/rm4068644352/tt0407362; Figure d from http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Battlestar_Galactica_1x12_Number_Eights.jpg
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and yet still remains different from Athena. This copy also heads a group of Cylons
who want to help the humans rather than destroy them.
What is interesting about this example is that the unknown designers of the number
Eight model set in place only one personality template. The different copies become
distinguishable based on their own experience, with no extra input from the designers.
The designers are able to generate a personality template for each model and then
allow copies to become their own individuals over time, while retaining some behaviour
similar to the other copies within that model number. This example is motivating
because the designers handcraft only twelve Cylon models and yet each of the many
Cylon copies can have its own individual personality. This ability to produce many
different characters from a handful of templates represents the overall goal of this thesis,
i.e. to be able to generate individual characters with personality without handcrafting
all behaviour.
To motivate our work further, we describe an example of an ideal virtual environ-
ment that could be built using the techniques that are developed in this thesis. This
example or vignette will be used throughout the thesis to explain concepts and the
model.
1.1.1 Motivating Vignette
Imagine a virtual world populated with diverse characters who live in villages and
who each have their own personality distinguishable from others. Usually in this kind
of world, the personality templates that are used become visible to a game player
after prolonged interaction with the world. For instance, if you have met the baker in
one village and travel to another village, you will probably meet essentially the “same”
baker. Imagine if this new baker still had many of the core traits of the other baker, but
had a different personality, i.e was recognisably different. For example, the baker in the
first village might sing while serving his customers, while the second might be sullen and
grumpy towards his customers, but may make better quality bread. Finally, imagine
that these differences are not handcrafted, but are automatically developed based on
each character’s personal experience with other characters, including the player, and
the world. Further, if something changes in the world, such as a stranger entering it,
the characters’ personalities will change over time to reflect their new experiences. For
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example, if the stranger is very hostile existing characters will change their behaviour
around the stranger and perhaps with other characters as well.
This is the world we are attempting to achieve.
Let us look at this example in more detail, since we will be using it as a case
study throughout the thesis, beginning by looking at how to build one village. In
our goal model, a limited number of carefully crafted personality templates would be
designed. A personality template includes information about how the character reacts
to events, what their personal goals are and the actions or choices available to it within
the world. These personality templates form the building blocks of all the characters.
Characters that have the same initial personality template will not necessarily have the
same resulting personality, similarly to identical twins and Cylons gaining their own
experience and becoming different from their twin or, in the case of Cylons, their model
number. Personality is generally considered to be a result of both nature and nurture.
In our goal model, the personality template represents a character’s nature, whereas
experiences in the environment represent a character’s nurture.
Using these personality templates, we generate a large number of characters for
our initial village. Then we allow the characters to interact with each other and learn
how to achieve their personal goals. This allows them to take on roles within the
village, such as butcher, baker or candlestick maker. Characters learn which action
they prefer to take and how they prefer to execute the actions. These preferences are
different depending on the character’s perceived context or state of its current goals.
For example, when a character is not achieving its goal to make friends, it may prefer to
talk to someone new, whereas when it has many friends it may prefer to do something
different. Characters with the same personality template will not be exactly the same.
This is because of the different relationships developed and the different methods the
characters have found to achieve the common goals. Now we have a village full of
interesting characters who all have their own history and relationships with the other
characters.
Next we use the same starting personality templates, but with a different random
seed, for a second village. Again we allow the characters to interact with each other and
develop their preferences and personalities. We now have a new village full of interesting
and different characters, and yet these characters will be observably different from the
characters in the original village. A human player who walks between the two villages
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will see some similarities, but will not be faced with “the baker” who is always the
same in every village. For example, in one village the candlestick maker and the baker
might be married, in another village they may never have met.
Villages will be able to generate a community personality of their own. For example,
if all the characters have a goal to make sure everyone is not hungry, then one village
might rely on giving away goods for free and then receiving other goods for free, whereas
another village works only by the use of money or bartering. If a baker is trying to be
generous and giving away bread, it will still need meat and candles. Unless the other
characters cooperate and give it these items, it may become hungry or will not have
light.
The villages will not be able to function well unless the roles of ‘butcher’, ‘baker’,
and ‘candlestick maker’ are filled (there may be more roles in an actual game). However,
who takes each of these roles is not defined by the personality template; it is discovered
by the character as a suitable way of achieving their personal goals. For instance, the
goal of making money could be achieved by any of these roles, but would probably
not be successful unless the character specialises in only one of the roles. The model
proposed in this thesis reflects the real world, where some personality “types” are
more inclined towards certain professions or roles. However, personality is more than
someone’s job. The way that a character executes their role and their overall behaviour
informs the observer of their entire unique personality.
One issue encountered in the games industry, is that characters capable of learning
can be considered risky because they may develop new behaviour that may offend the
players or change the gameplay significantly. The benefit of this model is that since
the personality template restricts the actions available to the character (and this does
not change over time), the character’s actions cannot become entirely unpredictable.
That is, characters cannot generate new actions, they can simply choose differently.
What gives the diversity and appearance of a level of unpredictability is the choices
the character makes and its preferences for those actions. An individual character, if
watched, will eventually become predictable in their actions. However, if a player sees a
character of the same personality type they will not be able to entirely predict the new
character’s behaviour without watching it for some time. By using the model in this
way, characters will not be able to generate “dangerous” or unconstrained behaviour
that becomes unsuitable in a shipped product.
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1.1.2 Motivation from Psychology and Personality Theories
When considering the motivation to pursue this topic, we need to establish why per-
sonality should be an important aspect of any virtual character. Chuck Jones, a car-
toonist for Warner Brothers, found that in creating believable characters, personality
is the most important aspect: it is “the individual, the oddity, the peculiarity that
counts” (Jones, 1994, p.14). Personality and emotions have been successfully used as
“filters to constrain the decision process when selecting and instantiating the agent’s
behaviours” (Andre´ et al., 1999). Personality can be considered as the engine that
generates reactions and responses in a coherent, consistent and predictable manner
(Ortony, 2002).
We believe that personality is visible in the observed behaviour of characters. There-
fore, the action a character chooses out of many possibilities should be a reflection of
the character’s personality. Differences in behaviour for the same person and for dif-
ferent people are due to a number of factors including emotionality (differences in
emotional reactions to events), current state and interpretations of the world situa-
tion (Ortony, 2002). Or, according to another theory (Lazarus, 1994), people respond
differently to similar events depending on their individual goal hierarchies and per-
ceived current context of themselves and the world. That is, behaviour or responses
are context-dependent. We believe that context should be based on the current level
of achievement of goals. For example, if a character currently has a lot of money but
no friends, it may achieve his goals better if it gives away food, rather than selling it.
We will take these concepts into consideration when building our model for personality
that generates behaviour.
Trait-based theories of personality are popular for virtual characters. However,
trait-based theories assume that personality is static and unchanging, and offer no ex-
planation of how personality is developed Cervone & Pervin (2008). Although this may
be appropriate for many environments, it assumes that the designer is able to develop
a suitably complex personality for every character in the environment and predict the
situations the character will encounter. Cognitive-social theories of personality (for
example Bandura’s social learning theory (Bandura, 1977)) address the issue of per-
sonality development. If we allow characters to develop their own personality according
to cognitive-social theories, then we will be able to use a simple template to generate
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many different complex personalities. This process will hopefully reduce the burden on
the designer.
Cognitive-social theories believe in reciprocal determinism: that is, behaviour re-
sults from the complex interaction of persons and the environment, rather than from
any single factor alone (Bandura, 1977). Hence, people are neither driven by inner
forces nor buffeted by environmental stimulus. The traditional view of behaviour in-
teraction is that a person’s behaviour is a function of the person and the environment.
However, people’s actions contribute to the overall environment, which will in turn
reflect behaviour in a reciprocal fashion (Bandura, 1977). In our village example, if
one character gives away food it may cause those around it to also give away food,
i.e. the environment has changed because of one character’s behaviour. Experiences
that a character generates through their own behaviour will affect what a person be-
comes. That is, if a person tries to bake bread (behaviour), and they are successful,
they may continue to do this (changing the person). Both the person and the environ-
ment will in turn affect subsequent behaviour (Bandura, 1977). There are three main
types of learning according to Bandura, by response consequences, through modeling,
and self-reinforcement (Bandura, 1977). People learn and adapt via these mechanisms
throughout their lives. Further, according to cognitive-social theories, behaviour is not
determined by global traits, behaviour depends on the situation that the person is in
(Cervone & Pervin, 2008).
An inspiration for this thesis comes from Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis
(Damasio, 1994). According to this hypothesis, emotions in the form of “gut instinct”,
called somatic markers, guide the decisions we make. Without somatic markers it
would be a struggle to interact rationally with other people (Damasio, 1994). Somatic
markers are built up automatically throughout our lives, so that when faced with a
possible decision in a particular context, they guide us towards or away from certain
choices. After this (often unconscious) elimination process, we are able to make a more
studied analysis of choices available in order to decide which to choose.
Cognitive-social theories and the somatic marker hypothesis represent ways that
real humans interact with other humans. Somatic markers represent an aspect of per-
sonality, in that our gut instinct guides us towards certain choices in a way that is
different from how another person may be guided. Somatic markers are based on past
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experience, and we will use cognitive-social learning theories to inform how our charac-
ters acquire these somatic markers. This acquisition process and using somatic markers
for decision-making is based on the character’s context, to reflect that people choose
different actions in different situations. In our thesis, we implement a combination of
learning by self-reinforcement and by response consequences using a reinforcing func-
tion to build up actual somatic marker values and therefore influence behaviour and
the environment.
From cognitive-social theories and the somatic marker hypothesis, we believe that
personality is unique to each individual, it should adapt to the environment and should
be context dependent. As we will show, these factors are not fully implemented in
current computer games and virtual characters.
1.1.3 Motivation from Virtual Agents Domain
Virtual agents can be seen in a number of application areas, from military simulations to
pedagogical environments to embodied conversational agents. Believability is one of the
key goals for most research groups in this area. Believability will make the characters
more engaging and users will have a more enjoyable experience (Johnson et al., 2000).
Characters that have unrealistic behaviour are more noticeable and distract users from
the virtual world (Johnson et al., 2000).
It has been thought for a long time that the use of emotions in virtual environments
improves decision-making and believability of characters (Minsky, 1986). Over the past
fifteen years, there has been increasing use of emotions to improve realism and believ-
ability of intelligent agents in the agent research field with much initial success. This
research by others into how to implement emotions in virtual agents is important, but
often does not fully address the issue of how to implement personality. Personality gives
life to characters, not emotions (Lim et al., 2005). Some research has concentrated on
how to animate characters with their own personality, i.e. change the visual appearance
of behaviour. Our work concentrates on how to imbue the character’s decision-making
and evaluation processes with their own personality without handcrafting every step.
We believe this will contribute to character believability. We concentrate on imple-
menting personality that is unique to each individual; adaptive over time; and reflects
the context the character is in.
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In the virtual agents domain, most characters developed can generally be considered
to be individuals. However, this is often because there are no other characters to
compare against, or because the individuality has been handcrafted, for example, the
Oz project (Mateas, 1997). The Oz project gave equal attention to believable characters
and story or interactive drama. However, the characters were handcrafted to obtain
the desired effects.
Most implementations of personality are based on trait-based theories, such as the
popular Five Factor Model (McCrae & John, 1992), and are static with respect to
time and contexts. However, personality does develop over time, particularly during
childhood experiences or when the environment itself changes in a substantial and long
term manner. For instance, a character that is constantly ignored would be expected to
change its behaviour over time to reflect this. Over extended periods of time, characters
will be more compelling if they appear to learn from experience (Blumberg et al., 2002).
However, characters should adapt in a way that is consistent with their personality
(Mateas, 1997). Characters such as Blumberg’s dog (Isla et al., 2001) can adapt, but
not in conjunction with its personality and only when taught explicitly by the user, i.e.
not by itself. Static implementations of personality do not provide support for context-
aware behaviour. In a static implementation, the number of starting personalities is
the same as the final number of personalities. Since the characters cannot learn, their
personalities will be fixed over time, so two characters with the same personality will
behave the exact same way without any variations unless explicitly included. In order
to present a believable complex personality, characters should be seen to make decisions
based on their past experience via adaptation, and based on their perceived context.
1.1.4 Motivation from Games Domain
The model we seek to build will ideally contribute to the body of work in computer
games. However, much of the academic work in emotions, personality, agents and learn-
ing is difficult to implement. Learning techniques are often complex for a lay-person
to understand, can result in unpredictable behaviour, require significant computational
power and require handcrafting of individuals. This results in making many models
unsuitable for use in games.
Many recent computer games include large numbers of computer-controlled char-
acters, such as in Grand Theft Auto, The Sims, and Oblivion. In many cases, these
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characters have been created using a limited number of handcrafted personality “types”
or archetypes (Ellinger, 2008). Every character with a particular personality type is
essentially the same and not distinguishable from others of the same type, that is the
characters are not individuals and appear homogeneous (Russell, 2008). For example,
the player can meet someone in a store in one part of town, move to another part of
town and essentially meet the same character again, even though they are supposed
to be different people. The longer a player spends in the world the more likely these
similarities will be noticed and will decrease the player’s enjoyment of the game due to
excessive repetition and predictability of behaviour.
A different approach is used in some other games, such as Half-Life 2 where the
player is required to work with a single computer-controlled character for much of
the duration of the game. In Half-Life 2, the character is explicitly scripted so that its
behaviour will change throughout the game. Unless this scripting is implemented by the
designer, the character will not be able to adapt its behaviour over time and can result
in the appearance of one-dimensional characters. In Black and White, the creature
character can adapt, however it is only via the explicit teachings or reinforcements
of the player, and not independently or in conjunction with its personality. In-game
learning is probably only suitable for characters that the player interacts with for
prolonged periods of time. However, learning prior to shipping the game will allow
unique characters to emerge and will improve the diversity of characters a player meets,
even if the player only has a short interaction with the character.
To be believable, characters should behave differently depending on their context.
Within games, the characters can only recognise different contexts if the game developer
has explicitly included that capacity with hand-scripting. For example, many characters
are developed using finite state machines. If the character is in a particular state
(e.g. surrounded by enemies), it will perform one action; if it is in another state,
it will perform a different action. However, these differences must be hard-coded by
the designer, who must consider each and every state and all the action possibilities
available to the character. In our ideal model, the character would be able to learn
which actions are appropriate for it personally on its own without enforced player
interaction or hard-coding preferences.
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1.2 Research Questions
Personality can give life to virtual characters. However, current applications of person-
ality require a large amount of handcrafting. We seek to reduce the amount of hand-
crafting required for a designer to build many individual characters. That is, this thesis
aims to answer the question: How can characters with personality be created without
handcrafting all behaviour? In addressing this question, we believe that cognitive-social
personality theories offer a method of developing characters based on their individual
experiences. Cognitive-social theories maintain that personality is both adaptive and
context-aware (situated). By common definition, each personality is unique. So a
requirement of personality itself is that characters should be individuals. These re-
quirements lead to the following research questions:
1. How can a model of personality be created that uses adaptation? How does
adaptation affect character behaviour?
2. How can a model of personality be created that uses context? How does context
affect character behaviour?
3. How can personality be implemented so that the same template can be used to
create a number of distinct, individual characters who behave differently?
These research questions can be broken down into a set of sub-questions relating to
creating the model and testing the model: model-based and testing-based.
1. Adaptation:
• Model-based sub-questions:
– What aspects of personality can adapt?
– How are decisions made?
– How can characters calculate reward?
– How can characters use reward to update behaviour?
• Testing-based sub-questions:
1.(a) Does behaviour change over time?
1.(b) Can characters learn about specific, functional goals?
1.(c) How does reward change with time?
1.(d) What happens if adaptation is turned off?
2. Context:
• Model-based sub-questions:
14
1.2 Research Questions
– How can context be represented?
– How can we fill in context information?
• Testing-based sub-questions:
2.(a) Is character behaviour different in different contexts?
2.(b) What happens if context is turned off?
3. Individual:
• Model-based sub-questions:
– What is an individual within our model?
– What is a personality template?
– How does personality change over time (i.e. how can a character be
different from another character with the same template)?
• Testing-based sub-questions:
3.(a) Are the behaviours of characters different from each other over time?
3.(b) Are any individuals obtained?
The model-based sub-questions can be answered by defining terms appropriately
and implementing the model in an application. It is not possible to measure the valid-
ity of these subjective answers directly, the model itself is the “answer”. To determine
whether the model developed is successful, we implement a game to be run with many
different starting conditions, we consider sub-questions relating to testing and establish
a set of criteria for success. From the runs of the game, we can extract data relating to
three quantifiable measures of effectiveness: behaviour, reward and individuality. Be-
haviour relates to what the player can see on the screen, the actions that the characters
choose to execute. In particular, we count the number of times that characters choose
different actions over regular output time periods. Reward relates to how well the
character is achieving their own goals according to their own personal evaluation. High
reward values mean that the character is achieving its personal goals in the current
environment. Individuality measures the number of differences between all characters
in the game based on their behaviour. The maximum number for individuality implies
that each and every character is completely different from every other character in the
game, in the respect that they choose different actions at the same time periods.
Using behaviour, reward and individuality as measures of effectiveness of the model,
led to a set of quantitative criteria for success the model should satisfy to be determined
successful. Each criterion for success addresses a specific testing-based research sub-
question as shown in Table 1.1. We recognise that the choice of the majority as a cut-off
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Research Questions and Criteria for Success
Testing-based Sub-questions
1. How does adaptation affect character behaviour?
1.(a) Does behaviour change over time? Behaviour changes over time.
1.(b) Can characters learn about spe-
cific, functional goals?
When given a functional goal to learn,
the majority of characters choose the
“correct” action the majority of the
time, based on behaviour.
1.(c) How does reward change with
time?
Reward values are on average higher
using our model than when random
choice is used.
1.(d) What happens if adaptation is
turned off?
Compared to when adaptation is
turned off, both individuality and re-
ward are higher when adaptation is
used.
2. How does context affect character behaviour?
2.(a) Does character behaviour differ in
different contexts?
For one character’s behaviour, show
that in different contexts the action
chosen the majority of times is differ-
ent.
2.(b) What happens if context is turned
off?
Compared to when context is turned
off; both individuality and reward are
higher when context is used.
3. How can personality be implemented so that the same template can be used to
create a number of distinct, individual characters, according to their behaviour?
3.(a) Are the behaviours of characters
different from each other over time?
Character behaviour passes the chi-
squared test.
3.(b) Are any individuals obtained? Based on their individuality, at least
one character is different from the ma-
jority of the other characters when they
are all based on the same template.
Table 1.1: Criteria for success to be used to evaluate testing-based research sub-questions.
Words in italics are the measures of effectiveness.
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for some of the criteria is somewhat arbitrary. Having at least the majority of characters
demonstrate a desirable behaviour shows that they are behaving as intended. We simply
use the majority as initial criteria so that we can quantitatively rate the model that is
designed and implemented in this thesis. Note that a chi-squared test measures whether
the characters’ behaviour (actions over time) are actually independent from each other.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This thesis begins with a literature survey of related work and introduces pertinent
theories. This allows us to place our work within the broader research field and explain
the theories that are used in our personality model. After the literature survey, we
introduce our model for agent personality development, Chapter 3. This chapter details
the key components that characters need, as well as the adaptation loop that characters
use to make decisions and evaluate their choices. It shows how we use cognitive-social
theories and somatic markers to develop personality that affects decision-making and
evaluation. The model is generic and can be applied to many domains. We detail how
to build individual characters and how to attach domain-dependent specifics to the
generic model.
To test our model, we developed an example game domain. The game developed
is based on simplistic school children who can insult each other and move around
their world. Limited implementations have been shown to generate large numbers
of possible paths or actions for characters (Theune et al., 2004). Within our simple
game implementation, we were able to generate a large amount of complexity due to
interactions between characters. In order to determine success of the model in terms of
being able to generate different individuals from the same personality template, we use
three measures of effectiveness: behaviour, reward and individuality. In Chapter 4 we
introduce our implemented game, discuss our experimental setup, including how the
measures of effectiveness are obtained, present our method for answering the research
questions, the scenarios used and consider expected results.
In Chapter 5, we present our results to the testing-based research questions as well
as some interesting side results that we found while answering the research questions.
Results are based on the criteria for success and the measures of effectiveness. The side
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results relate to domain-dependent aspects of our implementation. In this chapter we
also discuss the implications of the results obtained.
In the final chapter results are summarised, particularly in relation to the research
questions. We discuss future directions for research, implications for the game industry,
and contributions made by our agent personality development model.
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Literature Survey
In this chapter we explore previous work related to this thesis that has both inspired
and informed our research. This places the research presented in this thesis within
the broader context of agents, games, adaptation, and personality theories. We begin
with an overview of some of the concepts used in our model that are explained in
greater detail in Chapter 3. This overview of our model will motivate why we present
only certain theories in this chapter. After this overview, we introduce the theories
pertinent to our research, followed by applications of these theories.
Our model of personality draws from cognitive-social theories that suggest one way
we learn is via self-reinforcement based on past experience. Hence, past experience
forms a core part of personality in our model. This past experience influences decision-
making, so that the choice of what to do depends on the success of what was done
last time this context was perceived. Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio,
1994) offers an explanation of how past experience influences decision-making. Somatic
markers act as context-dependent preferences that guide decisions towards or away from
specific actions or choices.
Characters use the Beliefs, Desires, Intentions (BDI) agent paradigm to represent
how they reason. We use the BDI paradigm because it relates explicitly to goals, success
and reasoning, and uses terminology that allows behaviour to be explained easily. An
adaptation loop or learning loop is integrated into the standard BDI execution loop so
that characters can develop their own personalities. To generate and update somatic
markers, characters use a learning loop and calculate a self-reinforcement value or
personal reward and use a simple reinforcement learning technique from Sutton &
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Barto (1998), called the reinforcement comparison technique (see Section 2.1.4.2, page
40). An agent (the reasoning part of a character) uses learning to determine which
action is the most appropriate choice, given its current personal context. Based on
the character’s experience, it builds up a database of which actions it prefers above
others for a given context, i.e. it builds up its somatic markers. Character personality
is visible in the choices the character makes between activities and the sub-plans it
chooses to execute its chosen action.
After a character has completed an activity, it then evaluates the success or failure
of this activity at helping it achieve its own overall goals. This self-evaluation allows
the character to update its preferences, i.e. the character uses self-reinforcement. In
addition to influencing choices made, personality also influences how to evaluate the
success or failure of an activity. For example, one character may consider having a lot
of money as success whereas another may want to have a lot of friends. To model this
other aspect of personality in our model, we use soft goals to evaluate success or failure
of completed activities. Soft goals are goals that should be achieved, but the character
initially has no explicit knowledge of how to achieve these goals.
Based on the introductory chapter and this brief overview, the key theories that
our model draws from are: agents, personality theories, somatic marker hypothesis, and
adaptation or learning techniques. We begin the literature survey by introducing these
theories. This is then followed by examining applications from games and intelligent
virtual agents that use these theories and inform our model.
2.1 Theories
In this section of the literature survey we discuss theories and techniques relevant to
this thesis, as well as theories used by other applications in the field of intelligent virtual
agents and computer games. We begin by explaining theories and methods relating to
agents. Then we discuss psychological and cognitive science theories of personality.
The background to Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis is explained, followed by a
discussion of techniques used for adaptation and learning. In particular, reinforcement
learning is discussed as this is relevant to enable characters to adapt their behaviour
preferences.
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2.1.1 Agent Theories
In this section we describe theories, techniques and definitions that are used for “agents”
and intelligent virtual agents (IVAs). There are a variety of definitions of an agent in
the literature. We use the term “agent” to refer to the reasoning part of a character,
rather than the visual appearance. Agents are rational and model human behaviour.
A common position, that we adopt, is that agents have the following properties (from
(Padgham & Winikoff, 2004)):
• situated: exist in an environment;
• autonomous: behave independently and not controlled externally, i.e. they make
their own decision on which actions to implement;
• reactive: respond in a timely manner to changes in the environment;
• proactive: persistently pursue goals;
• flexible: have multiple ways to achieve goals;
• robust: recover from failure;
• social: interact with other agents.
We begin this section by explaining the beliefs, desires, intentions (BDI) agent paradigm
that models how agents reason about the world. This is followed by an exploration of
the different goal types that are used in the literature and within this thesis. We
then explain the core aspects of the cognitive appraisal model of emotions that is used
by many intelligent virtual agents applications. We finish by describing methods to
measure believability of characters in games and virtual worlds.
2.1.1.1 Beliefs, Desires, Intentions (BDI) Agents
This thesis uses the Beliefs, Desires, Intentions (BDI) paradigm of agent programming.
In this paradigm, based on work by Rao & Georgeff (e.g. Rao & Georgeff, 1995), agents
function in a manner similar to the way people normally reason about themselves. This
makes it easier for designers to understand and therefore debug characters, as well as
making it easier for players to understand why a character behaves the way it does. BDI
techniques map well to problems where there is no clear solution (Norling, 2004), such
as games where there are multiple ways to achieve the same goal. In the BDI paradigm,
an agent stores beliefs or knowledge about themselves and their environment. The agent
also has a number of desires that represent states it is trying to achieve. Desires can
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Figure 2.1: Generic goal/plan hierarchy: each goal can be handled by one of three plans.
Each plan is implemented by achieving two sub-goals.
also have payoffs associated with them (Rao & Georgeff, 1995), e.g. some desires are
considered more important than others. The set of desires that the agent is currently
committed to achieve are termed goals. Goals are a subset of desires and must be able
to be achieved simultaneously. Whereas the desires of an agent may contain conflicting
goals (Thangarajah et al., 2002). In Kru¨mpelmann et al. (2008), a motivation factor
induces a pre-ordering of desires, so that an agent is able to choose a single goal to
pursue at a time.
Once the agent has chosen a goal to attempt to achieve initially, it forms an inten-
tion, or plan, to achieve it. Plans represent ways that an agent can achieve their goals
(and consequently desires). Plans have an invocation condition to specify the triggering
event (relevant goal) that the plan handles. Plans also can have a precondition that
specifies the situation that must hold for the plan to be executable (Rao & Georgeff,
1995).
For example, an agent, called Gina, believes she is not talking to anyone currently
and is not reading. She desires to talk to someone and also to read a book by herself.
Based on her reasoning model, she chooses the goal to talk. She cannot simultaneously
choose to talk and to read a book, since she is not able to do both at the same time.
Since she has chosen to achieve the goal “talk”, she must now choose how she will
achieve this goal. So, based on her reasoning model, she chooses a plan to achieve the
goal of talking to someone, such as the plan “have a conversation”.
Agents designed using the BDI paradigm have a number of goals that they can
achieve, as well as a number of different plans that can achieve these goals. The
designer explicitly links plans to the goal they handle, and specifies whether plans
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require further sub-goals to be achieved. These links between goals and plans are
usually represented in a goal/plan hierarchy. Figure 2.1 shows a generic version of a
goal/plan hierarchy according to BDI methods. In the hierarchy shown, the agent has
a top-level goal it wants to achieve. It can do this by implementing any of the three
available plans or activities. Each plan has two sub-goals that must both be achieved
for the plan to succeed. In turn, each sub-goal can be achieved by choosing one of three
plans. For example, if the top-level goal is to have a conversation, the agent can do
this by choosing from three plans: talking to a friend, or an enemy, or someone they
have not met before. Once they have chosen to talk to a friend, they would need to
achieve the goals of choosing what to say and ending the conversation. Note that in
real-world examples the goal/plan hierarchy developed is not usually as symmetric as
our example.
By structuring goals and plans into this hierarchy, the designer is able to provide
the agent with a large number of ways to achieve its top-level goal. If the goal/plan
hierarchy has a depth of D (based on number of goal levels), always has C plans
applicable for each goal, and S sub-goals for each plan, then the number of ways
in which a goal at the top of a goal/plan hierarchy can be achieved is (Padgham &
Winikoff, 2004):
C(
SD−1
S−1 ) (2.1)
In the generic goal/plan hierarchy in Figure 2.1, C = 3; S = 2 and D = 2, so the
number of ways that the top-level goal can be achieved is 3(
22−1
2−1 ) = 27. This enables
greater variety in behaviour without requiring these paths to be coded explicitly.
In the BDI paradigm, each agent uses a standard execution loop (d’Inverno et al.,
2004; Rao & Georgeff, 1995) to act within the world, see Figure 2.2. Goals are usually
represented as events in many BDI implementations. An event is a goal that is sent
by a plan or an agent and once handled by an applicable plan the event is removed,
i.e. events are usually not persistent. The loop begins with the agent observing the
world and its own internal state to determine whether there are any new, incoming,
events. The event queue is updated with this information. The next event is taken
from the event queue and the agent chooses a plan to execute using its beliefs and
goal/plan hierarchy. The set of available plans is constructed based on whether the
plan is applicable, i.e. will handle the event being considered and is valid in this world
state. For example, Gina cannot choose the plan “talk to an enemy” if she does not
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Figure 2.2: Standard BDI execution cycle.
currently have any enemies. The chosen plan is pushed onto the intention stack. The
next step of the plan that is at the top of the intention stack will be executed. This
step may involve changing the agent’s own beliefs, generating a new event (for itself of
sending an event request to another agent), or acting in the environment itself. After
this, the loop begins again and continues while the simulation is running.
Modelling agents to have beliefs, desires and intentions using the BDI paradigm
is a way of representing and generating agent behaviour that is easy for people to
understand, since it is often how we explain our own behaviour. Existing programming
languages, such as the JACK programming language, have automatic support for the
BDI paradigm (Howden et al., 2001).
2.1.1.2 Goal Types and Motivations
In the BDI paradigm there are a number of different goal types (Huber, 1999; van
Riemsdijk et al., 2008). Declarative goals are goals “to be”, where the agent wants to
reach a certain state of affairs, e.g. “have ten baked bread rolls”. Procedural goals are
goals “to do”, when the agent wants to execute actions (van Riemsdijk et al., 2008),
e.g. “bake bread”. Within these main types there are number of sub-types of goals,
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including achieve, maintain and perform. Achievement goals are where the agent wants
to be in a specific state, e.g. “be at the bakery”, whereas maintenance goals are a state
that the agent wants to maintain over a period of time, e.g. “do not be hungry”.
Perform goals are a set of actions that the agent would like to do, irrespective of their
potential outcome, e.g. “go for a stroll”. Goals are usually dropped once they are
performed, achieved or maintained for the required duration.
Given the less precise nature of personality and to reduce the designer’s burden,
we should consider goals that may not have an explicit plan that achieves them. The
model of emotions by Ortony, Clore and Collins (OCC) (see Section 2.1.1.3, page 27)
uses emotional goals that link well to personality models. According to the OCC model
of emotions, there are three types of goals people have in the real world: Active-pursuit
goals, Interest goals, and Replenishment goals (Ortony et al., 1988). Active-pursuit
goals (A-goals) are goals that a person tries to obtain, such as become a baker, or
engage in a conversation. They also represent things one wants to get done, like bake
bread. Interest goals (I-goals) are goals that are usually not pursued actively, because
one has little control over their realisation, such as preserving one’s health or that
one’s friends should prosper (Ortony et al., 1988). I-goals are situations one wants to
see happen. Replenishment goals (R-goals) are goals that wax and wane, such as hunger
and getting petrol for one’s car. R-goals are somewhat similar to maintenance goals
that are sometimes actively pursued, and other times simply monitored for failure.
In many systems, the types of supported goals are very functional such as: “bake
bread”, “engage in conversation”. These goals are easily achievable by implementation
of plans such as: “ bake sourdough bread”, “bake white bread”. Higher level A-goals
are less clear cut. For example, “have friends” could be achieved or partially achieved
by talking to someone or giving away food or other choices depending on the domain.
In some instances this may be explicitly coded by the designer, but to reduce designer
workload it makes sense to make a distinction between the low-level functional goals
and higher level goals that cannot be directly achieved in the goal/plan hierarchy. The
term “soft goals” is used to refer to these non-functional goals that do not have explicit
plans to achieve them (Braubach et al., 2004).
Soft goals are distinct from, but related to, motivations which are also used in
agent and planning research (Coddington & Luck, 2004; Norman, 1994, 1997). Work
by Coddington & Luck is applied to a planning domain, but uses similar terminology to
25
2. LITERATURE SURVEY
Norman’s BDI-based agent research to improve goal management. Motivations allow
a planner or an agent to consider time and resources in addition to the traditional
planning analysis of number of actions and outstanding goals (Coddington & Luck,
2004). Motivations reflect the drive of an agent and are used to directly generate goals
and affect plan evaluation. The current values and importance of each motivation are
linked and change in relation to physical environmental changes (Coddington & Luck,
2004). Unlike soft goals, which have both a current value and a separate importance
value, if all motivations have the same value, then they are considered equally important
to achieve. When one particular drive is not being achieved, the agent will generate
goals that will actively improve that particular motivation value. When a goal is
generated it is given a priority based on time-related deadlines as well as the current
strength of the motivation that generated it. For example, if the agent is very hungry
now, a goal to find food will be given higher priority, compared to if the agent is just
mildly hungry. These priorities values are used to determine which goal to trigger and
pursue next (Coddington & Luck, 2004; Norman, 1997).
Soft goals are high level goals that are more general than hard (standard) BDI
goals or motivations that have a clear way to achieve them. Initially, the agents have
no knowledge of how to achieve these soft goals and so they must learn, via trial
and error, which plans allow them to achieve or progress towards achieving their soft
goals. That is, the main way that characters will adapt is to learn how to achieve
their soft goals simultaneously. The soft goals that an individual agent is trying to
achieve depend upon its personality. Soft goals act somewhat like maintenance goals;
although an individual soft goal may be achieved, the agent will not drop the goal.
It will continue to ensure that its actions do not cause the goal to fail in the future.
That is, we assume that once the agent is rich, it wants to stay rich. An agent does
not seek to achieve its soft goals separately, rather they are trying to achieve all of
them simultaneously. Some soft goals may be more, or less, important than others and
therefore their perceived proximity to achieving all goals will be higher when all the
important goals are achieved, compared to when the less important goals are achieved.
Comparing soft goals and motivations we note that, although both represent high-
level goals the agent wishes to achieve, motivations are quite functional and usually
relate to essentials that the agent must achieve or satisfy Coddington & Luck (2004);
Norman (1997), such as health or resources. Whereas soft goals relate to states that we
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would like to be satisfied (some more than others), but can physically live without, e.g.
having friends. Unlike soft goals, motivations have explicitly linked goals that they can
generate when they are not achieving a particular motivation. Further, motivations
use their current value to directly give an instantiated priority to specific generated
goals and actions. Although a prediction of the improvement to soft goal achievement
values is used to determine preference (or priority) of actions, these preferences are not
explicitly programmed, but are learnt by the agent by trial and error.
2.1.1.3 Cognitive Appraisal Model
The cognitive appraisal model is used in many intelligent virtual agent applications
(e.g. Andre´ et al., 1999; Dias et al., 2005; Egges et al., 2004; Gratch & Marsella, 2004).
There are many variations on cognitive appraisal, but the main premise is that emotions
can only be updated or triggered after an appraisal of the world and events. In other
words, before an emotion is felt, a cognitive process is necessary so that incoming events
can be interpreted and meaning attached to them. For example, a dark alley can cause
fear if one remembers, perhaps subconsciously, a reason to be afraid (such as watching
a scary movie recently). Two of the most influential works are the models by Ortony,
Clore & Collins (1988) (OCC) and Lazarus (1991).
In Lazarus’s model (1991) an incoming event triggers an appraisal that then leads
to the person implementing a coping strategy to deal with the event. Coping relates
to how to think and deal with emotional encounters and appraisal relates to how to
interpret events and what strategy to use to cope. There are three types of appraisal
according to Lazarus (1991):
1. Primary appraisal: occurs when an incoming event is received. This process
analyses the event to determine the relevance to the person’s well-being.
2. Secondary appraisal: chooses between coping choices in order to determine how
to deal with emotional encounters.
3. Re-appraisal: an evaluation of feedback from the environment based on one’s own
actions and reactions.
Primary appraisal is the key to how emotional responses differ or are the same. If two
individuals appraise different situations in the same way, their emotional response will
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be the same, but “if two individuals appraise the same situation differently, their emo-
tional response will differ” (Lazarus, 1994, p.336). After an appraisal, the person deals
with the result of the appraisal via coping using: problem-focused coping or emotion-
focused coping (Lazarus, 1991). Problem-focused coping processes are generally any
form of behaviour that the agent is able to exhibit in the virtual environment, such
as gestures and actions. For example, a person who is unhappy because they do not
have a car, can work to be able to buy a car. Alternatively, the person may modify
their values so that not having a car is something to be proud of. The emotion-focused
coping process captures this second kind of mechanism and can change beliefs, desires
and intentions.
The “OCC” model was first proposed in Ortony, Clore & Collins (1988). Its main
focus is its investigation of how to break down the primary-appraisal process into parts
to describe how different emotions are generated and which variables influence the ap-
praisal process. Appraisal depends on goals, standards and attitudes (Ortony et al.,
1988). Variables that influence which emotion is triggered include desirability, praise-
worthiness and appealingness (Ortony et al., 1988). The intensity of the emotion gen-
erated depends on both local and global variables, such as reality, proximity, unexpect-
edness, arousal, likelihood, and deservingness (Ortony et al., 1988).
Cognitive appraisal models require substantial world and individual models to be
developed so that incoming events can be appraised appropriately to generate emotions
for each person and for every possible situation. Otherwise a method to generalise
events would be needed. As a minimum, to implement primary appraisal in the OCC
model, the designer needs a model of expectations (Seif El-Nasr et al., 1998), a method
to determine what the event means to the character and a goal hierarchy to calculate
desirability (Bartneck, 2002). Ortony himself later described the OCC model as “the
rather cumbersome (and to some degree arbitrary) analysis” (Ortony, 2002, p.193).
2.1.1.4 Measurement Techniques for Believability
One common approach to determining “success” of virtual characters and their model is
to rate how believable the characters are. Although there is discussion about the need
for measures other than believability (Gratch & Marsella, 2005), many applications
would still like to achieve a high level of believability of their characters and in some
cases realism. In order to measure or evaluate the subjective quantity of believability,
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an audience is needed (Mateas, 1997). People can find believability and personality
hard to judge and this is commonly due to lack of expressiveness of agents (Jan &
Traum, 2005) or other visual problems.
The dream list of what an intelligent virtual agent (IVA) should have to be be-
lievable or project the “illusion of life” is commonly thought to include personality,
emotion, relationships, making its own decisions, have roles, follow social conventions,
respond with empathy, be self-motivated, change (grow and change with time, in a
manner consistent with their personality), and an illusion of life that includes pursuing
multiple, simultaneous goals and actions (Hayes-Roth & Doyle, 1998; Mateas, 1997),
self-perception and self-esteem (Seif El-Nasr et al., 1999), reactive, situated and embod-
ied behaviour (Mateas, 1997), realistic (for real-world simulations) (Johns & Silverman,
2001), and not be entirely predictable (Henninger et al., 2003).
Ruttkay, Dormann & Noot (2002) proposed a framework to compare embodied con-
versational agents (ECAs) to each other and to traditional input methods. ECAs are
usually a “talking head” on a screen that interacts with a user, often within a func-
tional application such as providing tourist information. The framework of Ruttkay
et al. (2002) is a series of mostly subjective questions relating to the design of the
character as well as how to evaluate the character itself. The possible methods of col-
lecting empirical data are observation of users, experiment (where users are involved as
subjects in a controlled way), criteria and comparative tests, survey and online survey,
questionnaire, interview, focus group, and usage data (Ruttkay et al., 2002). Questions
cover aspects of the character including actual embodiment, representation of the mind,
how users control or interact with the character, ease of use, user satisfaction, trust, and
engagement (Ruttkay et al., 2002). Despite the breadth of this framework, it mostly
relied on non-quantifiable or subjective questions such as “In what way does the model
of the user influence the communication of the ECA?” (Ruttkay et al., 2002, p.3) or “Is
the user pleased with using the ECA?” (Ruttkay et al., 2002, p.6). Another framework
to compare characters in virtual environments (particularly military simulations) can
be found in Sandercock et al. (2004). In both frameworks the subjective nature of
the questions makes it difficult to compare applications or eliminate participant biases.
Further, these frameworks do not address questions relating to the choice and number
of subjects. Some studies have used less than ten questionnaire participants (e.g. Jan
& Traum, 2005; Rousseau & Hayes-Roth, 1997) and this seems unlikely to be able to
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establish statistical significance, particularly in light of the large number of questions
asked of the participants.
Turing Test A classic measure of artificial intelligence (AI) is the Turing Test (Tur-
ing, 1950). The original Turing Test proposed by Alan Turing related to distinguishing
a woman from a man and then whether a machine could be distinguished from a woman
(Rousseau & Hayes-Roth, 1997). Although this test is used less frequently in recent
times, game AI researchers have advocated its use, particularly for computer-controlled
opponents in first person shooters (FPS), called Bots (Glende, 2004; Laird & Duchi,
2000; Livingstone, 2006; MacInnes, 2004; Sandercock, 2004). The Turing Test places
an emphasis on the appearance of intelligence and does not constitute proof that the
computer character actually is intelligent (Livingstone, 2006). This appearance of in-
telligence is similar to the aim of believability of characters.
MacInnes (2004) used the Turing Test in a custom-built FPS game where oppo-
nents (Bots) were created using different AI techniques; finite state machines (FSM),
neural network and “Mixture of Experts”. Laird & Duchi (2000) used a Turing Test
to assess custom Bots in Quake (by id Software) to determine “humanness” and which
parameters affected perception of this.
Both Sandercock (2004) and Livingstone (2006) used the Turing Test to look for
weaknesses in Bot believability, in order to determine ways Bots can be improved.
Livingstone (2006) believed that a questionnaire is more effective when it presents
participants with two versions of a character and asks which is more believable, because
this is likely to decrease problems with some participants who always say “no” or “yes”.
Livingstone (2006) and Sandercock (2004) used extensive surveys to determine how
people made their decisions on whether the opponent was human or artificial.
When people know they are being asked to look for a Bot or a specific number of
them, their responses may be biased (Sandercock, 2004). If the participant is unaware
that a character may not be human, then they may not notice that it is a Bot (Living-
stone, 2006; Sandercock, 2004). In Sandercock’s study, to eliminate this biasing effect,
participants played a number of different games where the number of human-controlled
opponents versus computer-controlled Bots was varied without the participant’s knowl-
edge (Sandercock, 2004).
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2.1.2 Personality Theories
According to Ortony (2002), personality should be viewed as a driver of behaviour.
A key component of development, both emotional and otherwise, is an individual’s
acquisition of the personality characteristics that influence all types of appraisal and
coping (Lazarus, 1991). This acquisition process can be viewed from both the perspec-
tive of innate tendencies (nature) and variable experience (nurture) (Lazarus, 1991).
In this section, we describe common theories of personality and discuss their varying
approaches.
Personality theories attempt to understand and describe why each person is, in
certain respects, like all other people, like some other people and yet like no other
person (Kluckhohn & Murray, 1953). That is, all people are born and are part of the
world as are all other people; but there are common traits or similarities that can be
noticed amongst specific individuals or groups (Kluckhohn & Murray, 1953). However:
“The ultimate uniqueness of each personality is the product of countless
and successive interactions between the maturing constitution and different
environing situations from birth onward. An identical sequence of such
determining influences is never reproduced” (Kluckhohn & Murray, 1953,
p.55).
In this section, we discuss two of the many existing personality theories: trait-based
and cognitive-social. Although other approaches may be equally valid, trait-based
theories are used frequently in virtual agent applications and games, and cognitive-
social theories offer an explanation of how personality is developed in a way that could
be implemented in a virtual agent. According to Ortony et al. (2005), there are two
main methodologies to analysing personality and individual differences; the first seeks
to identify the dimensions by which we differ from each other, the second questions how
personality affects deeper functioning and how it is developed . The first methodology
can lead to trait-based approaches, the second methodology can lead to cognitive-social
based approaches, which offer an explanation of how personality develops.
We begin by considering trait-based theories and identify their deficiencies. Then
we introduce cognitive-social theories. Finally, we present a section on individual dif-
ferences: reasons for behavioural and personality differences between and within indi-
viduals.
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2.1.2.1 Trait-based Personality Theories
Trait-based theorists assume that people display “broad predispositions to behave in
particular ways” (Cervone & Pervin, 2008, p.236). These theories describe or label
personality types based on what we can observe in others (Ortony et al., 2005). For
example, describing a person as extroverted, shy, or aggressive. Personality traits
are identified as “consistent patterns in the way individuals behave, feel, and think”
(Cervone & Pervin, 2008, p.238). Trait-based theories assume that an individual’s
tendencies are more important than the situation they are in (Pervin et al., 2005), that
average levels of behaviour are more important than patterns of variability in action
(Cervone & Pervin, 2008). In reality, “learning can occur throughout life” (Cloninger,
2008, p.343), behaviour can change to meet needs and goals and personality itself can
change over extended periods of time (Pervin et al., 2005). Trait-based theories do
not provide an explanation to address these issues of personality development (Pervin
et al., 2005).
Trait-based theories are frequently used when constructing intelligent virtual agents
(IVAs) and characters in games (see application sections: for games see Section 2.2.1.1,
page 42; for IVAs see Section 2.2.2.1, page 51). Trait-based theories generally require
construction of a schema of key personality dimensions and these schema can be classi-
fied according to the number of dimensions chosen. Many rely on three key dimensions,
but there are several popular versions using more, for example, the Myers-Briggs type
indicator (four dimensions) (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) and the five-factor model (Mc-
Crae & John, 1992). When implementing a trait-based theory in a virtual world, the
designer must consider in detail how each dimension or trait affects behaviour, reason-
ing and appearance, then set up individual characters based on some combination of
values for each dimension. The character cannot change its traits over the course of the
game, even when there are on substantial changes to the environment. This deficiency
is addressed in cognitive-social theories.
2.1.2.2 Cognitive-Social Theories
Cognitive-social theorists believe that personality is acquired based on experiences with
the environment; and behaviour is due to the effect of environment on the person
(Pervin et al., 2005). Adult personality may generally considered to be static and
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Figure 2.3: Reciprocal determinism in cognitive-social theories: how behaviour, the per-
son and the environment influence each other (adapted from Bandura (1977)).
does not adapt or change over time; therefore appearing to be suitable to trait-based
approaches to personality. Within virtual domains, this assumption may be appropriate
if the personality model is complex enough to begin with, but this requires handcrafting
each character, or setting up several personality types. However, adopting a cognitive-
social view of personality allows the characters to develop by themselves and generate
more complex personalities. That is, the characters can simulate in some respects the
way personality develops in childhood and adolescence.
People are key to cognitive-social theories (Cervone & Pervin, 2008). People can
reason about the world, the past and the future as well as reflect about themselves
(Cervone & Pervin, 2008). They are in control of their own actions and can motivate
and direct their own actions (Cervone & Pervin, 2008). Behaviour results from the
complex interaction of persons and the environment, rather than from any single factor
alone, see Figure 2.3 (Bandura, 1977). That is, people are neither driven by inner
forces nor buffeted by environmental stimulus (Bandura, 1977). The traditional view
of behaviour interaction is that a person’s behaviour is a function of the person and
the environment. However, people’s actions and behaviour contribute to the overall
environment (Bandura, 1977). The overall environment will affect the experiences a
person has and what they become, and also their subsequent behaviour (Bandura,
1977). This mutual influence of the person, the environment, and behaviour is called
reciprocal determinism. According to cognitive-social theorists, the behaviour and
cognitive processes of individuals are different due to their learning process (Cloninger,
2008). Further, situations can be linked to different sets of cognitions and effects, and
behaviour chosen based on different situations (Cervone & Pervin, 2008).
In cognitive-social theories, “cognitions about what the world actually is like (be-
liefs), about one’s aims for the future (goals), and about how things normatively should
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be (standards) play distinct roles in personality functioning” (Cervone & Pervin, 2008,
p.469). This is similar to the BDI paradigm (see Section 2.1.1.1, page 21). The key
concepts in cognitive-social theories are listed below.
• Competencies and skills: people can do different actions differently and context
is important (Cervone & Pervin, 2008).
• Beliefs and expectancies: what the world is like and what it probably will be like
in the future (Cervone & Pervin, 2008).
• Behavioural standards: people acquire different criteria for evaluating events,
called self-evaluative reactions (Cervone & Pervin, 2008). These evaluations in-
fluence our future actions and emotions by making us “respond in an emotionally
satisfied or dissatisfied way toward ourselves” (Cervone & Pervin, 2008, p.467).
• Personal goals: people can envision the future, therefore they can make specific
goals for actions and can “motivate and direct their own behaviour” (Cervone &
Pervin, 2008, p.464).
Learning Types in Cognitive-Social Theories Traditional learning occurs by
taking action and experiencing the effects. According to Bandura (1977), a large part
of learning occurs from observing other people’s behaviour and the consequences for
them, rather than for the person who is learning. He describes three main types of
learning.
1. Learning by Response Consequences
Informative and Reinforcing Function: Observe the outcomes of your own
actions and use this as a guide for future actions. This can only reinforce
behaviour if the reward/punishment is linked to that behaviour. If the indi-
vidual does not know what is being punished, then behaviour cannot change
(Bandura, 1977).
Motivational Function: Past experience allows the individual to create expec-
tations that certain actions lead to benefits, have no appreciable effect or
maybe will avert trouble. These foreseeable outcomes can become motiva-
tors of behaviour (Bandura, 1977).
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2. Learning through Modeling
Observe others and from this form an idea of how new behaviour is formed and
subsequently use this later to guide action (Bandura, 1977).
3. Self-reinforcement
This type of learning relates to how behaviour is regulated by the interplay be-
tween self-generated and external sources of influence. Performance improves
mainly via the motivational function linked to the self-regulated reinforce-
ment (Bandura, 1977). The self-regulation process is a self-observation, then
a judgmental process followed by the self-response (Cloninger, 2008). The
reinforcement value is based on how much the individual (not an external
trainer) prefers one outcome over another (Cloninger, 2008; Phares & Chap-
lin, 1997). Behaviour is evaluated partly based on how others react to that
behaviour (Bandura, 1977).
2.1.2.3 Individual Differences
Personality can be described as “a generative engine that contributes to coherence,
consistency, and predictability in emotional reactions and responses” (Ortony, 2002).
Our unique personalities can cause each of us to react differently, even when responding
to the same provoking situation. Also, the same individual can react differently de-
pending on the situation. For example, someone in an aggressive environment is likely
to be more aggressive, but this same person may be very calm in another environment
(Ortony, 2002). Both Ortony (2002) and Lazarus (1994) have addressed the possible
reasons why these individual differences occur.
According to Ortony (2002), individual differences are due to:
1. differences in evaluation and construal of the world (e.g. whether you are winning
a football match or not depends on which team you are on; and importance placed
on winning affects evaluation);
2. differences in the way that emotions affect us, called emotionality (e.g some people
are more volatile than others); and
3. current state of the individual and their view of the environment.
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On the other hand, according to Lazarus (1994, p. 334), different reactions to the same
provoking situation are due to “variable individual goal hierarchies, generalised beliefs
about self and world, and situational beliefs”, as well as environmental differences. How
one deals with events or how one acts to change their beliefs or actions also generates
individual differences (Lazarus, 1994).
According to Caspi & Roberts (1999), there are number of ways that differences in
personality can be measured.
1. Differential Continuity: change in an individual’s placement relative to the group.
2. Absolute Continuity: change in the quantity or amount of an attribute over time.
3. Structural Continuity: persistence of correlation patterns among a set of variables
across time.
4. Ipsative or Person-centred Continuity: change at the individual level, or the con-
figuration of variables within an individual across time.
5. Coherence: refers to conceptual rather than literal continuity among behaviours.
An example of this type of coherence is relating behaviour and attributes as a
child (aggression, social nature, physical adventurousness and nonconformity) to
adult sexual behaviour (Caspi & Roberts, 1999).
2.1.3 Somatic Marker Hypothesis
In the somatic marker hypothesis proposed by Damasio (1994), he rejects the belief
(held by Descartes, amongst others) that the mind and the body are separate entities.
Damasio believes that when making decisions our feelings or bodies assist us in an
indispensable way. When faced with a decision with many choices, the individual may
experience an unpleasant physical reaction, or gut instinct, in relation to one or more
of the choices available (Damasio, 1994). This will cause the individual to immediately
view those choices as negative and encourage them to choose from the other alternatives.
This type of physical reaction (feelings) are called a “somatic markers” because it is a
bodily feeling (‘soma’ means body) and ‘marks’ an image or choice (Damasio, 1994).
When choosing between courses of action, choices can be bucketed using somatic
markers to establish preferences (Damasio, 1994). The internal preference system is
inherently biased towards avoiding pain and seeking potential pleasure (Damasio, 1994).
Somatic markers represent, at any given time, the cumulative preferences a person has
received and acquired. Somatic markers act as biasing devices: a negative somatic
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marker is like an alarm bell; a positive one is like a beacon of incentive (Damasio, 1994).
Somatic markers do not deliberate for us, they highlight choices for the deliberation
process. That is, they drastically reduce the number of choices that need to be examined
if further cost/benefit analysis is required. According to Damasio, the accuracy and
efficiency of the decision process is increased with somatic markers (Damasio, 1994).
In some cases, such as intuition, somatic markers are formed and used unconsciously
without recognising their existence.
Somatic markers come from our experiences and socialisation (rather than our ge-
netics), and are largely acquired during childhood and adolescence. However, the acqui-
sition of somatic markers continues throughout our entire lives (Damasio, 1994). The
person must connect entities or events with the enactment of a body state, pleasant
or unpleasant. Somatic markers are acquired by experience, under the control of an
internal preference system and under the influence of social conventions, ethical rules
and the other entities with which a person must interact (Damasio, 1994).
By their very nature, somatic markers are dependent on the context in which the
action possibilities are being considered. The hypothesis is a useful way of representing
how agents can make decisions without domain-dependent deliberation. It provides
a simple structure to allow preferences, personality and intuition to influence current
decisions.
2.1.4 Adaptation Theories
As humans, people are continually adapting to the environment, mostly because the
environment is in a continual state of change. People acquire new goals and beliefs as
they age. However, it is generally assumed that the most important and stable goal
hierarchies and beliefs are established during our formative years before adulthood
(Lazarus, 1991). Further, learning can give the appearance of personality (Sanchez
et al., 2004).
Our focus is on virtual agents, not the ways people in the real world actually learn.
So, in this literature survey we examine simple machine learning techniques that can be
used to allow personality to adapt and develop via personal experience. We look first
at the aspects that can be learned, then we outline the main concepts of reinforcement
learning and finally concentrate on the particular learning technique that will be used
in this thesis, reinforcement comparison.
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2.1.4.1 Aspects that can be Learned
Agents in virtual worlds can acquire knowledge about a multitude of aspects of their
environment, including the other inhabitants and themselves. Aspects open to learning
can be categorised as follows:
• Concept learning about objects and other characters: (Seif El-Nasr et al., 1998;
Yoon et al., 2000) which objects and characters help achieve goals? Which objects
are associated with certain motivational states or emotions (Seif El-Nasr et al.,
1998).
• Social learning: what other characters are like (in terms of their behaviour and
likes and dislikes), when to collaborate, when to compete.
• Organisational learning: includes updating the relative importance (or weighting)
of the connections between entities as well as changes in the structure of an
organisational network (Yoon et al., 2000).
• Preferences for actions or strategy: which action or strategy is “good” (i.e. prefer-
able) in a particular situation. This can be related to forming somatic markers
based on Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Yoon et al., 2000).
• Learning about events: likelihood of events to occur at any given situation, which
events are “good” (i.e. which states should be achieved, compared to learning
which actions are good), event sequences, and potential consequences and rewards
(Seif El-Nasr et al., 1998).
• Learning about the human user: (Seif El-Nasr et al., 1998) what does the user
like (actions, objects, etc...)? What is the user’s current emotion, mood or per-
sonality?
Reinforcement learning is a relatively simple method of machine learning and has been
used commonly to learn the above aspects.
2.1.4.2 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is derived from animal training techniques where the
animal is given a reward based on its good or bad behaviour. The goal of reinforcement
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learning is to maximise reward by mapping situations to actions, i.e. what to do in a
given situation. Usually the reward is externally determined by a training agent that is
separate from the agent that is learning. Through trial and error interaction with the
training agent, the learning agent is able to acquire knowledge about what are “good”
and “bad” states (according to the external trainer) and which actions or behaviour
lead to “good” states and therefore rewards.
There are four main elements in a RL system (Sutton & Barto, 1998): selection
policy, reward function, value function and the model of the environment. The selection
policy is the function that maps perceived states of the environment to action. The
selection policy needs a mechanism to handle the trade-off between exploration of all
state-action pairs and exploitation of known successful state-action pairs (Sutton &
Barto, 1998). Some policies only exploit successful state-action pairs without exploring
further. These policies are called greedy policies. -greedy policies exploit the successful
state-action pairs only some of the time, based on the parameter . The reward function
should be unalterable by the agent and clearly related to the pre-acquired goal of the
agent. The reward function is required to map the state of the environment to a single
number - the reward. The value function defines what is “good” in the long run for
the agent, e.g. getting high rewards is good. The model of the environment mimics
the behaviour of the environment. If a particular action is taken when in a specific
state, the model of the environment can predict the next state and the next reward.
To simplify this process, the actual virtual environment can be used instead of a model
of the environment could do. Techniques that use this method include both simple
techniques, such as reinforcement comparison, and more complex techniques, such as
Q-learning.
Properties of Virtual Environments According to Russell & Norvig (2003), vir-
tual environments can be categorised based on four properties: observability, determin-
ism, dynamics, and the number of agents. The properties of most game environments
are likely to be:
• partially observable: the agent cannot determine the state of the environment
fully;
• non-deterministic: the next state of the environment is not completely determined
by the current state and the agent’s actions;
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• dynamic: the environment can change while the agent is deciding what to do;
and
• multi-agent: other agents can affect the state of the environment.
Many RL techniques assume the environment is deterministic, thus making them diffi-
cult to implement in games. However, one simple technique that does not require the
agent to already have a model of how the environment behaves, is the reinforcement
comparison technique.
Reinforcement Comparison Technique The reinforcement comparison technique
provides a mechanism to update the selection policy based on the reward, without
requiring a complex model of the environment (Sutton & Barto, 1998). It determines
whether a reward is “large” or “small” based on previous rewards received. In this
process, a reference reward, r¯t, (usually an average of previous rewards) is stored to
provide a comparator for future rewards. The updated preference, pt+1(at), for an
action, at, selected on the last play is (Sutton & Barto, 1998):
pt+1(at) = pt(at) + β(rt − r¯t) (2.2)
where rt is the reward received on the last play and β is a positive step-wise parameter.
To update the reference reward, the following equation is used (Sutton & Barto, 1998):
r¯t+1 = r¯t + α[rt − r¯t] (2.3)
where 0 < α ≤ 1. If the initial reference reward, r¯0, is set at a high level, then this
equation encourages exploration.
The reinforcement comparison technique is expected to work well to match with
a personality theory, since according to Moffat (1997), personality theories require
that the reinforcement value should reflect the expectancy value. That is, determining
whether the result is good or bad depends on whether the agent was expecting a good
or bad result to begin with (Moffat, 1997).
2.2 Applications
Having surveyed the theories and methods most relevant to our topic, we now investi-
gate applications that others have implemented. These applications are separated into
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those intended for use in computer games and those in the broad field of intelligent
virtual agents. Some applications incorporate theories of personality, adaptation and
somatic markers. However, to facilitate easier comparison, applications are grouped
according to their major contribution in one of these areas.
2.2.1 Game Applications
For many years, games competed based on their visual effects. Now, games must also
compete in terms of the gameplay experience they offer (Spronck et al., 2006). One
way to enhance gameplay experience is to provide large numbers of virtual characters
that the player can interact with, for example Oblivion (by Bethesda Softworks) and
The Sims (by EA Software). Although sometimes quite complex, these characters can
appear too similar to their archetype. Another method to generate large numbers of
characters is to use crowd simulators, such as those used in The Lord of the Rings, or for
a forest fire simulation (Cho et al., 2008). These simulators rely on giving characters
simple behaviour and some fixed traits to present the appearance of diversity. The
characters generated are often too simplistic to support player interaction.
Introduction of emotions into games has been seen as a potentially useful approach
to enhance gameplay. Some middleware products have been developed to allow game
designers to put emotions in their characters using the cognitive appraisal model (such
as Sollenberger & Singh (2009)). However, much work in putting emotions into games
is directed towards generating emotional responses in players (Freeman, 2004; French,
2007), or the graphical expression of emotions (e.g. Rehm & Andre´, 2005), rather than
enabling characters themselves to have and use emotions for decision-making. Char-
acters developed often lack the social skill necessary for autonomous characters (par-
ticularly in role playing games, RPGs), so characters cannot become deeply involved
in group tasks (Prada & Paiva, 2005). The future for games is likely to lie in creating
more engaging games for the adult population that are not simply shooting or driving
games (French, 2007).
There are roughly two ways to approach implementation of game AI. The first is
the reductionist approach that reduces the number of entity types, but has a large
number of instances of each type (Russell, 2008). This approach tends to homogenise
the characters (Russell, 2008). The reductionist approach supports emergent gameplay,
which gives a strong suggestion of open-endedness to players, leading them to believe
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that they could continue to play and yet still encounter new ideas (Russell, 2008).
The second approach is the constructivist technique where there are many different
entities, but not many instances of each type (Russell, 2008). This approach promotes
richness by using high levels of handcrafted work in individual scenes or characters
to make memorable player experiences (Russell, 2008). However, this method has
poor scalability and limits replayability (Russell, 2008). Although the player has a
unique experience in a single playthrough, the experience is diminished on multiple
playthroughs (Russell, 2008). Russell proposes the concept of situationist game AI
that combines the reductionist and constructivist techniques and attempts to reconcile
parallelism of action and conflicting situations (such as aiming a gun while opening a
door) (Russell, 2008). The work presented so far appears preliminary and is primarily
directed towards animating individual characters and groups of characters (Russell,
2008).
Across all these approaches, the actual techniques used to cognitively model char-
acters are often “basic”, including, finite state machines (FSMs), reactive behaviour
rules, situation trees (Funge, 2000), scripts (Spronck et al., 2006), and goal hierar-
chies (Adams, 2000). These techniques are often easy to understand and develop, but
debugging or introducing changes to an existing system can be difficult. Characters
often cannot adapt unless explicitly instructed, meaning that the characters cannot,
by themselves, adapt behaviour in response to the skill level of the player or player
preferences.
In the following sections we discuss applications and techniques with an emphasis
on personality and, after this, adaptation. We then examine in detail Spronck et al.’s
research group who aim to improve learning for strategy game characters.
2.2.1.1 Games with a Personality Emphasis
Early work on personality in computer games generally related to developing simple
models of emotions, attitudes, moods and static personality traits for characters (e.g.
Silva et al., 1999; Wilson, 1999). This work recognised that these techniques were
probably more useful to long term games (Silva et al., 1999), rather than first person
shooter (FPS) games (Wilson, 1999). When considering personality as part of the
behavioural model, game AI developers generally seek simple models to provide the
appearance of interesting and complex behaviour (e.g. Ulicny & Thalmann, 2002).
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Some work relates to how to create avatars (the virtual representation of a player within
a game) whose personality resembles the personality of the player themselves (e.g.
Imbert & de Antonio, 2000). We did not find any mechanisms to semi-automatically
create personalities in game characters that are distinct from other characters.
A key ingredient to providing distinct personalities is the creation of variety in the
behaviour available to characters. There are different levels to this variety (Ulicny
& Thalmann, 2002). At the bottom level, there is a single solution for a given task.
At the next level, there is can be either a finite number of solutions or the solution
can be composed of combinations of sub-solutions. At the highest level, solutions can
be chosen from an infinite number of possible solutions (Ulicny & Thalmann, 2002).
Ulicny & Thalmann (2002) have implemented a system that uses rules at the bottom
level, hierarchical FSMs at the mid-level, and autonomous and scripted behaviour at
the highest level.
Personality Types There are several examples of the reductionist approach to game
AI in relation to personalities, in which a small number of personality types are de-
veloped, usually via handcrafting to suit the particular game. The personality types
usually have entirely different behaviour, rather than tweaking personality parameters
(e.g. Smith, 1999).
In da Silva Correˆa Pinto & Alvares (2005), five handcrafted and simple personality
types are implemented for use in Unreal Tournament (by GT Interactive) with the
aim of improving believability. They interpreted personality to relate to a character’s
motivations and goals, and how it acts to achieve its goals (da Silva Correˆa Pinto &
Alvares, 2005). They took a working personality and obtained the desired personality
by hand tuning global parameters and goal strengths, or adding a new module (da Silva
Correˆa Pinto & Alvares, 2005). The authors believed that the number of concurrent
actions able to be performed in their approach was not sufficient to be applicable to
commercial games (da Silva Correˆa Pinto & Alvares, 2005). The entire model is very
reliant on the domain’s physical world, and consequently the developed characters have
limited reusability. The personality types developed were static and stereotypical, did
not use learning, and did not utilise different personas for different mood or emotions
(da Silva Correˆa Pinto & Alvares, 2005).
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Another example of creating personality types can be found in Ellinger (2008), who
describes how to develop archetypes of personality that are instantly recognisable due
to their one-dimensional nature, for example, “the coward”, “the defender”. These per-
sonality archetypes are not meant to be unique. Indeed they allow the player to use their
existing knowledge of social interactions to determine how the archetype behaves and
therefore which tactics work best against each particular archetype (Ellinger, 2008).
For example, the player learns that “the coward” runs away. According to Ellinger
(2008), more subtle distinctions in characters can be expanded using storytelling and
dialogue, but are usually unnecessary since players fill in subtle behaviour themselves.
Archetypes appear best suited to games for novice players or games that are not played
for extended periods of time. After prolonged periods of time, players will instantly
recognise each archetype, implement the counter tactics and easily defeat the char-
acter, thus eliminating the challenge element of the game, and rendering the game
uninteresting in the eyes of many players.
Fac¸ade The game Fac¸ade represents pioneering work in giving agents emotions that
affect behaviour (Mateas & Stern, 2002). In this game there are two distinct characters
who (according to the story) are on the point of separating from each other. The player
interacts with characters via text based conversation and from this discussion can choose
to encourage them to split up or make their marriage stronger. The personalities of the
characters were thoroughly handcrafted meaning it would be unrealistic to implement
in more than a handful of characters. However, the game represents a break from the
standard game genres and indicates a possible future for social games.
The Sims Although the characters in The Sims (by Electronic Arts) appear to be
very complex, most of the “smarts” are stored within objects in the environment. These
objects tell an agent what animations to display when using the object (Doyle, 2002).
The object also lets agents know how this particular object can change the agent’s
emotional or social state (Doyle, 2002). The characters are unable to learn (Clarke,
2005). Personality is only modelled in these characters to the extent that their hierarchy
of needs and some simple traits are different from other characters.
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2.2.1.2 Games with an Adaptation Emphasis
In most computer games, the technologies used to build characters usually “constrain
them to a set of fixed behaviours which cannot evolve in time with the world in which
they dwell” (Merrick & Maher, 2006, p.1). Although some designers may use learning
during game development, it is unusual to have games where characters learn in the
shipped product (Kirby, 2005). In the preface to the latest AI Game Programming
Wisdom book (number 4), Rabin (2008) lists three reasons why learning is not being
used extensively, despite years of interest in the subject:
• Agents in games do not usually live long enough to benefit from learning.
• Learning happens over time, so it is hard for players to perceive, therefore benefits
are subjective and unclear.
• Learning requires time-expensive trial and error and tuning.
All of this leads to a high risk (that the learning will not be noticed or useful) and time
investment with benefits that are difficult to quantify, so it is hard for developers to
justify including learning (Rabin, 2008).
There are a number of learning techniques that the games industry has used or in-
vestigated. Sanchez-Crespo (2005) provides an overview of machine learning techniques
as applied to games. We will investigate applications using reinforcement learning, since
this is the most applicable to our research.
Reinforcement Learning RL techniques (see theory Section 2.1.4.2, page 38) are
commonly used in both games applications and intelligent virtual agents. Compared
to other techniques, reinforcement learning allows character behaviour to be explained
more easily, which is highly desirable feature for games (both from the designer and the
game player’s perspectives). The creatures in the game Black and White and the dog
in Fable 2 (both from Lionhead Studios) are created using a modification of the BDI
architecture and a degree of learning (Champandard, 2007; Evans, 2002). However,
the learning provided for the characters is restricted to reinforcement learning using
feedback only from the player (Evans, 2002), so the characters are unable to assess by
themselves what they personally consider “good” and “bad”. This places an additional
burden on the player to act as the external trainer. Since a player can only teach a
limited number of characters, the technique is restricted to a few characters.
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Merrick & Maher (2006) use motivation and an -greedy exploration strategy for
RL applied to create support characters for massively multi-player worlds. The term
“motivation” appears to refer to the difference between observation and expectation,
where expectation comes from learning by clustering similar events together (Merrick
& Maher, 2006). Their method can allow a single agent model to develop different skills
for different agents when they are in different environments (Merrick & Maher, 2006),
i.e. developing a form of personality for the agents. Although they claim this adds a
highly desirable feature, the outcome appears to be a side-effect of their implementation,
and there is no analysis of whether the differences are sufficiently distinct to achieve
individuality.
Trait-based personalities have been built using a learning technique in combination
with handcrafting, in order to get the best results (Pisan, 2000). Explicit models are
better for games, so that they are easier to debug (Pisan, 2000). In this system, the next
action is decided based on current state and history or memory (Pisan, 2000). The world
is non-deterministic and characters have a single optimal way to act within the world
(Pisan, 2000). Despite this simplification, Pisan (2000) found that the behaviour of the
character when engaged in discovering the single ideal method was very interesting; to
the point that delaying convergence of selection policy could be seen as desirable to
prolong this period of interesting behaviour.
Game developers perceive it to be risky to allow characters to adapt after shipping,
since the characters may develop undesirable habits and change the gameplay signifi-
cantly. A combination of both online and offline Q-learning (a type of RL) can allow
for the creation of characters with the capacity to adapt their skills to a specific human
opponent after their initial training (Andrade et al., 2005). This process allows Q&A
testing to be performed on the character prior to game shipping and is likely to reduce
the perceived risk to game developers.
An example of the application of RL to strategy games is found in the work of
Spronck et al. and this is described in the following section that focuses on their
research group.
2.2.1.3 Focus on Research by Spronck et al.
Extensive work has been done by Spronck, Ponsen et al. on applying advanced rein-
forcement learning techniques to combat and real time strategy (RTS) game characters.
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Their main contributions are dynamic scripting (Spronck et al., 2006) and hierarchi-
cal reinforcement learning (Ponsen et al., 2006a). They have also compared learning
techniques for a simple problem within the RTS world (Ponsen et al., 2006a), and in-
vestigated ways to improve set up (Ponsen et al., 2007) and speed (Bakkes & Spronck,
2006) of the reinforcement learning problem.
One of their aims is to make adaptive enemies who adapt tactics to find optimal
tactics depending on the ability of their human opponent (Spronck et al., 2006). The
characters should be able to be used against both beginners and experts (Spronck
et al., 2006). Another aim is to reduce the complexity of the game and therefore allow
the characters to learn more effectively (Ponsen et al., 2007), and for each character
to optimise its learning selection policy (Ponsen et al., 2006a). Characters should be
“interesting” (Spronck et al., 2006). This “interest” applies to creating characters that
can be beaten rather than generating opponent tactics that are unusual or captivating
to interact with.
The applications implemented were designed to test learning techniques intended
for RTS (strategy) games with a single opponent (Ponsen et al., 2007; Spronck et al.,
2006). Ponsen et al. (2006a) used a simpler test world that was fully observable with
one worker, one enemy, and one goal to achieve. In another article, Bakkes & Spronck
(2006) used three grid world tests with different obstacles in the grid to determine which
method of speeding up reinforcement learning achieved more successful characters.
Learning Details The reward function depends on the domain being used for testing.
In Ponsen et al. (2007), the reward function for a particular state depends on game
score which is measured using both military and building points. In the simple test
worlds described in Bakkes & Spronck (2006), success was determined by how close
the agent gets to the top row of the grid world. Other than the goal square, all other
non-neutral squares were negative, e.g. causing death or decreasing health (Bakkes &
Spronck, 2006). Determining a suitable reward function when agents pursue multiple
goals is difficult, as found in Ponsen et al. (2006a).
The agents learn domain-specific knowledge or rules about what can be done in the
world (Spronck et al., 2006). They label state-action pairs with reward values (Bakkes
& Spronck, 2006). That is, observations (i.e. states) and action pairs are stored with
an associated assessment of success/reward (Bakkes & Spronck, 2006). After a new
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observation, the reward is updated using an average of past value and current reward
values (Bakkes & Spronck, 2006). In some circumstances, not only is the reward for
the state visited updated, but a penalty can be attached to other actions available
that were not taken (redistribution of reward) (Ponsen et al., 2006a). Having a table
with state-action values is appropriate for small domains, but states grow exponentially
as the domain grows (Ponsen et al., 2006a). This explosion of the state-action space
is a major reason why standard reinforcement learning may not be suited to games
(Ponsen et al., 2006b). Even in simple worlds there are many possible states (Ponsen
et al., 2006a).
Standard reinforcement learning has difficulties determining the balance between
exploitation and exploration (Spronck et al., 2006). Some RL methods require the
agent to know what states it can transition to, due to a system model (Ponsen et al.,
2006a). For games, due to the non-deterministic nature of player input, it is not usually
possible to know all the states and the transitions between them to develop the system
model. To overcome this, the RL technique, Q-learning, may be appropriate because
it does not need a model of the system and is online (Ponsen et al., 2006a). However,
this technique is less effective for tactical or strategic level learning, where reward can
be delayed and the agent can not determine final reward until other actions have been
taken (Spronck et al., 2006).
Initialising Domain Knowledge In order for Spronck et al.’s dynamic scripting
technique to function, a good knowledge base is needed (Ponsen et al., 2007). Some
processes to provide this knowledge include manual coding, semi-automatic methods
(machine learning techniques where strong tactics are pulled out for implementation),
and automatic transfer from offline learning (where examples are annotated with state
transitions) (Ponsen et al., 2007). Ponsen et al. (2007) discuss using an evolutionary
algorithm to generate the domain knowledge which is then used by dynamic scripting.
This process constrains the action state space to reduce complexity inherent in a large
numbers of states (Ponsen et al., 2007).
Accelerating Learning Bakkes & Spronck (2006) discuss a method to facilitate
faster reinforcement learning, by providing the characters with a more informed decision
process when entering a state that has not been encountered previously. Using large
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numbers of trials to establish “decent” behaviour takes a long time and the search may
not be able to locate desirable behaviour (Bakkes & Spronck, 2006). In the proposed
method, if the agent finds a state it has not been to before, it calculates a similarity
value to determine which states visited previously are most similar to the current one
and then uses this to determine the initial reward for the current state (Bakkes &
Spronck, 2006).
Dynamic Scripting This method is similar in many but not all respects to rein-
forcement learning (Spronck et al., 2006). Dynamic scripting changes individual scripts
themselves. A script is built up of goals from the database (Spronck et al., 2006), it is
similar to a ‘plan’ in BDI terminology (see Section 2.1.1.1, page 21). Dynamic script-
ing only works when the game already uses scripts (Ponsen et al., 2007). The method
does not allow different personalities within the same agent class (Spronck et al., 2006).
Agents can choose rules (similar to goals) randomly, but these have changeable weights,
so that the agent is more likely to choose some rules above others (Spronck et al., 2006).
The total weight on all rules is constant. Therefore, if the weight on “rule A” increases,
then the weight on all others decreases (Spronck et al., 2006). It is a key feature of the
work of Spronck et al. (2006) that all rules are updated at every time step (Spronck
et al., 2006). Their work demonstrated that dynamic scripting can lead to combat
behaviour optimisation (Ponsen et al., 2006a).
Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning This method is useful when the agent is
required to optimise two or more goals at the same time. The developer manually
designs the hierarchy of goals (Ponsen et al., 2006a) and decomposes tasks into simple
independent subtasks within the goal hierarchy (Ponsen et al., 2006b). In their imple-
mentation, they examined a case with two sub-goals: “move away from enemy” and
“move towards goal” (Ponsen et al., 2006a). A sub-goal is triggered based on how close
the agent is to achieving the other sub-goal (Ponsen et al., 2006a). Once a sub-goal
has been chosen, the agent can choose a direction to move (e.g. north, south, east,
west). Reward is calculated using an equal weighting of the two goals based on the
position the agent was in before the choice compared to the position it is in after the
choice (Ponsen et al., 2006a). Convergence cannot be guaranteed. Although this is
normally undesirable, it could be considered desirable in computer games where the
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human player opposing the AI character can change (Ponsen et al., 2006a). Hierar-
chical reinforcement learning appears to work well for two competing tasks but when
there are more goals, it would be more difficult to develop reward equations and the
hierarchical decomposition.
Summary of Research by Spronck et al. The research by Spronck et al. focused
on sophisticated learning techniques based on redistribution of reward to improve tac-
tics in strategy games. They tested different techniques to initialise domain-dependent
knowledge and accelerate learning. The research used a hierarchy of goals so that reward
could be calculated when there were two goals for the agent to achieve simultaneously.
2.2.2 Intelligent Virtual Agent Applications
Intelligent virtual agents (IVAs), or embodied conversational agents, have been used in
a vast variety of applications, such as:
• a tour guide (Lim et al., 2005; Zheng et al., 2005);
• psychological models of the effect of oblivious ostracism (Selvarajah & Richards,
2005);
• teaching autistic children social behaviour (Dautenhahn, 1999);
• teaching school children about bullying (Dias & Paiva, 2005);
• military simulations designed to teach soldiers how to deal with emotional civil-
ians (Si et al., 2005; Traum et al., 2005);
• interactive animals (Blumberg et al., 2002; Seif El-Nasr et al., 1998);
• planning (Andre´ et al., 1999);
• robots in mazes (Gadanho, 2002);
• presentation teams (Andre´ et al., 2000);
• interactive drama (Theune et al., 2004);
• leveraging group social dynamics (Prada & Paiva, 2005);
• logistics (Buczak et al., 2005); and
• coordination of multiple robots (Yingying et al., 2002);
In this section, we begin with applications that relate predominantly to personality,
then consider applications using adaptation followed by those using somatic markers.
We finish this section with a focus on work done by Blumberg et al.’s research group
relating to developing characters that adapt and also have their own personalities.
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2.2.2.1 IVAs with a Personality Emphasis
According to Ortony (2002), believable characters should have variability within con-
sistency. To achieve this, characters need to be coherent at a global level, across dif-
ferent kinds of situations, and over quite long time periods (Ortony, 2002). Characters
also need to exhibit “within-individual consistency and cross-individual consistency”
(Ortony, 2002, p.191). Personality (or constraining principles) can provide this con-
sistency and emotionality can provide variability (Ortony, 2002). Personality gives life
to characters, not emotions (Lim et al., 2005). Certainly, for social systems, personal-
ity is a requirement (Campos et al., 2006). The personality given to characters must
be consistent itself (Francis et al., 2010), because personality is viewed as a driver of
behaviour (Ortony, 2002).
The model of personality does not necessarily need to be highly complex, since it
has been shown (Andre´ et al., 2000) that useful results can still be obtained with simple
models. For example, Theune et al. (2004) found that, even with their limited imple-
mentation, a large number of different possibilities were able to be generated. Further,
social responses can be triggered in users even if the agents are not very sophisticated
(Rousseau & Hayes-Roth, 1997). Rousseau & Hayes-Roth (1997) implemented a sim-
ple system to determine whether personality can be detected. They found that simple
personalities were detectable, but personalities that depended on moods and attitudes
were hard to determine when the scenarios were not very long (Rousseau & Hayes-
Roth, 1997). Their short sessions also caused them to find that adaptive personalities
and extreme personalities were not believable (Rousseau & Hayes-Roth, 1997).
Usages of Personality Even within psychological and cognitive science theories of
personality, the definition of personality varies greatly. Within applications, the usage
of personality and how to model and store personality also varies as illustrated in the
following examples.
• Personality is the thresholds that cause an emotion to be triggered (Taylor, 1995).
• Personality is defined based on high-level goals, with multiple ways to achieve
goals (Mateas, 1997).
• Personality can be the preferences and long-term goals given to each character
(Andre´ et al., 1999).
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• Personality is based on a vector of six possible actively-pursued desires (Parunak
et al., 2006).
• Personality includes OCC (cognitive appraisal) based goals, standards and prefer-
ences (Johns & Silverman, 2001), where preferences relates to opinions of objects
and other agents rather than action preferences.
• Hard-coded personality can include goals, emotional reaction rules, action ten-
dencies (reactive actions), emotional thresholds and decay rates for each emotion.
Where emotion reaction rules are domain-dependent and cognitive appraisal rules
based on personality (Dias & Paiva, 2005).
• Personality is modelled using emotional monitoring, personality evaluation and
behavioural transformation (i.e. capable of changing coping preferences based on
past experience) (Francis et al., 2010).
• Memories can be seen as part of personality, particularly in reference to emotional
memory (which relates to events and episodes) compared to semantic memory
(which relates to facts) (Lim et al., 2005).
Influence of Personality Just as personality can be used and implemented in a
number of ways, it can produce different influences on the character itself. In gen-
eral, personality influences the reasoning process (Dias & Paiva, 2005). According to
Lazarus, personality influences both appraisal and coping (Lazarus, 1991), where ap-
praisal generates emotions and decides which coping strategy to use and coping is the
actual method an agent uses to deal with an emotional event. Table 2.1 lists aspects
some of the major applications have used personality to influence. These aspects are:
primary appraisal, decision-making, reward calculation, and goals or desires. Unlike
most other methods, Rousseau & Hayes-Roth (1998) use personality to give actions
themselves a personality profile. For instance, one particular action is labelled as some-
thing that only “extroverts” would perform.
It appears to be relatively common for personality to influence how decisions are
made. For example, in Andre´ et al. (1999), personality and emotions were used as fil-
ters to constrain the decision process when selecting and implementing the agent’s be-
haviour. It is less common for personality to influence reward calculation or evaluation
of “good” or “bad”. However, since some theorists believe personality should influence
reward, we provide two examples here to demonstrate possible methods. Yingying et al.
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Aspect Influenced Implemented/Proposed By
Primary Appraisal Gratch & Marsella (2004);
Silverman & Bharathy (2005).
Decision-making Johns & Silverman (2001) and
(Secondary Appraisal) Silverman & Bharathy (2005);
Andre´ et al. (1999).
Reward Calculation Johns & Silverman (2001);
Yingying et al. (2002).
Goals or Desires Parunak et al. (2005);
Lim et al. (2005).
Table 2.1: Aspects Influenced by Personality in IVA Applications.
(2002) modelled personality to affect evaluation (and not decision-making directly) in
an application intended to allow multiple robots to coordinate assignment tasks be-
tween themselves more efficiently. They used evaluation weights (defined in relation
to the personality) to change the total reward a robot calculates for itself (Yingying
et al., 2002). By allowing different robots to have different rewards, they will search
for different optimal solutions and this is expected to improve coordination (Yingying
et al., 2002). Johns & Silverman (2001) used trait-based personality to obtain a single
utility value from multiple emotions. The expected reward, i.e. utility, is calculated
by multiplying each personality factor by the relevant emotion values to get a single
utility value which is then used to determine which plan to choose (Johns & Silverman,
2001).
Separation in Reasoning Processes In some applications, the reasoning process
(as applied to appraisal or decision-making) is separated into two parts, a quick process
and a more deliberative one. Theories suggest that the brain completes a quick response
without appraisal and then subsequently performs the (emotion) appraisal and responds
more ‘rationally’ (LeDoux, 1996). For example, Dias & Paiva (2005) use a top-level
to appraise the instant reaction, and a subsequent level for more thorough planning.
Greene et al. (2005) use Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis as a reflex layer. Andre´
et al. (1999) separate the reasoning systems of affect and behaviour.
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Similarly in Gadanho (2003), when making a decision, an initial emotional conclu-
sion is made, which may then be rejected by a cognitive conclusion (Gadanho, 2003).
The justification for this method is due to the dual purposes of cognition and emotion:
“the cognitive system can make more accurate predictions based on rules [of causal-
ity] while the emotion associations have less explanatory power but can make more
extensive predictions and predict further ahead in time” (Gadanho, 2003, p.386).
Emotions, Mood and Personality Some models implement personality, mood and
emotion (PME). In these models, emotions last for a short time, mood is defined as
a more general emotion that lasts for a longer time period, and personality is stable
and unchanging. For example, Wilson (2000) sees personality as a kind of long term
emotion. In these PME models, “personality” is trait-based and often uses similar
terminology to that applied to emotions, e.g. a happy personality versus the emotion
happiness. Work by Henninger et al. (2003) links emotions directly to personality, so
that when there is high arousal according to the agent’s emotions, the agent will revert
to a ‘core personality’ or behaviour that has already been shown to work; otherwise
the agent will try less safe choices. Some models (Egges et al., 2004; Strauss & Kipp,
2008) implement a “generic” model of personality that can be used as a toolkit for
other applications. The model is only generic in the sense that it can be applied to any
trait-based model of personality, but not an adaptive model of personality.
Dias & Paiva (2005) implement mood as the overall valence of the emotional state,
which is then used to influence the intensity of emotions. The intensity of emotions
decays over time, according to an exponential function (Dias & Paiva, 2005). To
calculate the intensity of an emotion, I, that was created based on an emotion event
(or appraisal), k, after a given time, t, use a decay of b and following equation (Dias &
Paiva, 2005).
I(k, t) = I(k, t0)× e−b(t−t0) (2.4)
Applications using Cognitive Appraisal Model Many IVA applications have
used the cognitive appraisal model to simulate emotions that the agents “have”. For
example, many have used the OCC model: Andre´ et al. (1999), Egges et al. (2003,
2004), and Seif El-Nasr et al. (1999). Dias et al. (2005) implemented the OCC model
and a Lazarus style coping mechanism in their application, FearNot!. A very in-depth
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implementation of Lazarus’ cognitive appraisal model of emotions is provided by Gratch
& Marsella (2004). They use heuristics to establish fixed preferences and then, in
decision-making, to choose the most preferred coping strategy (Gratch & Marsella,
2004). This work emphasises the realistic generation of character emotions for small
numbers of characters.
Personality Types Developed In many applications, a fixed number of hand-
crafted, static personality types are developed (e.g. Dias & Paiva, 2005; Lim et al.,
2005; Rousseau & Hayes-Roth, 1997; Rousseau & Hayes-Roth, 1998; Yoon et al., 2000).
Personality can be hard-coded to make the character “interesting” (Rousseau & Hayes-
Roth, 1997), or tailored by the designer using trait-based approaches so that each char-
acter type has its own way to exhibit behaviour (Andre´ et al., 1999). The most common
implementations of personality theories are trait-based theories relying on fixed per-
sonalities, for example Ball & Breese (2000); Jan & Traum (2005); Wilson (2000).
Trait-based, hard-coded models of personality have been used to recreate fixed, stable
personalities for characters based on past real-world leaders (Silverman & Bharathy,
2005). Bevacqua et al. (2008) used different emotional styles (similarly to personality
traits) so that an agent who listens can choose statements that match to its emotional
style and the apparent emotional state of the user. Some models, attempt to match
the personality of the character to the personality of the user (e.g. Moon & Nass, 1996;
Scheutz & Ro¨mmer, 2001). One reason for this is that it has been found that users
want agents they must interact with, such as conversational agents, to become more
like the user with time (Moon & Nass, 1996).
Situation-dependent Applications According to Mateas (1997), behaviour should
be context-aware, but should be written for each individual character with their specific
conditions. Some systems use fixed trait-based personality archetypes, but allow the
archetype expressed to vary depending on the situation the character is in. For ex-
ample, Rousseau & Hayes-Roth (1998) combined trait-based approaches with situated
behaviour to allow traits to vary (according to probability distributions) to different
degrees depending on the situation. In this way the designer can create an agent that is
friendly only to people it likes (Rousseau & Hayes-Roth, 1997; Rousseau & Hayes-Roth,
1998).
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Campos et al. (2006) also implement an entirely hard-coded, situated, trait-based
static personality. In their system, behaviour is a function of the situation, the per-
sonality and a level of error (Campos et al., 2006). The situated personality affects
behaviour only, and behaviour does not affect personality (Campos et al., 2006), so
although inspired by Bandura, it is not a full implementation of the social learning
theory (see Section 2.1.2.2, page 34).
In Satoh (2008), a museum guide agent senses its current context and uses this to
tell a visitor pertinent information. However, in this simulation, context only relates to
location, the character itself does not behave differently in different contexts, it simply
provides different tourist information (Satoh, 2008).
Explaining Agent Behaviour For characters to be believable, it can be important
(particularly for interactive dramas) for characters to explain their behaviour so that
users can understand why a character chose a particular action (e.g Scheutz & Ro¨mmer,
2001). If the user understands what is going on in the mind of the character and its
intentions, then character behaviour is more plausible (Wallis, 2005) and users tend
to feel more comfortable (Yoon et al., 2000). Scheutz & Ro¨mmer (2001) implemented
autonomous agents who act on the behalf of the user when the user is absent from
the virtual world. The agent’s actions while the user is away are explained in an
entertaining story (Scheutz & Ro¨mmer, 2001). Similarly, Theune et al. (2004) use a
narrator to explain the actions of the characters so that the user can understand the
character’s motivations.
2.2.2.2 IVAs with an Adaptation Emphasis
Adaptation can be used to develop the initial personality of a character and allow it to
expand or change. Learning or adaptation means characters can be interesting, even
after long periods of interaction with them (Blumberg et al., 2002). As with game
characters, simple agents are easy to develop, however they can become predictable
and brittle (Francis et al., 2010). More complicated agents are more flexible but harder
to develop (Francis et al., 2010). Although adding adaptation to agents makes agents
more convincing but they can become less controllable (Francis et al., 2010).
A number of different learning techniques are used in the IVA domain. For example,
Sanchez et al. (2004) use a combination of evolutionary learning, RL learning and
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bottom-up intelligence. Seif El-Nasr et al. (1999) use RL learning for learning about
events and Pavlovian conditioning for learning about objects. The complexity of their
learning system is due to the need to address the more complex, non-deterministic
input that is obtained from the user (Seif El-Nasr et al., 1999).
Improving Reinforcement learning There is substantial work on methods to im-
prove reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning can be slow and needs to have
some basic behaviour described first (Gadanho & Hallam, 1998). Driessens & Dzˇeroski
(2004) discuss how to improve a selection policy for applications where the rewards
are sparse. Matignon et al. (2006) investigates how to improve convergence of RL
techniques.
Role of Emotions in Learning Learning is not automatically linked to emotions.
According to Gadanho & Hallam (1998) there are three ways that emotions can be
integrated into the reinforcement learning process. Emotion can generate reinforcement
reward values, emotion can determine the current state or emotion can trigger state
transitions (for FSMs) (Gadanho & Hallam, 1998). For example, emotion values can
be modelled to give expected utility (Bozinovski, 2002; Silverman & Bharathy, 2005).
When this approach is taken, the problem of how to determine utility (or reward) for
reinforcement techniques is solved, as long as emotion is implemented in a suitably
complex manner. However, this is not always the case, because “computers do not
automatically have valence attached to everything they learn; some mechanism must
determine if the item is good or bad” (Picard, 1997, p.223). Often, reward is calculated
based on feedback from the user, for example Francis et al. (2010); Seif El-Nasr et al.
(1999); Vela´squez (1998).
Emotions and the Adaptation Loop The use of emotion in decision-making and
the adaptation loop is illustrated by the work of Ahn & Picard (2006), in which they
aim to increase efficiency of learning and decision-making. The work is applied to
practical problems where the goal state is obvious, such as gambling and maze-finding
tasks (Ahn & Picard, 2006). The goal given to each agent is to maximise positive
emotions and minimise negative ones (Ahn & Picard, 2006). Agents learn appropriate
probability values for state transition functions (Ahn & Picard, 2006). Both long term
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and short term achievement goals are considered, so that the agent may do a task that
seems “bad” now, but will lead to greater reward (Ahn & Picard, 2006). The execution
loop for each agent at each time step is (Ahn & Picard, 2006):
1. make a decision;
2. implement it (i.e. update the cognitive state);
3. determine reward;
4. update affect (emotion);
5. update uncertainty;
6. update extrinsic decision value;
7. move to new affective state;
8. move to next time step.
In their evaluation of their work, Ahn & Picard (2006) show that the agents are able to
learn relatively quickly and converge on the optimal solution. That is, all agents learn
the single correct optimal path to the goal state.
Learning Animation Sequences The emphasis of work by Sanchez et al. (2004) is
for agents to learn the correct animation to show when requested by the game system.
The agent must select actions that can achieve the requested task and construct a plan
with the correct and minimal sequence of steps to achieve its goals (Sanchez et al., 2004).
The system is deterministic, so actions always have the same reward consequences
(Sanchez et al., 2004), which makes learning easier for the agents. Convergence of
behaviour is not guaranteed (Sanchez et al., 2004). Due to the way their system builds
up an agent’s selection strategy, the agents can develop slightly different behavioural
modules so that each agent does not act exactly as its neighbours do, i.e. a form of
personality is generated in the animations they present (Sanchez et al., 2004).
Anticipation and Chromosomes Bozinovski (2002) uses anticipatory learning sys-
tems (originally designed to solve how to assign credit using a neural network) based
on Dungeons and Dragons. This theoretical work applies a physics like view of person-
ality using potential field, flow and tension (Bozinovski, 2003). Input personality is two
traits (curiosity and patience) and a set of handcrafted “chromosomes” (Bozinovski,
2003). The chromosomes indicate to the agent which of the 20 situations (locations
on a map) are “good”, “bad” or “neutral”, which affects their current emotional state.
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For the neutral situations, the characters learn which behaviours allow them to move
towards the “good” situations, i.e. they learn the selection policy (Bozinovski, 2003).
Initial behaviour is based on the curiosity constant, whereas final behaviour is the
learned behaviour (Bozinovski, 2003). Although situated behaviours are developed, all
characters with the same starting personality have exactly the same behaviours due to
the deterministic environments used for testing.
2.2.2.3 IVAs with a Somatic Marker Emphasis
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) (see Section 2.1.3, page 36) has
been implemented in a limited number of applications using intelligent virtual agents.
The hypothesis has no true explanatory power. This means it cannot explain why a
choice is “good”, it simply attaches a positive or negative connotation with choices
available to the agent in the decision-making process (Gadanho, 2003). Being able to
feel “good” or “bad” does not “merely affect the agent’s ability to learn, but helps
it prioritise and choose among all its actions - learning, planning, decision-making,
and more” (Picard, 1997, p.223). We now consider some applications that claim to
be inspired by Damasio’s work, but do not fully implement the hypothesis. Then we
examine the body of work by two research groups who have used the somatic marker
hypothesis in their applications.
Inspired By Somatic Marker Hypothesis McCauley (1999) was inspired by
Damasio in their work based on Pandemonium Theory and applied to Wumpus work.
Although inspired by Damasio, the model of emotions in Vela´squez (1998), used for a
robot exploring the physical world, does not extensively rely on Damasio’s techniques
for decision-making. The robot has a temperament (based on threshold levels) and
learns emotions based on feedback from user (Vela´squez, 1998). The robot has simple
plans to choose from and more than one action can be performed at the same time
(Vela´squez, 1998).
The work of Ventura & Pinto-Ferreira (1999) claims to use somatic markers, but
their implementation seems more akin to Pavlovian conditioning than somatic markers
for decision-making. The system links images to a body state at the time the image
occurred (Ventura & Pinto-Ferreira, 1999). This seems to be the wrong way around
according to the hypothesis. In the somatic marker hypothesis, a particular body state
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provides the individual with images (somatic markers) related to each possible choice
to decide what to do. In the method of Ventura & Pinto-Ferreira (1999), the image
triggers a body state (causing the face to change its expression), and then the agent
decides whether the image was good or bad, based on some internal process.
Logistics and Military Applications The research group comprising Buczak, Greene
et al. use somatic markers for agents in a logistics application and military simulations
(Buczak et al., 2005; Greene et al., 2005). In their work, somatic markers are only used
for reflex actions (Greene et al., 2005). Their implementations are based on the military
OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop and allows adaptation of reflexes at any
stage in the loop (Greene et al., 2005). The reinforcement learning process changes the
reflex itself (Buczak et al., 2005), and not the preferences for choosing to execute the
reflex.
Their system is reactive; that is, a plan or reflex is only implemented if there is
a stimulus (event) (Buczak et al., 2005). If the agent has seen a stimulus before it
will implement the previously learnt reflex; if not, it will attempt a new reflex (Buczak
et al., 2005). This adaptation occurs by following a series of steps:
1. When the agent takes an action (reflex), the agent predicts the result and creates
an expectation object (Greene et al., 2005).
2. The agent waits to see if it can match this expectation to an actual observation
(Greene et al., 2005).
3. If the agent does not find a match in time, then it assumes it has not met any of
its expectations at all (Greene et al., 2005).
4. If the agent matches an expectation to an observation, it compares that observa-
tion to the expectation and its reward is based on expected environment state to
actual state (Greene et al., 2005).
5. If the result is different from what is observed, then it may update the selection
policy based on the summation of its reinforcement value over time (Buczak et al.,
2005).
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When performance decreases, the well-being value of the agent decreases (moves away
from ideals), and this decrease triggers the agent to find a better solution (Greene et al.,
2005). Exploration of new actions is also related to well-being (Buczak et al., 2005).
When well-being is low, the agent will explore more (Greene et al., 2005).
Maze Finding Robots Gadanho’s work implements the somatic marker hypothesis
using a biologically based hormone system that alters the ‘body’ of the robot (Gadanho
& Hallam, 1998). Gadanho uses somatic markers because they aid decision-making,
according to Damasio. The application domain is the task of getting robots through
a maze (Gadanho, 2003), a task that where the goal state is clearly defined based on
a single dimension. The system uses only small number of emotions, since others are
probably too sophisticated or irrelevant for the domain (Gadanho & Hallam, 1998).
For example, love and hate are relevant in a social setting, but unlikely to suit a robot
traversing a maze (Gadanho & Hallam, 1998). The cognitive and emotion models
are entirely separate (Gadanho, 2003), similar to the separation of reasoning processes
described in Section 2.2.2.1 (page 53). An initial decision is made based on an emotional
decision, i.e. based on somatic markers. This initial decision may then be rejected
by a cognitive decision (Gadanho, 2003). The emotion model is constructed from
recent emotional history (Gadanho & Hallam, 2001). Emotions colour perceptions and
are used for state transitions as well as utility (Gadanho & Hallam, 2001). Learning
convergence is not guaranteed (Gadanho, 2003). Primitive behaviour is hard-coded as
a base for learning (Gadanho, 2003). The primitive actions used were: avoid obstacles,
seek light and wall follow (Gadanho & Hallam, 2001). This approach allows prediction
of future outcomes of certain scenarios (Gadanho & Hallam, 1998).
2.2.2.4 Focus on Research by Blumberg et al.
Work by Blumberg et al. modelled both adaptation and personality in applications
containing a small number of characters, such as a shepherd and dog (Isla et al., 2001),
puppies (Blumberg et al., 2002) and three characters in a diner (Yoon et al., 2000).
The aim was to make virtual characters more compelling over extended periods of time
by allowing them to learn (Blumberg et al., 2002). Learning was also seen to assist
the designer since “not every situation can be predicted at the character design stage”
(Yoon et al., 2000, p.365). The emphasis is on making characters learn movement
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tasks, based on feedback from the user (Burke & Blumberg, 2002). The characters
were required to be reactive and learn, in order to make “simple things simple and
complex things possible” (Isla et al., 2001, p.7). Interestingly, they found that some
mistakes the characters made improved realism (Isla et al., 2001).
Creature Kernel The main component of a character is its creature kernel which
decides what the character does and how to do it (Yoon et al., 2000). The kernel is
made up of four systems: percept, motivation, behaviour and motor systems (Yoon
et al., 2000). The percept system handles how the character receives information from
their world and the motor system implements chosen actions (Yoon et al., 2000).
The behaviour system is a network of hierarchically connected units that can excite
or inhibit each other and therefore govern the action selection process (Yoon et al.,
2000). The system triggers behaviour groups based on state, stimuli, interest, inhibitory
gain and preference (Yoon et al., 2000). The behaviour network can be modified by the
agent and actions can be added and deleted as the agent learns (Yoon et al., 2000).
The motivation system comprises drives and affect. Affect is emotions in a hi-
erarchy (high-level affect is mood) that each have a valence (good/bad), stance (ap-
proach/avoid) and arousal (intensity) (Yoon et al., 2000). Drives are also in a semi-
hierarchical network with connections that are modifiable by the agent (Yoon et al.,
2000). The agent starts with species-specific drives such as curiosity, hunger, dislike of
objects (Yoon et al., 2000).
Choosing and Implementing Behaviour When deciding which action to imple-
ment, the action with the highest expected reward is chosen (Burke & Blumberg,
2002), i.e. a greedy policy. Only one top-level behaviour is active at a time (Blumberg
& Galyean, 1997). A behaviour plan gives basic action commands and their impor-
tance to the motor controller system for the agent (Blumberg & Galyean, 1997). The
motor controller implements startle actions (behaviour) first, then default ones, where
startle actions can interrupt the current action (Isla et al., 2001). Level of interest de-
termines whether an action (behaviour) is interesting enough to implement (Blumberg
& Galyean, 1997). There is a releasing mechanism which gives actions a value above
which the action is triggered (Blumberg & Galyean, 1997). In Yoon et al. (2000), play-
ers can ‘possess” characters which strongly encourages the behaviour system to allow
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the player’s requests to be executed, however, the characters can resist possession to
the point that they leave the diner and the control of the player.
Learning Organisation, Concepts and Affective Tags Characters learn based
on feedback from their own personal experiences, but also from observing other char-
acters in the environment (Yoon et al., 2000). Observational learning assumes the
characters know where to focus their attention and what actions are interesting, i.e.
exactly what should be noticed (Yoon et al., 2000). In Yoon et al. (2000), the characters
in the diner can learn via three methods: organisational learning, concept learning and
affective tag formation.
Organisational learning modifies preferences on behaviour groups within the be-
haviour system and can add new behaviour or strategies (Yoon et al., 2000). The
preferences are linked to groups (not individual actions) based on expected reward,
which is, in turn, calculated based on expected valence and stance which are calculated
using inference learning about parent and children nodes within the network (Yoon
et al., 2000).
Concept learning relates to learning the features (from the percept system) which
are associated with objects or events (Yoon et al., 2000). All characters begin with the
same concepts such as “animals are scary”. The characters then refine the concepts
as they explore the world, so they can learn “tigers are scary”, “small, grey animals
(mice) are not scary” (Yoon et al., 2000).
Affective tags are updated based on motivational feedback and used when there
are no other cues to prefer one way over another (Yoon et al., 2000). They relate to
individual objects and events, which can be general, such as do not like red, or more
precise, such as do not like red umbrellas (Yoon et al., 2000). Affective tags help the
agent choose by eliminating actions related to objects or events with negative affective
tags (Yoon et al., 2000). Affective tags are based on somatic markers, but instead of
linking the tag with the action choice (as in somatic markers), they link the tag to
objects or events that may be involved in the action choice.
Animal Learning based on Reinforcement Learning In Blumberg et al. (2002),
the model combines unsupervised RL with supervised animal training techniques to
train a dog for typical dog tasks, e.g. sit. They use online learning and assume that
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the agent gets immediate feedback from its actions (Blumberg et al., 2002). Classical
conditioning learning (Isla et al., 2001) is used to teach “interesting” movements (Burke
& Blumberg, 2002). The agent learns causality relationships which are a list of time-
related cause and effect relationships that the agent has observed (Burke & Blumberg,
2002). A limitation of their model is that it biases the agents to learn immediate
consequences rather than extended action sequences (Blumberg et al., 2002). Agents
store state-action pairs that are typically accompanied by a numeric value representing
future expected reward or the benefit from doing that particular action in the associated
state (Blumberg et al., 2002). Action tuples include information on what to do, when,
to what, and for how long (Blumberg et al., 2002; Isla et al., 2001). The agents are
able to rank states in a hierarchy (a percept tree) by themselves during the simulation
(Blumberg et al., 2002). The animals can learn new states based on vocal input from
users (Isla et al., 2001) and these are placed within the hierarchy as the agent learns.
Personality Personality types can be initialised with different starting biases, and
then allowing the character to learn new motor skills (Yoon et al., 2000). In the
diner implementation, personality is described using emotion-terms, such as “angry”,
“happy”, “fearful” (Yoon et al., 2000). The three characters in the diner application
were each given their own creature kernel to govern behaviour, although most characters
had similar kernels excepts for initial biases towards desires, learning rates and more
(Yoon et al., 2000). Characters are able to learn to like actions they would not normally
like on their own based on feedback from a player in the world (Yoon et al., 2000).
Summary of Research by Blumberg et al. Blumberg et al. used learning and
personality for a small number of characters. Each character is designed with its own
specific creature kernel with fixed personality characteristics. Characters can learn in
a number of complex ways, via user feedback and via feedback according to their own
drives and motivations. According to Picard (1997), in Blumberg’s work, the effects
are global, “biasing or predisposing [the character] to certain behaviours or actions,
without determining these behaviours or actions”(Picard, 1997, p.217). Blumberg et
al.’s systems appear very complex with many domain-dependencies and very reliant
on the low-level percept and motor systems. The main emphasis of the research is a
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small number of handcrafted characters who are believable, rather than large numbers
of characters with different personalities.
2.3 Building Blocks: Theories to Be Used in this Thesis
In this literature survey we presented a number of theories from the broad area of
research relevant to this thesis. Here, we summarise the main theories that underpin
our model.
From Agent Research Our model uses a BDI paradigm (see Section 2.1.1.1, page
21), so as to provide an established mechanism for agents to reason about their goals
and plans, as well as failure recovery. We use both agent research and emotions to
underpin soft goals which represent goals that enable the agents to determine what
“good” and “bad’ means for them (see Section 2.1.1.2, page 24).
The cognitive appraisal model of emotions (see Section 2.1.1.3, page 27) can provide
a complex domain-dependent appraisal of choices process to enable agents to determine
what an event ‘means’ to them, in terms of which emotion to elicit and the intensity
of that emotion. In the theory there are three types of appraisal: primary appraisal,
secondary appraisal and reappraisal. Many implementations of appraisal concentrate
on primary appraisal. However, the work presented in this thesis has an emphasis on
personality, rather than emotions, so does not implement a full version of the cognitive
appraisal model of emotions. In our model, we implement secondary appraisal as
appraisal of coping choices or decision-making to determine which action to choose
when more than one action is available. We implement reappraisal as evaluation, which
is the process by which emotions are generated after actions have been completed.
Coping is implemented as a constant activity that agents pursue to improve their overall
wellbeing in the form of soft goals.
From Personality Theories Our model is based on cognitive-social theories of per-
sonality (see Section 2.1.2.2, page 32). We implement a combination of two types
of learning, learning by response consequences using a reinforcing function and self-
reinforcement. The reward received by characters is generated internally and is deter-
mined based on their own personal goals or motivations. The reward value depends
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on their own behaviour and also depends on what has happened in the world. Due to
this, the reward can be considered as partly self-reinforcement and partly learning by
response consequences.
For our model, we wish to mimic the development of individual differences auto-
matically, so that a simple character is able to adapt to its environment in order to gain
suitable complexity. Work by Ortony and Lazarus (see Section 2.1.2.3, page 35) relat-
ing to how individuals differ has contributed to constructing the causes and the way
in which behaviour is generated in our model. According to Caspi & Roberts (1999),
there are a variety of methods to measure differences in personality (see Section 2.1.2.3,
page 36). These methods are related to the testing-based research sub-questions that
we proposed in the introductory chapter (see Section 1.2, page 14) as follows:
1. Differential Continuity. Research sub-question 3b (individuals obtained).
2. Absolute Continuity. Research sub-question 1a (behaviour over time), research
sub-question 1c (reward over time).
3. Structural Continuity. Research sub-question 3a (comparing characters), and
individuality for Research sub-questions 1d and 2b.
4. Ipsative or Person-centred Continuity. Research sub-question 2a (behaviour in
different contexts)
5. Coherence. Research sub-question 1b (learning specific, functional goals, confirm-
ing continuity between soft goals and behaviour).
From Somatic Marker Hypothesis We use Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis
(see Section 2.1.3, page 36) to provide preferences for actions and the decision-making
process. In the hypothesis, somatic markers are part of a physical body. We will
not attempt to represent this physical body, and represent somatic markers as stored
preferences. We use the hypothesis to dictate how our agents make decisions between
actions. That is, actions are grouped according to their somatic marker preference into
desirable and non-desirable actions, rather than other methods of action selection that
are based purely on a probability function according to the exact preference. All actions
that are grouped together can then be considered equally, ignoring their ranking within
that group. These somatic marker preferences are inherently context-aware, so that the
characters will make decisions based on past experience in that particular context. The
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somatic marker values are adapted using the character’s personal reward value based
on their personal goals.
From Adaptation Theories The aim of this thesis is to develop a model of person-
ality that allows characters to become individuals without handcrafting all behaviour.
This thesis does not aim to make any new contributions to the field of adaptation and
machine learning. We use simple techniques to reduce complexity in this aspect of
our model. Hence, we use a process similar to reinforcement techniques, except the
reinforcement value comes from internal goals, rather than an external trainer.
2.4 Summary of Literature Survey
In this chapter we presented theories and applications relevant to this thesis. While this
body of past work has inspired our research and provides a basis for our model, there
are perceived gaps in the past work. Our work is expected to be useful to automatically
generate background or support characters. It is believed that the user will have many
interactions with characters of the same “type” (or archetype), and yet each instance
(i.e. character) of a type needs to be distinctly different from others of the same “type”.
In this way the appearance of diversity in the environment is improved, the player is
constantly exposed to new characters none of whom is exactly the same as another
character.
Giving characters personality will enable them to become more interesting since they
will appear different from other characters based on the behaviour they choose and the
way they act within the world. People do not act the same way in every situation
they are faced with. Previous applications use trait-based, static, personality theories
for their characters. This means that, to provide characters whose behaviour (and
therefore personality) depends on the situation, each situation has to be handcrafted
by the designer, and so the designer needs to predict all the situations in which the
character may find itself. In order to reduce the level of handcrafting required by
the designer, personality development theories, such as cognitive-social theories can be
used.
Current applications for games and intelligent virtual agents (IVAs) do not allow
character personality to adapt and be context-aware without extensive handcrafting
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and are all based on trait-based personality approaches. If the characters can con-
tinue to adapt, then the characters will become more engaging over longer periods of
time. Other applications using adaptation do so primarily so that characters can learn
functional tasks where the goal is clearly defined or they can learn based on extensive
feedback from the user. These processes are suitable for simple environments (with a
clear goal) or for a small number of characters (so that users do not have to explicitly
teach large numbers of characters how to behave).
The somatic marker hypothesis allows characters to make quick decisions based on
their past experiences and context. Somatic markers have not been previously imple-
mented alongside BDI approaches or explicitly linked to personality. Other implemen-
tations of the somatic marker hypothesis have used it to allow characters to make better
decisions in functional applications or to improve the way a character uses its emotions.
In addition to this usage, we use the somatic marker hypothesis to represent part of
a character’s personality. This is because learnt somatic markers guide a character’s
decisions, which in turn determines behaviour, the visible aspect of personality.
Now that we have established the background and grounding for our work, we are
able to introduce our model of agent personality development.
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Chapter 3
Agent Personality Development
Model
Our model is designed to enable complex personalities for character to be constructed
without handcrafting every behaviour. In this chapter we explain how the model will
satisfy all three research questions (see Section 1.2, page 14) by generating character
personalities that are adaptive, context-aware and individual. The glossary on page
xxiv provides a reference to the concepts and definitions used in this chapter.
Our model is designed to be generic and therefore applicable to any domain. How-
ever, to provide examples of the generic concepts, we use the motivating example in-
troduced in Chapter 1. The motivating example is set in a world where characters live
in villages. We will concentrate on one particular village and consider the characters
within this village, since the model can easily be extrapolated to other villages within
a more complex virtual world.
We begin by giving an overview of the model as if it was applied to the village
example. Then we define the key aspects of behaviour and what personality means in
our model. After this introduction we separate the components used to build the agents
and the process that uses these components. This chapter addresses the model-based
research sub-questions.
Illustration of Model as Applied to the Village Example The agents repre-
senting villagers have a number of activities they can perform including make, give,
sell, buy, ask, use, interact and respond. The villagers are constantly doing one of
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these activities and will automatically start a new activity after they have completed
all other activities they were doing. The villagers have a number of soft goals that
they can pursue (see literature survey Section 2.1.1.2, page 24), such as having friends,
having money, not being hungry, and no one in the village being hungry. The villagers
have no initial explicit knowledge of how to achieve these soft goals. Although many
villagers can be pursuing the same goals, the importance or weight that any one villager
places on each goal may differ. For example, one villager may place a high importance
on not being hungry and a low importance on having money. The villager’s actions will
affect achievement of their soft goals and they will need to learn which actions lead to
achievement of the soft goals they personally consider important.
Making a Decision in the Village Example When a villager is faced with the
choice of which activity to do next, it starts by determining its current context, based
on the current level of achievement of its soft goals. For example, the villager may be
hungry and not have much money. They use this to look up the preference they have,
based on past experience, for each of the available activities. For example, they use
the context [not hungry and have money] to determine the preference for “give” and
“sell” and any other available activities. Then the villager separates these activities into
buckets of ‘desirable’, ‘undesirable’ and ‘don’t care’ according to the somatic marker hy-
pothesis. In order to ensure all activities are explored appropriately, a random number
is used to determine which group to choose an activity from first. This random number
is compared to a cutoff value, so that it is highly likely that the ‘desirable’ group will
be chosen but the other groups will also be occasionally chosen. If there are multiple
activities within the chosen group, then, for simplicity, the villager randomly chooses
an activity within the group to execute. This activity may require further decisions to
be made. For example, if the chosen activity is to sell something then decisions about
what to sell and who to sell it to need to be made. If this happens, then the decision
process just described is repeated for those sub-activities or plans.
Evaluation in the Village Example After the villager has finished executing its
top-level activity (e.g. “sell”), it performs an evaluation of the activity and all the
plans that were successfully executed. It determines how close it is to achieving each
of its goals now which gives it an individual reward value for each goal. The villager
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sums these values together, based on how important it considers each goal, to obtain
an overall personal reward value for the activity. For example, the villager may still
be hungry, but has more money. If this villager places more importance on not being
hungry, the reward for this activity may not be as large as it could be compared to
if making money was most important. The personal reward is compared to previous
reward values to determine whether this activity was “good” (i.e. closer proximity
to achieving all of its important goals) or “bad”. The reward is used to update the
character’s preferences for the plans from which it chose in the context it was in when it
made the decision. That is, if the villager choose to “sell food” in the original context,
[hungry and have money], the preference for “sell food” may be decreased for this
context, since the villager has not improved its achievement of goals. So the character
updates its preferences and next time may choose a different choice since it has updated
the preference on “sell food” for the context [hungry and have money].
Building Relationships in the Village Example Within the domain-dependent
activities undertaken by the characters, they are able to build up relationships with
other characters, for example, who they consider to be a “friend”. Over time the
characters will acquire different sets of relationships with the other characters. Based
on the decision-making and evaluation processes the characters will also have different
preferences on activities depending on their experience. This will mean that each
character is different from the others (individual in terms of observable behaviour), can
adapt to new environments, and chooses activities based on its perceived context and
past experience.
Key Aspects of Behaviour Personality of virtual characters can only be perceived
by players or users based on actual behaviour exhibited by the characters within the
world, as chosen by the agent part of the character. Based on cognitive-social the-
ories (Bandura, 1977) (see literature survey Section 2.1.2.2, page 32), and work by
Ortony (2002) and Lazarus (1991) on individual differences (see literature survey Sec-
tion 2.1.2.3, page 35), we believe that the causes of behaviour can be classified into
three major categories:
1. A value and goal hierarchy , or a personality template;
2. Current context; and
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3. Past experience.
The personality template is used to guide learning and development to ensure that the
personality is within appropriate limits. Context ensures that the agent’s behaviour is
relevant to its current perceived situation. Past experience allows the agent to develop
and learn. Note that our model works similarly to cognitive-social theories (Bandura,
1977) (see literature survey Section 2.1.2.2, page 32) where behaviour is influenced by
the person and the environment; and the opposite is also true. The behaviour that an
agent chooses will affect its environment and will affect its experiences, which will in
turn affect future behaviour.
The personality template is constructed using a number of components that repre-
sent how the agent responds to the environment, the actions available and a ranking
of importance of goals it is trying to achieve. It is generally accepted that both nature
and nurture play key roles in personality development (Lazarus, 1991) (see literature
survey Section 2.1.2, page 31). A personality template can be seen as an agent’s in-
trinsic nature, whereas its past experience can be seen as its nurture. The personality
template can be considered to be similar to the value and goal hierarchy Lazarus (1991)
considered to be a key component of personality (see literature survey Section 2.1.2.3,
page 35).
In order for the agent to use context, the agent itself needs to store domain-
dependent knowledge, such as objects the agent has, and who it likes. This domain-
dependent information is required when calculating how close the agent is to achieving
its goals. The achievement levels of goals are then used to determine what context the
agent believes it is in.
We use Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) (see literature survey
Section 2.1.3, page 36) as the reinforcement learning selection policy to link an agent’s
current context with its own past experience. We update somatic markers using an
adaptation loop (reinforcement learning) that evaluates the success of activities (based
on the agent’s goals), reward function, and creates corresponding somatic markers or
preferences. The adaptation loop is the key element in the automatic development of
agent personality.
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Definition of Personality So, within the context of our model, what does “per-
sonality” mean and how does it influence behaviour? We take personality to mean
the combination of the personality template and somatic markers (past experience).
Somatic markers are used for decision-making, so that the choice of what to do now
depends on the success of what was done last time this context was perceived. Thus,
personality influences decision-making. Personality should also influence an agent’s
evaluation of the success or failure of an activity. To model this aspect of personality,
we use soft goal personality to evaluate success or failure of completed actions. Soft
goal personality is the relative importance that an individual places on each of the
available soft goals.
We will now discuss the agents’ components in our model and then we will detail
how the agents use and modify these components within the adaptation process.
3.1 Model Components
In this section we investigate the major components that each agent needs to have in
order to exhibit an individual personality that adapts and is context-aware. We address
the following model-based research sub-questions:
• What aspects of personality can adapt?
• How can context be represented?
• What is a personality template?
The components or beliefs that each agent stores in our model are shown in Figure 3.1,
we will discuss these in detail in the subsequent sections. We begin by an explanation of
what soft goals are in our model and the main components they influence: achievement
level, and context. Next, we discuss the somatic marker table and how somatic markers
are stored and used. The three main components that make up the agent’s personality
template are presented: goal/plan hierarchy, soft goal personality, and emotionality.
We finish with a brief look at domain-dependent knowledge.
3.1.1 Soft Goal Related Components
The goals that the agents are trying to achieve forms a key part of its decision-making
and evaluation sub-processes. As explained in the literature survey, formal models of
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Figure 3.1: Agent components and beliefs
goals contain a number of different types of goals (Braubach et al., 2004) (see literature
survey Section 2.1.1.2, page 24). Hard goals are directly achievable by implementation
of a specific plan, according to the explicit goal/plan hierarchy. The set of adopted
hard goals is non-conflicting and only one goal is pursued at a time. Soft goals work at
a level above the goal/plan hierarchy and are a set of potentially conflicting goals that
the agent is attempting to achieve at every step. The agent is not given any knowledge
of which plans achieve their soft goals. Plans may contribute partially to achieving a
number of different soft goals.
The agent is given a number of soft goals based on its soft goal personality, as part
of the its fixed personality template. The soft goal personality specifies which soft goals
the agent is pursuing, the importance it places on each of these goals, and the ideal
goal value. The soft goal personality is described later in more detail as part of the
personality template in Section 3.1.3.2 (page 80). The agents adapts and learns to find
the best way (or ways) to achieve its soft goals.
We begin by examining the achievement levels of soft goals and the domain-dependent
equations needed to calculate achievement levels. Then we define what context means
in our model.
3.1.1.1 Achievement Level of Soft Goals and Soft Goal Equations
For each of the soft goals it is trying to achieve, the agent stores the current achievement
level of that goal. For example, if the soft goal is “have friends”, then the achievement
level represents a quantitative measurement of this. If the agent is friends with half of
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the population of the village currently, the value may be set at 50%. To determine this
achievement level, domain-dependent soft goal equations are used. These equations
are functions that take knowledge of the world and determine the achievement level of
each soft goal. Achievement levels are updated during evaluation of an activity. The
agents use their current level of achievement of their soft goals to influence reward and
context calculations.
Storage of achievement levels is domain independent. However, since the actual soft
goals are domain-dependent, an equation to determine the achievement level must be
supplied. The soft goal equations are the same for every agent. That is, having friends is
measured in the same way by all agents, although the goal value may be different. Soft
goals must relate to the domain-dependent knowledge stored by the agent, otherwise
the equation cannot be used to measure success or failure of that particular soft goal.
3.1.1.2 Context
In this section we address the second research question (see Section 1.2, page 14):
How can a model of personality be created that uses context? We also address sub-
question: How can context be represented? We are interested in context because it
is a key component of personality according to cognitive-social theories and individual
differences (see summary in the literature survey Section 2.1.2, page 31).
We use context to relate to an agent’s soft goals, in particular, to describe overall
achievement level of all of its soft goals. For each soft goal, a letter is used to represent
the subjective achievement level. For example, if the agent is friends with half of the
population currently, its soft goal personality within its personality template will dictate
whether the soft goal “have friends” is considered to be ‘H’ (high), ‘M’ (medium), ‘L’
(low). If the achievement level is unable to be measured, it is assigned as unavailable
using ‘-’. This can occur (for example) if the soft goal is “talk to friends” and the agent
has no friends currently. These letters are combined in alphabetical order of the soft
goal they represent. For example, if there are two soft goals “have friends” and “have
money”, a context of “HL” represents that the agent is currently in: have lots of have
friends and no money. The somewhat arbitrary distinction of ‘H’, ‘M’, ‘L’ is intended
to limit the total number of contexts possible.
It is possible to include further information within the context, if the goal/plan
hierarchy or domain requires it. This information is most likely to relate to decisions the
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agent has already made within the same top-level activity it is implementing currently.
For example, if Chris has already decided to give away bread; when choosing “who to
give it to” he should consider that he has already chosen to give bread. That is, the
context could be “HL&Bread”. This extra information may not be necessary for many
domains, particularly since it drastically increases the number of contexts about which
the agent needs to learn.
By linking context to the achievement of soft goals, it provides a means for agents
to learn that, when the achievement level of a particular soft goal is low, certain actions
will improve the achievement of that goal. For example in the village domain, if Chris
does not have many friends, giving away bread will probably help him gain more friends.
3.1.2 Somatic Markers
Damasio’s (1994) somatic markers (see literature survey Section 2.1.3, page 36) are
a key concept in our model and are used as a simple method of allowing the effects
of experience or gut instinct to contribute to decisions. Somatic markers are used to
represent an agent’s past experience, so as to guide the agent’s decision-making towards
or away from available plans, and can adapt with time. According to the hypothesis,
somatic markers are linked to a physical body. However, we use computational methods
to simulate the effect of somatic markers on decision making, not their physical effects.
In considering the research sub-question relating to which aspects of personality can
adapt, somatic markers are a part of an agent’s personality and represent the aspect
that adapts. During the adaptation process (see Section 3.2, page 82), the somatic
marker preferences are used during decision-making and then updated based on the
agent’s immediate experience.
In our model, a somatic marker is a record consisting of a context and plan key
with a numerical preference value. When the agent is required to decide between more
than one action in a context of which it has no experience, the agent creates initial
somatic markers for every action that is applicable. After execution of an activity, each
plan name and context pair that actually completed execution have the somatic marker
preference updated for that particular agent, based on how successful the activity was
deemed to be. The new preference is recorded and stored in that agent’s look-up table
of somatic markers. This stored value is used the next time the agent is in that context
and must choose between that particular plan and the others available. Calculation of
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the new, updated preference value is described in evaluation (see Section 3.2.2, page
90).
To explain how somatic markers work within the context of our model, let us take a
concrete example from the village domain. Consider the agent Chris, who is trying to
achieve the soft goals “have friends” and “have money”, and has equal importance on
both. Chris, gets to a point where he can choose between the top-level activities. Chris
uses his current achievement of soft goals to determine his context, for this example
we will use “HL”, which means Chris has many friends and not much money. Then,
Chris uses the context and each plan name to find all preference values for the plans
he is choosing between. Based on these values he chooses a plan to try next (using
the appraisal of coping process described in Section 3.2.1, page 87). Let us assume
Chris has chosen “give”, he then implements that plan, which requires him to choose
what to give and who to give it to, so he must look up the somatic markers for the
available sub-plans. When Chris has finished the “give” activity he then performs an
evaluation of the success of this activity and its chosen sub-plans in achieving his soft
goals. Based on this the somatic marker preference values for the chosen plans and
activity are updated for this particular context, i.e. “HL”.
If Chris has no friends, but a lot of money (“LH”), he should eventually discover
that giving away products for free will improve his overall achievement of his goals,
since he will gain friends. However, if Chris is friends with everyone, but has no money
(“HL”), he should find that, giving away products for free will not improve his overall
achievement of his goals. Chris will need to attempt other activities and may discover
that selling his products will improve his overall achievement, only to the level that
it does not take away too many friends. That is, Chris may learn that either giving
or selling are his favourite activities depending on his context. In this sense somatic
markers are similar to expected utility for plans within this context. However, if another
agent, e.g. Adam, has the same importance on the soft goals “have friends” and “have
money”, he may discover that to have friends and money he can interact with people
and say nice things to them, buy objects from others, sell his products, and never give
anything for free.
If there are many agents within the village who make bread (i.e. are bakers), then
Chris may find it difficult to sell bread, since everyone will have bread of their own.
In this circumstance, Chris may discover that if he makes candles, i.e. becomes a
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Figure 3.2: Possible partial goal/plan hierarchy from the village domain. Part A.
candlestick maker, he will be able to sell his candles and make more money. This is a
preliminary step to generating observable personality. Being a baker or a candlestick
maker are not usually considered to be personality traits, so this concept needs to be
followed further. When the agents are given more diverse choices, such as singing while
making bread, or yelling while selling products, then the agents could be seen to choose,
not just what to do, but how to do it in their own way. Agents learn these preferences
automatically based on past experience with the other agents and the environment
itself.
3.1.3 Personality Template
In research question three we ask how personality can be implemented so that the same
template can be used to create a number of distinct, individual characters, according
to their behaviour. This in turn leads to the question: What is a personality template?
Our goal is that the developer can create a small number of templates, and yet
end up with a much larger number of observably different agents who still have some
similar goals and behaviour. For the agent component of each character, we define
a fixed personality template (potentially the same as that of a different agent) that
helps guide evaluation, decision-making and agent behaviour so that the agent does
not adapt and change uncontrollably. The personality template cannot change over
time, even though the agent’s observed personality, in the form of behaviour, can
change over time due to learning. The personality template restricts the way that the
agent’s overall “personality”, including somatic markers, can develop. The personality
template can be handcrafted to suit many agents. There are three components to the
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Figure 3.3: Possible partial goal/plan hierarchy from the village domain. Part B.
personality template: goal/plan hierarchy; soft goal personality; and emotionality. We
now explain each of these in turn.
3.1.3.1 Goal/Plan Hierarchy
Our model uses the BDI agent programming paradigm (see literature survey Section
2.1.1.1, page 21). In a BDI paradigm, the plans available to an agent are represented
in a goal/plan hierarchy. The goal/plan hierarchy is designed for the particular domain
and represents the hard goals (not soft goals) and the associated plans an agent can
use to achieve the goals and indirectly its soft goals. Goal/plan hierarchies have a
hard goal at the top and the plans indicate ways to achieve this goal. The hierarchy
is designed so that each goal in the hierarchy has at least one plan that will directly
achieve that goal. In simple cases, by successfully executing a plan that handles the
goal, it is assumed that the hard goal has been achieved, without testing to confirm
this. Plans are able to post sub-goals that are all required to be achieved for the plan
to be successful. At the bottom level are plans with simple steps that do not require
any sub-goals. One possible (partial) implementation of a goal/plan hierarchy for the
village domain is illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. In this example implementation,
eight top-level activities are available for an agent to choose from: Make, Sell, Give,
Ask, Buy, Use, Interact, and Respond.
For a given domain, it is likely that a large number of different agents can use the
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same goal/plan hierarchy. Many domains will only require one goal/plan hierarchy as
long as it is rich enough to encapsulate all actions that agents can execute. In our
model, the domain-dependent goal/plan hierarchy is linked into a generic goal/plan
hierarchy to ensure that the agents can perform an evaluation of their choices. This
generic structure is described in the adaptation process (see Section 3.2, page 82).
3.1.3.2 Soft Goal Personality
The agent’s soft goal personality represents the soft goals that the agent seeks to
achieve, the importance of each goal, and the level it must reach to be considered
“achieved”. This enables the agent to calculate its own personal reward values (i.e.
self-reinforcement) during the evaluation process, rather than relying on an external
trainer (as most reinforcement learning problems require, see literature survey Section
2.1.4.2, page 38). Our agents are able to determine personal reward based on what they
consider to be “good” and “bad” according to the soft goals they are trying to achieve.
In hierarchical reinforcement learning (RL) (see literature survey Section 2.2.1.3, page
49), every agent has the same goals. These goals are put into a hierarchy by the de-
signer so that the agents can determine reward when they have multiple goals. In our
model, the agents are given a list of the soft goals they should achieve as part of their
input personality template.
As described earlier, soft goals can be conflicting. For example, the agent may
simultaneously want to have objects and give away objects. What can be different
for each agent is the importance, or weight, it places on each soft goal; whether it
wants to maximise or minimise the value; and the ideal value of the goal. For example,
Chris may place a very high importance on making friends, and a small importance
on making money; while Adam agent may place a high importance on no one being
hungry. The soft goal personality includes information on what the agent considers to
be the maximum or ideal value for each soft goal. For example, one agent may consider
“have money” achieved when it has $100,000, another agent may only consider the soft
goal achieved with $1 million. If any of the soft goal personality values are not provided
for a particular soft goal, the domain-dependent default is used.
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3.1.3.3 Emotionality
The term emotionality is used to represent an agent’s emotional personality, similar to
Ortony (2002) (see literature survey Section 2.1.2.3, page 35) and includes aspects that
Vela´squez (1998) used for temperament (see literature survey Section 2.2.2.3, page 59).
Different individuals will react to the same event differently based on their emotionality.
In Figure 3.1 (page 74), it can be seen that emotionality is made up of a number of
different values. We define emotionality as a vector of values:
1. uptake values (u): how the initial reaction to an emotion event is recorded. A
high negative uptake value means the agent considers even the smallest bad event
to be very bad. A low positive uptake value means positive events will not affect
emotions as much;
2. decay values (b): how long it takes for a particular emotion event to decay with
time. Low decay values mean that the agent will take a long time to forget an
event;
3. domain-dependent thresholds: cutoff values for emotions, opinions etc. Used by
the agent to determine if something or someone is “good’ or “bad”;
4. soft goal achievement thresholds: cutoff values for allocating a letter (e.g. ‘H’,
‘M’, or ‘L’) to a soft goal achievement level. This will determine the agent’s
context.
5. bucketing thresholds (δ): used in decision-making to determine which plans are
“desirable” (see Section 3.2.1, page 87). High bucketing thresholds mean that
a plan must be very good to separated out from other plans and be considered
“desirable”;
6. bucketing choice threshold (τ): used in decision-making to determine which
bucket to choose from (see Section 3.2.1, page 87). A low bucket choice threshold
will cause the agent to be more likely to exploit successful plans, rather than
explore other choices; and
7. step-wise learning parameters (α, β, r0): used to moderate the influence of recent
rewards compared to past rewards in learning;
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3.1.4 Domain-dependent Knowledge
The agents must store information about their domain in order to be able to evaluate
the achievement of their soft goals and therefore evaluate their success or failure. In the
village example domain, beliefs (knowledge) that the agents store could include: amount
of money they have, objects they currently hold (e.g. have 2 candles), happiness and
other emotions, attraction values towards others and how much others are attracted to
them.
3.2 Adaptation Process
The previous section introduced the main components of each agent. In this section we
address how these components are used and modified so that the agent can adapt. This
relates to the first research question as to how can a model of personality be created
that uses adaptation. In doing so, we consider the following model-based sub-questions:
• How are decisions made?
• How can characters calculate reward?
• How can characters use reward to change behaviour?
• How can context information be provided?
• How does personality change over time (i.e. how can a character be different from
another character with the same template)?
In our model, personality includes past experience, as implemented by somatic markers.
An agent’s somatic markers are used to assist decision-making and adapt over time
based on self-calculated rewards. Characters calculate reward based on their soft goal
personality and experiences in the environment. The personality template guides how
they adapt, but each agent will have its own experiences, that generate its own unique
somatic markers. In this way, personality is enabled to change over time and allow
agents to differ from each other, even given the same initial personality template.
The agents use an execution loop at every time step and an adaptation loop for
every activity (i.e. longer duration). We begin this section by explaining the difference
between the execution loop and the adaptation loop in our model. Then we detail the
exact steps of appraisal of coping choices, followed by evaluation.
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Figure 3.5: Adaptation process: triggered by an incoming or self-generated event.
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Execution Loop At every time step the agents follow an execution loop, see Figure
3.4. The model we are proposing adds a more complex decision-making process to
the plan choice step of the standard BDI execution cycle (compare Figure 3.4 to the
standard cycle shown in Figure 2.2, page 24). The extra step is appraisal of coping
choices which uses the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) (see literature survey
Section 2.1.3, page 36), the steps of appraisal of coping choices are explained in Section
3.2.1 (page 87). Appraisal of coping choices corresponds to secondary appraisal in the
cognitive appraisal model of emotions (see literature survey Section 2.1.1.3, page 27)
and acts as the reinforcement learning selection policy, the function that maps from
perceived states of the environment to action (Sutton & Barto, 1998) (see literature
survey Section 2.1.4.2, page 40). Note that if there are no new events, then the agent
simply executes the next step in its current plan, if it has one.
In order to develop personality automatically, a learning feedback (adaptation loop)
is needed to update each agent’s past experience, represented by somatic markers. That
is, in order to learn how to improve the appraisal of choices process, a reward function
needs be used in conjunction with a value function. This adaptation loop requires
that the agent uses a specific adaptation process, see Figure 3.5. In this process, the
agent chooses a plan to execute, executes it, and then evaluates the success of this
plan with respect to achieving its soft goals. The process becomes a loop because after
every evaluation the agent will automatically choose something new to do, if it is not
currently doing anything else.
At every time step the agent completes the execution loop shown in Figure 3.4. A
single step in a plan would probably not have changed the agent’s perception of the
environment sufficiently for the agent to be able to determine the effect and merit of
that single step. For example, it would be difficult to perform an evaluation after a
small step, such as choosing who to talk to. This means that the adaptation process
(Figure 3.5) needs to apply only to major actions (called activities) and constitutes a
higher level loop than the BDI-based execution cycle. For example, a suitable activity
would be a longer interaction, such as actually having an entire conversation with an
agent. A generic structure is needed to force the agents to follow this adaptation loop
in addition to the standard execution cycle.
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Figure 3.6: The adaptation process with a generic goal/plan hierarchy: linking the adap-
tation loop to the top-level of a domain-dependent BDI hierarchy.
Adaptation Loop The adaptation process (Figure 3.5) is enforced by combining
some domain independent goals and plans and raising them to the top of the goal/plan
hierarchy, see Figure 3.6. This ensures that an agent will always evaluate its choices.
There are two built-in plans that the agent can use: a proactive plan and a reactive
plan. The reactive plan is triggered by an incoming event (goal) from the environment
(e.g. new agent arrived in village), from another agent (e.g. a request to interact or
to buy something), or from the agent itself (e.g. choose what to bake). The proactive
plan is used when the agent has no activities to do currently, and this also functions
to ensure agents are always doing “something”. Both plans cause the agent to perform
the following adaptation process shown in Figure 3.5 and described here.
1. Appraisal of coping choices: Choose between activities or plans to decide what
to do next.
2. Execution of the chosen plan: this might involve posting another goal and then
making further appraisal choices of sub-plans. Repeat steps 1 and 2 as required
by the domain-dependent goal/plan hierarchy.
3. Evaluation: after the top-level activity has been finished, evaluate achievement
levels of soft goals; evaluate personal reward; update somatic marker values (pref-
erences); and update emotions.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of adaptation processes on components and beliefs: How components
and beliefs affect and are affected by the two main adaptation process, i.e. appraisal of
choices and evaluation.
This adaptation process is similar in some respects to the execution loop used by Ahn
& Picard (2006) to increase the efficiency of learning and decision-making by using
emotions in the decision-making process (see literature survey Section 2.2.2.2, page 58).
In summary, we have enhanced the standard BDI architectures by including somatic
markers, soft goals, and evaluation. This is done by adding an extra step when choosing
which plan to implement and forcing agents to evaluate results after top-level activities
have been completed.
Components and the Adaptation Process Figure 3.7 shows the two main sub-
processes of the adaptation process, appraisal of choices (decision-making) and eval-
uation, and how they affect the agent’s components. Personality can be observed in
actions done, which can be seen to be influenced by somatic markers in appraisal of
choices, and these in turn are influenced by soft goal personality in the evaluation pro-
cess. In appraisal of choices, the domain-dependent goal/plan hierarchy and context
are used to look up the somatic markers for available actions. This leads to a choice
between the actions. In evaluation, the actions taken, domain-dependent evaluation
functions (soft goal equations) and the ideal soft goal value from the soft goal personal-
ity are used to calculate a value of how much each soft goal is being achieved currently
(achievement level of soft goals). This in turn leads to an update of the agent’s context.
The domain-dependent soft goal equations also lead to an overall personal reward value
when combined with the importance of soft goals from the soft goal personality. The
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reward value is used to update the somatic marker preferences during the evaluation
of a completed activity.
We will discuss in detail Steps 1 and 3: appraisal of choices and evaluation. Step
2, execution of a plan, is domain-dependent based on the designer defined goal/plan
hierarchy.
3.2.1 Appraisal of Coping Choices
In this section we address more fully the research sub-question relating to how decisions
are made. The appraisal of coping choices process is used for decision-making between
multiple plans. Coping in the cognitive appraisal model of emotions (see literature
survey Section 2.1.1.3, page 27) is the result of a reaction to a new emotional state
generated by a new event and the primary appraisal process. In our model we use
coping as plans or actions that the agent can use to improve their overall wellbeing in
the form of achieving their soft goals (not just their emotional state).
The appraisal of coping choices process is part of the execution loop performed at
every step and also part of the adaptation loop. In the execution loop, appraisal of
choices is used to determine which plan to execute next. Appraisal of choices fulfills the
role of the reinforcement selection policy and is considered part of adaptation because
the agent needs to remember what it choose so that it can update the policy based on
its experience. In the cognitive appraisal model, appraisal usually refers to the initial
(primary) evaluation made when an event is recognised and emotions are updated.
Secondary appraisal in the cognitive appraisal model is the decision-making step and
is used to decide what to do next to cope with the emotions generated. We use the
term appraisal of coping choices to refer to this secondary appraisal process. The third
part of appraisal (according to the cognitive appraisal model) is reappraisal which is
implemented in our model as evaluation (see Section 3.2.2, page 90).
The appraisal of coping choices process is based directly on Damasio’s somatic
marker hypothesis (see literature survey Section 2.1.3, page 36). The hypothesis de-
scribes how humans make decisions in the real-world. Although we do not simulate
physical bodies for our agents, the appraisal of coping choices process is otherwise
consistent with the somatic marker hypothesis.
When a goal is posted that could be handled by more than one plan, the agent uses
appraisal of coping choices to determine which plan to choose to execute. If the chosen
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plan fails to finish successfully, the BDI system automatically reposts the original goal.
This causes the agent to repeat the appraisal of choices process and choose from the
other applicable plans, excluding the failed plan. When only one plan is left, there is
no need to follow the appraisal of choices process since no choice can be made. The
final plan is implemented, but will not have its somatic marker updated since the plan
was not chosen. If the final plan fails and there are no more applicable plans available,
then the goal will fail. This may cause the plan that posted that goal to fail and so on
up the goal/plan hierarchy, unless this failure is handled explicitly. The steps in the
appraisal of coping choices process in our model are described as follows:
1. Determine which plans are applicable. Examine the goal/plan hierarchy to
see which plans are available to handle the goal posted, then consider whether
each plan is currently applicable. For example, the plan “give something” is not
applicable if the agent has nothing to give. This step generates a list of applicable
plans.
2. Find the current context using soft goal achievement levels. Use the
“H”, “M”, “L” value for the current level of achievement for each of the soft goals
and place together in alphabetical order of the name of each soft goal (see Section
3.1.1.2 (page 75). If the domain requires, add any extra information to expand
the context. For example, if the agent is choosing who to give an object to, the
type of the object itself may need to be included.
3. Obtain somatic marker preference. For each applicable plan, ai, find the
current somatic marker preference, ps,t(ai), for this context, s, at the current
time, t, using the somatic marker lookup table. If this context-plan pair has not
been encountered before, set the preference to an initial domain-dependent value.
4. Bucket plans. Group plans into three buckets based on their preference values,
ps,t(ai), to simulate the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) (see literature
survey Section 2.1.3, page 36) that will guide decisions towards or away from
plans. To group plans, we use the average preference, p¯, and standard deviation of
preferences, σ, for applicable plans. We also use the agent’s bucketing thresholds,
δ−ve and δ+ve, from emotionality in the personality template. The plans are
grouped into “desirable”, “undesirable”, and “don’t care” based on:
88
3.2 Adaptation Process
• if ps,t(ai) > p¯+ σδ+ve; plan is in the “desirable” group;
• if ps,t(ai) < p¯− σδ−ve; plan is in the “undesirable” group; and
• if p¯− σδ−ve ≤ ps,t(ai) ≤ p¯+ σδ+ve; plan is in the “don’t care” group.
5. Decide which group to use. If the agent always chooses a plan to execute
from the “desirable” group, then the first plan that reaches the desirable group
will always be chosen and the agent will cease to explore other possibilities. To
handle the trade-off between exploration and exploitation, a random number, ,
is chosen, where 0 ≤  < 1. This value determines which group the agent should
attempt to choose from first. The bucket choice threshold value from emotionality,
τ , guides the use of  according to:
• if  ≥ τ , try to choose in the order:
1. “desirable”; 2. “neither”; 3. “undesirable”;
• if  ≤ 14τ , (i.e. a small number and very unlikely to occur), try to choose in
the order:
1. “undesirable”; 2. “neither”; 3. “desirable”;
• else, try to choose in the order:
1. “neither”; 2. “desirable”; 3. “undesirable”;
In this way, the “desirable” group is chosen most often, but not always. The other
groups are chosen less frequently, but the potential for exploration is retained.
6. Choose a plan randomly from the first group chosen. If there are no
plans available in the preferred group, attempt to choose a plan from the next
group and repeat until a plan is chosen. Based on the somatic marker hypothesis
(Damasio, 1994) (see Section 2.1.3, page 36), at this point a more thorough and
in-depth domain-dependent decision-making process can be used to determine
which plan should be chosen from within a “desirable” group. This is because
somatic markers are meant as a coarse sorting of all plans available so that the
in-depth analysis does not need to be performed on a potentially large number of
plans. However, we wanted to test whether somatic markers improved decision-
making at all and decided to begin with a simpler model, using random choice
within the group to reduce domain-dependent coding.
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Usually in RL, when preferences for plans are obtained the selection policy is simply
a probability function to determine how likely it is for each plan to be chosen. However,
we are using the somatic marker hypothesis which only allows us to determine whether
a plan is “good” or “bad”. This means that our process takes the stored (continuous)
somatic marker value and turns it into a discrete value by bucketing it.
3.2.2 Evaluation
In this section we focus on the research sub-questions: How can context information
be provided? How can characters calculate reward? How can characters use reward to
change behaviour?
When making decisions, an agent uses its current context in the appraisal of coping
choices process to determine which plan to choose for this particular configuration of
soft goal achievement levels. Depending on its soft goals, an agent will have a number
of different contexts, although it is only in one at a time (see Section 3.1.1.2, page 75).
For each context, the agent needs to know its somatic marker preference, i.e. what to
do in this context. In previous applications that use context when making decisions,
this detail has been handcrafted by the designer (e.g. Campos et al., 2006; Rousseau
& Hayes-Roth, 1998) (see literature survey Section 2.2.2.1, page 55). The main goal of
this thesis is to create individual characters with a minimum of handcrafted behaviour.
So, we use evaluation as a self-reinforcement learning process to automatically build
up the somatic markers that an agent needs for every context it encounters. In this
evaluation process, the individual (not an external trainer) calculates for themselves
how much they prefer one outcome over another (Cloninger, 2008; Phares & Chaplin,
1997) (see literature survey Section 2.1.2.2, page 32).
To give feedback on the activity completed and therefore enable adaptation, the
agent performs an evaluation of how well it is achieving its soft goals. The results (i.e.
level of success or failure of plans) are stored so that they can be used by the agent
to encourage the agent not to make the same mistake when it is next in that context
deciding what to do. As found by Ponsen et al. (2006a), determining a reward function
when there are multiple goals can be difficult (see literature survey Section 2.2.1.3, page
47). We use a process that combines how important each individual agent considers its
goals. This leads to the evaluation process consisting of the following steps.
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1. Update achievement levels and calculate the individual reward for each soft goal.
2. Calculate personal reward, how well this agent thinks it is doing currently and
the success of the plans executed.
3. Update somatic marker preferences for all the plans that were successful, using
the context from when the choice was made.
4. Update emotions.
5. Update the reference reward.
Each of these steps is now described in more detail. That is, how personal reward
(self-reinforcement value) is calculated and how the somatic marker value for a given
context is updated.
3.2.2.1 Step 1: Individual Soft Goal Reward Calculation
For soft goal, j, at time t, the achievement level, zt,j , is updated by the domain-
dependent soft goal equations. For example, if the soft goal is to “have money”, then
the amount of money the agent believes it has now can be used as the measure. As
another example, if the soft goal was “not to be hungry”, then the achievement level
could be based on the amount of food the agent has eaten over the last time period.
Since the soft goals themselves and the beliefs (facts and opinions) that the agent
stores are domain-dependent, the calculation of the achievement level is necessarily
domain-dependent.
Most beliefs are updated directly within the domain-dependent plans of the goal/plan
hierarchy. For example, if a plan gives the agent money, the agent’s fact about how
much money it has will be updated as a step within that plan. Opinion-related beliefs
are also updated in this way, e.g. if the plan caused the agent to change its opinion of
another agent. Some soft goals are based on the agent’s emotions, such as “be happy”.
Unlike other beliefs of the agent, emotions are updated based on the agent’s personal
reward value. This occurs as one of the final steps during evaluation, see Step 4. This
means that, if the soft goal depends on an emotion, the individual reward value calcu-
lated here (in Step 1) would reflect what the agent did in the previous cycle, not the
current one, since emotion has not been updated yet. To overcome this, the agent uses
an estimate of what the current emotion will become based on the achievement level
of all other soft goals and the previous emotion value.
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A domain-dependent reward function, based on the distance to the ideal soft goal
value, Zj,max, is used to calculate reward for each soft goal. The ideal value can be set
within the soft goal personality or the default domain-dependent value can be used.
The absolute reward, rabst,j , at time t (i.e. now) for each soft goal, j, is:
rabst,j = Zj,max − zt,j (3.1)
where zt,j is the current (just calculated) achievement level of soft goal, j; and Zj,max
is the desired goal value of the reward. The range of this absolute reward is 0 ≤ zt,j ≤
Zj,max − Zj,min, where 0 is the best value the absolute reward can take.
This method assumes that the maximum value is greater than the current value.
However, if, for example, the soft goal is for no one in the village to be hungry, the
ideal value would be that no one is hungry, i.e. 0. In this circumstance, the absolute
reward should be calculated using
rabst,j = zt,j − Zj,max (3.2)
This gives an absolute reward on the same scale and with 0 being the best value.
Reward is commonly used where high values represent a desirable reward, negative
values are punishment, and zero is neither a reward or punishment. So to convert
reward so that the range is rmin ≤ rt,j ≤ rmax (in many domains it is likely the range
will be [−1, 1]), the following equation is used when ideal value is greater than the
current value (after substituting in equation 3.1):
rt,j = rmax − (rmax − rmin)× Zj,max − zt,j
Zj,max − Zj,min (3.3)
The above equations are suitable when the agent wants to maximise the soft goal,
e.g., “have friends”. However, sometimes the agent wants to minimise the goal, e.g.,
minimise “have enemies”, which is different from placing a low importance (weight) on
the goal “have enemies”, which would mean that the agent does not care whether or
not it has enemies. For this case, the equation to calculate reward would be converted
using Equation 3.2 instead of Equation 3.1. All agents use the same soft goal equations
to work out the individual soft goal reward values, but the beliefs they hold are likely
to be different. Therefore the reward value for a specific soft goal is almost invariably
different.
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3.2.2.2 Step 2: Calculate Personal Reward
This step answers the research sub-question as to how can characters calculate re-
ward. That is, how do the agents calculate their own personal reward value (self-
reinforcement)? After all the rewards for each individual soft goal have been deter-
mined in Step 1, the agent’s overall personal reward for the activity under evaluation
needs to be calculated. The personal reward reflects how close the agent is to achieving
all of its soft goals. Some goals may be more or less important to an agent based on its
soft goal personality (set in the personality template) and so the rewards are weighted
to reflect this. The value is called personal reward because each agent will evaluate the
events from their perspective and generate their own reward, i.e. a personal reward.
To explain the reasoning behind this process, let us consider the example of Adam
and Chris who are both pursuing the same soft goals, “have money” and “have friends”,
and have the same ideal value for the goals. During the last activity both these agents
received a large amount of money, but they still had no friends. This means that the
agents both have the exact same achievement levels for the soft goals, and therefore
the same context and individual reward values. If Adam and Chris had the exact
same soft goal personality, then their personal reward values would be exactly the
same (assuming the same result from the last activity, which is itself unlikely). If their
soft goal personalities, i.e. weights on soft goals, are different, then their personal
rewards would likewise be different. Adam’s soft goal personality may place a high
importance (weight) on “have money” and a smaller importance on “have friends”. On
the other hand, Chris has the opposite soft goal personality: low importance on “have
money” and high importance on “have friends”. In this case, based on the activity
just completed where they gained money and no friends, Adam would calculate his
personal reward as being very high, whereas Chris would have a lower personal reward.
This reflects the fact that Chris considers activities to be “good” when he gains friends.
Note that Chris is still trying to gain money and this gives him some reward, it is just
that he prefers to have friends.
Accordingly, the personal reward, rt, is found using a weighted sum of the soft goals
derived from the weights of the soft goal personality:
rt =
∑
rt,j · wj∑
wj
(3.4)
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where wj is the weight the agent places on soft goal j. The weight is a value from [0, 1],
where 1 represents the highest importance for this goal, and 0 means no importance
whatsoever. The scale for personal reward is rmin ≤ rt,j ≤ rmax. In many domains it
is likely the range will be [−1, 1].
3.2.2.3 Step 3: Update Somatic Marker Preferences
This step addresses the research sub-question relating to how characters use reward to
change behaviour. This is the learning step of the adaptation process. To update so-
matic markers, the agent must decide whether the personal reward received constitutes
“success”. We use a simple reinforcement learning technique, the reinforcement com-
parison technique, from Sutton & Barto (1998) (see literature survey Section 2.1.4.2,
page 40). The technique compares the current reward, rt, with a reference reward, r¯t,
in order to update the preference for choosing a particular plan. The reference reward
is based on all previous rewards and is used to determine whether the current reward
obtained is “good” in comparison to all past rewards received in all contexts and for
all activities. For example, a reward of 0.8 might be “good” if previous rewards were
0.5. However, if previous rewards were all 0.95, then 0.8 may be considered “bad”.
The somatic marker preference, ps,t(ai), for a plan, ai, selected during the last play
(at time t, when the agent was in context s) is incremented so that at time t + 1 (i.e.
the next time step) the preference, according to the theory (Sutton & Barto, 1998)
(Equation 2.2, page 40), will be calculated as:
ps,t+1(ai) = ps,t(ai) + β(rt − r¯t) (3.5)
where β is a positive step-wise parameter and r¯t is the reference reward. The refer-
ence reward is an incremental average of all recently received rewards for all activities
in all contexts. After updating the somatic marker preference, the reference reward
is updated and according to Sutton & Barto (1998) (Equation 2.3, page 40) this is
calculated as:
r¯t+1 = r¯t + α(rt − r¯t) (3.6)
where α (0 < α ≤ 1) is a step-size parameter, as used in many other reinforcement
techniques.
In our model, plans may be ranked at varying levels within the goal/plan hierarchy.
Plans that are very low in the hierarchy have only a small number of different ways
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of executing that plan. For instance, in our example goal/plan hierarchy in Figure 3.2
(page 78), the plan “choose to make bread” has no sub-plans and can only be executed
one way. However, the plan “make something” has a number of ways that it can be
executed: by making bread, meat or candles. Each of these plans forms one possible
plan path for “make something”. Evaluation is performed after an activity has been
completed, i.e. when a single path (potentially consisting of many plans) has been
executed. However, the activity could have been completed by following a different
path. For each plan that was executed, the preference should be adjusted based on
the possible paths below this plan in the hierarchy. This reflects that the other paths
that were not taken may have a different reward and as a result this plan may not be
“good” or “bad”, it could have been this particular chosen path was “bad”. So, “make
something” may not be a bad plan just because “make bread” did not achieve the soft
goals. The agent may need to attempt “make candles” instead. In order to include
this, the preference is updated by a factor of 1/b, where b is the number of possible
paths below this plan.
In some domains, it is possible for a plan to be repeated multiple times before evalu-
ation is performed. For example, if the agent is interacting with another, it might post
the goal “choose something to say” multiple times before the activity, i.e. conversation,
is over. If this happens, the particular plan considered may only have been chosen a
small number of times from the total number of times that there was the opportunity
to choose this plan. To include this weighting, the preference is updated using the ratio
of number of times chosen to number of times it could have been chosen.
By combining these factors, the somatic marker preference for choosing plan a at
the next time step t+ 1 in context s is updated according to:
ps,t+1(ai) = ps,t(ai) + β · d · (rt − r¯t) (3.7)
where
• d is a factor calculated per plan based on the number of paths below this plan,
b, and the number of times this plan could have been chosen in the last activity,
c, out of the total number of times the plan could have been chosen, ctot. This
accounts for the plan’s position in the goal/plan hierarchy and the fact that a
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plan may have been executed more than once within a single activity:
d =
c
ctot · b (3.8)
• β is a step-wise parameter from emotionality. It is usually between 0.2 and 0.8;
• ps,0(ai), initial reward is set based on the domain; and
• r¯t is the reference reward.
Only plans that have been chosen and passed are updated. Note that the process gives
preferences that are unbounded, unless the designer explicitly restricts them.
3.2.2.4 Step 4: Update Emotions
In the cognitive appraisal model (see literature survey Section 2.1.1.3, page 27), emo-
tions are updated based on primary appraisal immediately after an event has been
received. In systems with an emphasis on emotion modeling, this can be a very com-
plex process, based on a domain-dependent analysis of individual beliefs. In our model,
we update emotions only during evaluation (called reappraisal in the cognitive appraisal
model) after an activity (coping) as been performed. In our implementation we use a
single emotion, “happiness”, that is based on the overall personal reward calculated.
This happiness reflects a simple “good”/“bad” analysis of how the agent feels. If other
emotions are required for the domain, they can be used similarly to happiness, al-
though the emotion event update may be triggered at a different time, rather than
after evaluation.
Every time an evaluation is performed, a happiness emotion event, k, is generated.
An emotion event consists of an initial intensity, I(k, t0), the time at which the event
happened, t0, and a decay value, b. The initial intensity is determined by:
I(k, t0) = rt × u (3.9)
where u is the emotion uptake value from emotionality in the personality template. If
the reward was positive, the positive uptake value is used, and if negative, the negative
uptake is used. This reflects that some people may react more strongly to positive
events compared to negative events. For example, an agent might be very upset if they
lose something, but only mildly happy if they gain a lot.
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Emotions decay over time. After a given time, t, the intensity, I, for a given event,
k, can, according to Dias & Paiva (2005) (see literature survey Equation 2.4, page 54),
be calculated as:
I(k, t) = I(k, t0)× e−b(t−t0) (3.10)
where b is the decay value from emotionality in the personality template.
The overall current emotion value is determined by summing the intensities of all
relevant emotion events at the given time of evaluation:
I(t) =
∑
k
I(k, t) (3.11)
If I(k, t) falls below a small threshold, then the event is discarded, i.e. forgotten, for
future calculations.
3.2.2.5 Step 5: Update the Reference Reward
The reference reward, r¯t, is updated according to the reinforcement comparison tech-
nique (Sutton & Barto, 1998) (see literature survey Equation 2.3, page eqnLitSur-
vey:RefRewardUpdate) using:
r¯t+1 = r¯t + α(rt − r¯t) (3.12)
where
• α is a step-wise parameter from emotionality;
• r¯0 is the initial reference reward and is set to a value based on the domain.
The agent stores only one reference reward to be used in Step 3 to determine whether
the personal reward value is “good” or “bad”. The reference reward is independent of
the particular activity that is being evaluated currently and context used.
3.3 Summary of the Model
The model presented in this chapter represents a reduced version of the cognitive-social
view of personality. Characters use self-reinforcement to adapt to their environment,
that is, change themselves and their behaviour. An agent’s behaviour within the en-
vironment can change the environment itself and this may, in turn, change the agent,
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similar to the process shown in Figure 2.3 (page 33). According to cognitive-social
theories, expectancies allow people to predict what the world will be like in the future
(Cervone & Pervin, 2008) (see literature survey Section 2.1.2.2, page 32). Somatic
markers take on a similar role. When deciding between different activities, an agent
uses its somatic markers to predict how choosing a specific activity will affect its soft
goals.
In our model, agents store past learning experience as somatic markers. These
somatic markers guide the agent’s future decisions towards or away from certain choices.
Agents use a soft goal personality to specify the goals they are trying to achieve and to
determine how to calculate their personal reward (self-reinforcement value). An agent’s
soft goal personality is part of its personality template. This personality template also
includes emotionality and the hard goals and plans it can use to achieve its soft goals (i.e.
goal/plan hierarchy). The personality template guides the development of an agent’s
somatic markers, and therefore guides the development of the agent’s personality
3.3.1 Generic Infrastructure Implementation
This model can be implemented entirely generically, so that it can be re-used in many
application domains. Implementation was performed using the JACK development en-
vironment (Howden et al., 2001) that provides automatic support for BDI architectures
(see literature survey section 21, page 21). The core goals and plans required for en-
forcement of the adaptation loop were set up so that any domain-dependent goal/plan
hierarchies could link into them, as shown in Figure 3.6 (page 85). A simple top-level
program can be run to link together the generic and domain-dependent aspects. Each
domain-dependent plan needs to have additional steps included automatically so that
the appraisal of coping choices process can be followed where necessary and informa-
tion stored about which plans are chosen and in which context. The domain-dependent
equations, to determine achievement level and reward for individual domain-dependent
soft goals, are stored in a single area. The structure to determine current context, up-
date somatic markers and emotions can be built without any knowledge of the actual
domain to be used.
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3.3.2 Building an Individual
In this section, we answer the research sub-question: what is an individual within our
model? An individual is a character who is different from other characters in their
reasoning, i.e. in the agent part of the character, not its physical appearance. This
difference is manifested in observed behaviour (executed actions) of the agents. In
our model, the agents choose actions based on their somatic markers. So the major
factor in making an individual is their somatic markers. There are a number of other
components that make up an individual in our model, see Figure 3.1 (page 74). We
summarise the components as follows.
• Personality:
– Somatic markers.
– Personality template:
∗ Goal/plan hierarchy,
∗ Soft goal personality,
∗ Emotionality.
• Current context.
• Achievement level of soft goals.
• Domain-dependent knowledge (beliefs), including facts and opinions.
To build an individual in our model, there are a number of steps to follow. Firstly,
the generic model must be added to by deciding on domain-dependent knowledge and
soft goals to be provided for all the agents. Then, the designer creates a small number
of personality templates, each of which can be used by more than one agent. Setting
up a goal/plan hierarchy can take a substantial amount of time so, to ease the burden
on handcrafting, we suggest that many agents can have the same goal/plan hierarchy.
Some agents can have the same soft goal personality and emotionality. The individual
agent emerges from this over time by using the adaptation loop to incorporate its unique
experience. The components that become unique to a particular agent are its somatic
markers, current soft goal achievement levels, current context, and personal knowledge
(beliefs). This distinction is illustrated in Figure 3.8.
The number of possible starting personality templates depends entirely on the do-
main and time available for the project. If many very diverse characters are required,
more goal/plan hierarchies could be developed. To obtain smaller character differences
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Many:
Goal/Plan Hierarchy
Some:
Soft Goal Personality
Emotionality
Individual (Automatically Generated):
Somatic Markers
Soft Goal Achievement Levels
Current Context
Build Up of Knowledge (opinions and facts)
All:
Adaptation Loop
Figure 3.8: What makes an individual an individual in our model: Components that only
one agent has compared to components and processes that all agents have.
(but still significant), more soft goals should be possible to use in the soft goal person-
ality. The range of emotionality parameters is also domain dependent, but the number
of parameters is fixed to the list shown in Section 3.1.3.3, page 81.
According to Kluckhohn & Murray (1953), personality theories attempt to under-
stand and describe why each person is in certain respects: like all other people, like
some other people, like no other people (see literature survey Section 2.1.2, page 31).
In our model, all agents use the same adaptation loop, some agents have the same
personality template; and after time no agents have the same somatic markers, and
therefore no agents will have the same behaviour.
This chapter has addressed the model-based research sub-questions throughout.
The exact listing of the questions with precise answers is provided in the concluding
chapter. The model we have presented will now be tested for its success at delivering
individual, adaptive and context-aware characters. In order to test the model, an
implemented version of the model and a testing methodology was required to be built
prior to obtaining results.
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Chapter 4
Implementation and
Experimental Setup
Our generic model presented in the previous chapter was explained with assistance from
examples of the village domain. However, the model can be applied to any domain. In
this chapter, we introduce and explain the particular domain created to test our model1.
We used a prototyping method of testing where we developed a pilot implementation
followed by the final implementation. The use of a pilot implementation was intended
as a proof of concept and was used to improve the model design itself and guide the
construction of the final implementation. The final implementation was used to test
our research questions and generate quantitatively measurable results to address the
criteria for success.
In this chapter, we begin by describing the pilot implementation and its findings.
We follow this by describing the final implementation domain covering: the goal/plan
hierarchy used for all characters, context labels used, the domain-dependent knowledge
and, finally, soft goals and how achievement levels of soft goals were determined. After
this, we detail experimental set ups and considerations. We begin with initial findings
relating to updating somatic markers and then introduce the emotionality variables
used as determined by preliminary testing. To test the criteria for success relating to
the research sub-questions we used three main measures of effectiveness: behaviour, re-
ward and individuality. We outline how we obtained these quantitative measures, then
1Examples from the actual implementation were not used in the previous chapter so as to assist
separation of generic and domain-dependent aspects.
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we introduce the scenarios used to test starting conditions on personality templates.
Finally we discuss expected results for each of the criteria for success for the scenarios
concerned.
4.1 Implementation
Choosing an implementation domain to test the model was very difficult. The style
of games that would benefit most from the model are (complex) social games where
(human) players interact for extended periods of time with large numbers of virtual
characters. We settled on a simple domain relating to school children making friends.
Although simplistic, it was thought that, since the characters could generate their own
friendships, they would be able to exhibit relatively complex behaviour. The more
complex the domain, the harder it would be to determine what the characters were
doing and develop appropriate quantitative measures to evaluate their performance.
By showing that the model works to some degree in a simple domain, this would
indicate it would be even more effective in a more complex domain. This is because
eventually we seek to allow human participants to see the complex structure called
“personality”. If something as complex as personality is visible in a simple domain
where the characters do not have many choices between what to do, then, in a more
complex domain, there would be more differences to observe. That is, a complex domain
would allow the characters to choose between more plans and therefore differ from each
other in more ways, and personality would potentially be more visible.
Often in games and virtual agents, testing is based on user feedback and question-
naires. When testing a new model, it is advisable to make sure the model is reaching
its criteria for success before using human participants. In this way, we can consider
a larger number of variations of time periods, emotionality and personality templates
than would be feasible to ask a human participant to test and provide feedback.
We considered the best way to test the model without human participants would
be in two stages: a preliminary pilot model to test the concepts, and a second stage
to test the criteria for success. By doing a pilot study, we were able to test the model
itself, refine the pertinent concepts and determine which variables have the greatest
effect on behaviour. The pilot model allowed us to improve the model before our final,
more in-depth, implementation.
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In this section, we begin by outlining the pilot implementation and the findings
obtained. After this, we introduce the game used for the final implementation. We
present the goal/plan hierarchy and outline how context is used in this particular
domain. We introduce the domain-dependent knowledge that characters need to store
to enable them to function within this game. The domain-dependent knowledge leads
us to list the soft goals available to characters. We finish by documenting how soft goal
achievement levels were calculated in this particular domain.
4.1.1 Pilot Implementation
We begin by briefly outlining the pilot domain before discussing the most important
lessons we learned from the pilot implementation. The pilot implementation was based
on school children characters having conversations together (Sandercock et al., 2006).
The characters could choose who to talk to and have “conversations” (passing topic
knowledge sentences between each other). Characters were given some initial knowledge
and preferences on topics, and were then expected to learn about topics from other
characters and also whether they were interested in a topic. The pilot implementation
relied less on adaptation than the model presented in Chapter 3 and required characters
to have initial knowledge. This meant the characters still needed more handcrafting
than desired because characters had to have a lot of initial beliefs or knowledge in
order to be able to react to the world. To address this problem, the final model and
implementation did not require prior knowledge for the characters.
Although characters were using somatic marker preferences for their top-level activ-
ity choices, somatic markers were not used further down the goal/plan hierarchy, such
as when choosing what to say within a conversation. This meant that preferences on
what the characters should say within a conversation were hard coded by the designer.
This process involved creating a laborious preference table that was the same for every
character. This problem was solved in the final implementation by allowing characters
to learn somatic preferences for all plan choices, and not just the top-level activities.
All characters were given only one soft goal to achieve “be happy”. The point at
which they considered this achieved was based on how well three factors were achieved:
“like emotions”, “like conversation topics”, and “like having friends”. The characters
placed weights on these each factors to represent how important they considered that
factor. This weight was learnt by the characters themselves during an initialisation
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phase and fixed after initialisation. As a result, characters who were talking about
topics they liked were more likely to want to keep doing this; resulting in much less
diversity of character behaviour than was desired. By varying both the character’s
appraisal of choices and their evaluation method, the characters could become unstable,
and were much more prone to have difficultly learning anything outside their previous
experience, i.e. they did not explore all possibilities enough.
The evaluation function was not suitably complex and, if the character was un-
happy, this led to a bad evaluation, which led to a more unhappy character and so
on. Evaluation and emotion were so entwined that once the character became slightly
unhappy, they would continue until they were very unhappy and unable to find any
path to get out of the cycle. To reduce this problem, it was considered best to fix
the parameters used in one of appraisal of choices (decision-making) and evaluation.
Evaluation was chosen to be fixed, so that somatic markers could develop and change.
To address the evaluation problems, the final model used a more complex evaluation
based on more than happiness by incorporating soft goals to define their goal state.
Results from the pilot implementation indicated that the characters had some di-
versity, but measurement presented a problem. Characters were clustered slightly, but
the clusters were only loosely subjectively detectable and a quantitative measure was
not developed. There were problems with the interface between the character AI and
the GUI, which resulted in non-repeatable runs. Therefore, in the final implementation,
this was monitored very closely to ensure repeatability. The pilot implementation iden-
tified some gaps in the initial concepts in the model and enabled these to be rectified,
so as to arrive at the model presented in Chapter 3.
4.1.2 Game Description
After analysing the pilot implementation, the model was refined, enabling the next
stage of the testing: creation of a final implemented game to provide the basis for
answering the research questions. The final implemented game is also based on social
interactions in the form of building friendships between characters. The domain is
similar to the pilot, but instead of extended conversations, the characters pass only
insults and, in addition, characters can move or wait around. The characters are a
group of school children, such as those in Figure 4.1, on their lunch break who want to
interact with each other. Individual children can choose from three different top-level
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Figure 4.1: Three characters from the game: Anna, Bec and Chloe.
activities: to wait in one place, move towards or away from another character, and tell
another child the name of a child they do not like, i.e. insult someone. The children
choose actions in real-time.
A character’s personality template includes their goal/plan hierarchy, emotionality
and soft goal personality (see Section 3.1.3, page 78). Since the aim of this thesis is to
determine whether a small number of templates can lead to personality diversity, we
made all characters use the exact same goal/plan hierarchy (shown in Figure 4.2). At
the top of the hierarchy is the generic goal/plan hierarchy structure that is required
for the model to be able to adapt appropriately (see Section 3.2, page 82 and Figure
3.6). Underneath the generic plans and goals, each character can choose from four
possible activities. If the character is responding to an incoming insult, they can use
the plan “listen”; otherwise, they have a choice of “move”, “wait around” or “insult”.
After a character has listened to another character (“listen”), they reply by agreeing or
disagreeing with the incoming insult. When a character is pro-actively choosing what
to do, it has 22 different possible paths through the goal/plan hierarchy. That is, there
are 6 different ways the character can “move” (e.g. move away from an enemy; or move
towards a friend); 15 ways the character can “insult”; and one way to “wait around”.
In Figure 4.2, external messages represent the sending of insults and replies between
different characters. If a reply is not sent to an insult, then it is assumed that the
listening character disagrees with the insult.
The implemented game can be seen in Figure 4.3. If a (human) player is in the
game, they act as another child and have access to the same information and actions
as the characters. In Figure 4.3, the player’s avatar has “bunny ears” and is being
told an insult about another character. The player has the opportunity to agree or
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Figure 4.2: Implemented domain-dependent goal/plan hierarchy used for all characters.
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Figure 4.3: Screenshot from the implemented game: Anna tells the player an insult about
Fran. Colour of speech bubble matches to the box around the character’s name.
Figure 4.4: Screenshot from the implemented game: Anna insults the player. Colour of
speech bubble matches to the box around the character’s name.
disagree with the statement. In the same Figure we can also see some other characters
interacting via an insult.
Each child character is trying to achieve a number of domain-dependent soft goals,
such as making friends, not being insulted, and being close to friends. When a character
gets an interaction request from another character, such as Figure 4.4, they respond
immediately and perform an evaluation on the choices they make, even if they are
doing something else at the same time. These screenshots with the (human) player
are to show how the game could be played. For quantitative testing, there is no player
interacting with the characters, see Figure 4.5. Excluding players allowed multiple runs
to be executed under different starting conditions without player variability affecting
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Figure 4.5: Screenshot from the implemented game without a player included. The
captions in grey were used for debugging purposes.
the quantitative measures.
Within the domain-dependent actions that the characters execute, they are able to
build up relationships with other characters, i.e. who they consider to be a “friend”.
After a long period of time, each character will have a different set of relationships with
the other characters and will also have different preferences on actions for different
internal contexts. This process will mean that each character is different from the
others (individual), it can adapt to new environments and chooses actions based on
its perceived situation. The characters’ fixed soft goal personality encourages coherent
behaviour. For example, one character may find that the best way to make friends is
to wait around until someone talks to them (another might make friends by telling one
character they do not like another character) but both characters are still trying to
make friends.
The game was constructed because it appeared simple enough to show some com-
plexity, but not so complex that the different personalities would be difficult to dis-
tinguish from other confounding factors. The complexity is evidenced by the different
friendships the characters build with each other and the way they can execute the
different activities. When choosing an activity pro-actively, the characters can choose
between 22 different possible paths. In addition to this, from the viewpoint of each char-
acter, there are seven other characters in the environment, some of which are friends
and enemies. So in fact, the number of different paths a character can take is substan-
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tially more than 22. For example, Chloe can choose to move towards her friend, Bec,
and not towards another friend, like Elle.
The characters begin with no inherent preference for or against any of the actions.
A character will choose which action to perform based on its somatic marker prefer-
ence values, initialised to the same neutral starting value. The restriction to allow only
insults (and not compliments) forces the characters to choose who they will be friends
with more specifically, and means that characters are not able to be friends with ev-
eryone, enhancing the potential for the characters to become different. Further, the
characters are not able to actively make friends with other characters, they need to
learn the indirect means of making friends, for example, insulting a character that is
not liked by anyone.
To react to the world, a character needs to store domain-dependent knowledge
(beliefs) about their world, including their opinions towards the others in the world.
These beliefs enable the character to calculate achievement levels for its soft goals of this
domain. In the following sections, we begin by outlining how context was used in this
game domain, introduce the domain-dependent knowledge that the characters were able
to store and describe how the domain-dependent knowledge is updated. Then we detail
the domain-dependent soft goals used for this game and the equations for calculating
achievement levels for these soft goals.
4.1.2.1 Context
In most instances, the characters use simple contexts, being the achievement level string
without any additional information. For example, if the character had two soft goals
to achieve, one possible context is “HL”. Based on the goal/plan hierarchy, Figure 4.2
(page 106), there were three exceptions to this.
• Choosing what to say in reply to someone else, i.e. “choose insult response”.
The context is the achievement levels plus whether the insult is towards itself, an
enemy, neutral, or a friend, e.g. “HL&Friend”.
• Choosing who to move with respect to. The context here is the achievement levels
plus the direction the character has chosen to move, i.e. towards or away, e.g.
“HL&Away”.
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• Choosing what to say and choosing who to insult. The context here is the achieve-
ment levels plus who the character has chosen to tell the insult to, i.e. friend,
enemy, neutral, e.g. “HL&Neutral”.
4.1.2.2 Domain-dependent Knowledge
The goal/plan hierarchy and soft goals were developed in conjunction with the domain-
dependent knowledge the characters could store and the game domain itself. This
domain-dependent knowledge is not considered as part of the model because it relates
only to the particular game scenario in the final implementation. However, it is impor-
tant to specify exactly what knowledge the characters could have and how they update
their knowledge because this knowledge affects achievement levels of soft goals, which
in turn affects the somatic markers and the emergence and development of personality.
We divide the domain-dependent knowledge (beliefs) into two categories: facts and
opinions. Facts relate to beliefs that the character has been given by others or the
environment itself and which the character cannot change the values of on its own.
Opinions relate to beliefs that the character has created itself, values placed on objects
or other characters. Opinions can be changed by the character themselves. An example
opinion is that Anna can consider Elle a friend and then change her mind if she so
chooses. In the final implemented game, the characters had five groups of beliefs they
could store related to: insults, location, happiness, attraction from others and attraction
towards others.
Facts: Insults When the character insults someone or is told an insult they store the
information along with whether or not both parties agreed to the statement. This allows
the character to remember what has happened, so they can determine achievement
levels of soft goals, such as “don’t be insulted”. The beliefs are stored as: “A insulted
B and told C; C agreed/disagreed”. Only characters who are either the speaker or the
listener (i.e. one of A or C) can store information. Characters are not able to overhear
other character’s insults or pass on insults from others.
Facts: Location The agents are embodied as characters within the domain using
avatars and so must store information about where they are within the domain. They
also store information on which characters are close or far away from them. That is,
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for every other character in the domain, they store a discrete value of the location that
can be “close” or “far”. This allows the characters to calculate achievement levels for
location related soft goals, such as “be close to friends”.
Facts: Attraction From Others The beliefs associated with attraction are how
much the character likes the other characters and how much the other characters like
this particular character. Characters are told by the other characters when they become
a “friend” or “enemy”. This means that characters can store discrete information on
the attraction other characters have towards themselves. This information is used by
the characters to update their attraction to others. For example, if Chloe knows that
Elle likes her, then Chloe will be more likely to like Elle in return. When Chloe changes
her attraction of Elle from “neutral” to “friend”, she will send a message to Elle to
tell her of the change. This way every character can keep a coarse track of who does
or does not like them. Note that although this is an attraction value, the character
cannot change its value directly. That is, if Chloe knows that Elle does not like her,
then this is a fact in Chloe’s eyes. Chloe can only change the value, so that Elle likes
her, if Elle tells her that herself.
Opinions: Attraction Towards Others In addition to keeping information about
how other characters feel towards them, an individual character stores information on
how much they “like” or “dislike” every other character. Attraction of others is updated
within individual plans in the goal/plan hierarchy (Figure 4.2, page 106). Particularly,
within the plans “insult” and “listen to insult”. The plan “insult” is where a character
chooses someone to tell an insult to, whereas “listen to insult” is where the character
has been told an insult by someone else.
In Section 3.2.2.3 (page 94), we described the reinforcement comparison technique
used to update somatic marker preference values. When considering how to update
attraction values, we used rather complex methods, inspired by the reinforcement com-
parison technique, to try to elicit some of the complexity that is associated with how
people may decide who is their friend in the real world. The way that attraction is
updated depends on whether the character is telling the insult or receiving the insult.
The new attraction value is based on the previous value plus or minus a factor that
depends what has been said and about whom it has been said. Decision flow charts
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can be used to determine how to update attraction, as illustrated in Figures 4.6 and
4.71. Figure 4.6 is used when the character has insulted someone; Figure 4.7 is used
when the character has been told an insult from someone else. Generally, the characters
like being spoken to and when another character agrees with what they have said. The
characters are able to update their attraction to the other character in either of the two
plans. When a character is listening to an insult from another character (Figure 4.7),
they may also change their attraction to the character that is being insulted, depending
on how strongly they feel about the characters involved.
Let us consider an example where Anna tells Chloe an insult about Bec. Both
Anna and Chloe will update their opinions of each other and Chloe may also update
her opinion of Bec. To determine how Anna updates her attraction of Chloe, we use
the process shown in Figure 4.6. Anna needs to answer the following questions.
• Did Chloe accept my (Anna’s) statement?
• Is Bec my (Anna’s) enemy?
• Is Bec my (Anna’s) friend?
For example, if Chloe accepted Anna’s statement and Bec is Anna’s enemy, then Anna
will increase her opinion of Chloe (the enemy of my enemy is my friend). Chloe uses
the process shown in Figure 4.7 to determine how to update her opinions of both Anna
and Bec. If Anna has insulted Chloe to her face or insulted one of Chloe’s friends, then
Chloe would decrease how much she likes Anna. If Chloe had no strong opinion of Bec
currently, then she would update her opinion of Bec based on how much she likes Anna.
If Anna is her good friend, then she will believe the insult about Bec and vice-versa.
The equations used to determine exactly how much to increase or decrease the
attraction values are shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Each equation differs due to the
complex interaction of the three characters involved in an insult: the speaker, the
listener and the character being insulted. Some preliminary testing allowed us to de-
termine the values of the constants in the equations. We used α = 0.2, so that old
opinions matter more than new opinions. When increasing or decreasing the attraction
values by a fixed amount, the value δ = 0.25 is used. This value is based on being a
small proportion (18th) of the attraction range of [−1,+1]. When updating how much
the character is attracted to another character, the opinion of the other character is
1The equations are not repeated in the text because it is difficult to understand the equations if
they are not placed within the context of when to use them according to the flowchart.
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Figure 4.6: Flowchart used to determine how to update attraction values when the
character (“Me”) has insulted someone. Terms used:
ωA,B,t is how much A is attracted to B at time t;
ωC,Me is based on the discrete value of how much the
other character (C) likes this character (Me).
Since it
is discrete, the value used here is based over a
period
of time (i.e. “I have been liked for a long time”);
α is the same step-wise learning parameter as used to
update the reference reward;
δ is a small value; and
κ is a constant weight on the importance the character
gives to the other character’s attraction value.
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I have been told an insult: A insults B
Figure 4.7: Flowchart used to determine how to update attraction values when the
character (“Me”) has been told an insult. Terms used:
ωA,B,t is how much A is attracted to B at time t;
ωC,Me is based on the discrete value of how much the
other character (C) likes this character (Me).
Since it
is discrete, the value used here is based over a
period
of time (i.e. “I have been liked for a long time”);
α is the same step-wise learning parameter as used to
update the reference reward;
δ is a small value; and
κ is a constant weight on the importance the character
gives to the other character’s attraction value.
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taken into consideration. For example, when Chloe is updating her attraction towards
Elle, she includes how Elle feels towards her, i.e. Chloe. This “attraction from” value
is stored as a discrete value, but is calculated over a period of time to determine how
long the other character has been feeling that way (e.g. Elle has believed Chloe is a
friend for a long time). The “attraction from” value is multiplied by a constant weight
of κ = 0.1 to reduce its affect.
Opinions: Happiness In our domain, we had a single emotion, happiness. In our
implementation, it is based on the personal reward values calculated and therefore
relates to the character’s achievement of its soft goals. Each time a reward is calculated
an emotion event is generated. This process is described in Section 3.2.2.4 (page 96).
4.1.2.3 Soft Goals
Although the storage of soft goals is domain independent (see Section 3.1.1, page 73),
the actual soft goals, and how to calculate achievement levels, are domain-dependent.
For example, in the village domain, one possible soft goal could be “have money”. This
soft goal would not be applicable in our implemented domain since the characters are
not able to obtain money by any means. In the following list, the soft goals for our final
game implementation are described along with information on how the achievement
level of the soft goal, x, can be calculated. The achievement levels are all based on ratios,
so the maximum value the soft goal achievement level can be is +1, and the minimum is
zero. The achievement levels are based on the domain-dependent knowledge introduced
in the previous section. In the following list, we specify which knowledge is necessary
to be able to calculate the associated soft goal achievement level. These achievement
values are calculated during the first step of the evaluation process (see Section 3.2.2.1,
page 91).
• Be Happy: Uses the belief happiness . Achievement is determined based on the
current intensity, I (see Section 3.2.2.4, page 96), of happiness compared to the
maximum value that happiness could be.
• Make Friends/enemies: Uses the beliefs attraction from others and attraction
towards others. To calculate the achievement of the goal “make friends”, the
character uses, for every other character in the simulation, a combination of
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Character A
Like (+1) Don’t Care (0) Don’t Like (-1)
Character B
Like (+1) 2 1 0
Don’t Care (0) 1 0 -1
Don’t Like (-1) 0 -1 -2
Table 4.1: Calculation of friendship points for two characters: used to determine achieve-
ment level for the soft goals “make friends” and “make enemies”.
whether they like a particular character and whether that character likes them.
When a character likes another character, that counts as +1 points. When a
character does not like the other character, that counts as −1 points. Table 4.1
shows how to work out the friend points for each relationship between character
A and character B. Equal weight is given to both characters’ opinions. The
character calculates the points for every possible relationship it can have with
every other character in the game and generates a total, ntotal. The maximum
possible number of friend points the character can have is nmax = 2×ncharacters,
where ncharacters is the number of other characters in the simulation. This value
represents the circumstance where this character likes everyone and everyone likes
it. Using these values, the character can work out its current achievement level,
z, using a ratio of how many points they have currently to the maximum (ideal)
value:
zfriend =
ntotal
nmax
(4.1)
The character uses a similar equation to determine achievement of “make ene-
mies”, counting enemies rather than friends.
• Insult Everyone/Enemies/Friends: Uses insults beliefs. The achievement of this
soft goal is based on the last N activities completed. This allows a character
to forget old insults. The measure takes into account insults towards the group
specified in the soft goal name, i.e. everyone, enemies or friends. There are three
different types of insults.
1. Mutual insults (both parties agreed), nmutual.
2. Insults that this character said, but the other character did not agree with,
nIsaid.
3. Insults that the character was told, but did not agree with, ntheySaid.
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The total number of “insults” is found by adding the insult types using a weighted
sum, so that mutual insults are considered to be a stronger insult than non-mutual
insults. The following equation is used to calculate achievement level, z:
z =
wmutual × nmutual + wIsaid × nIsaid + wtheySaid × ntheySaid
N
(4.2)
The exact weights used in the simulation were: wmutual = 1, wIsaid = 0.5, and
wtheySaid = 0.2.
• Don’t be insulted: Uses insults beliefs. Measured based on the number of times
this character was personally insulted, ninsulted over the last N activities (regard-
less of whether it was agreed to or not):
z =
ninsulted
N
(4.3)
• Be close to everyone/enemies/friends: Uses location belief. Measured using the
number of enemies (or friends or everyone) that are close, nclose and the total
number of enemies/friends/everyone, ntotal:
z =
nclose
ntotal
(4.4)
If the soft goal is based on friends/enemies and the character does not currently
have any friends/enemies, then the achievement level cannot be calculated.
• Meet everyone: Uses attraction towards others belief. Measured using the num-
ber of characters this character has met, nmet
1 and the total number of other
characters in the simulation, ntotal:
z =
nmet
ntotal
(4.5)
This soft goal was used for testing to confirm that the characters could successfully
achieve a simple, easily obtainable soft goal.
Soft goals relating to insults were based on the last N activities. In our implementation,
we used N = 5. This number was chosen after initial testing of the final implementation
showed the characters were not recovering from insults that happened a long time in
1If an attraction value for a character has not been initialised, then the character has not been met
yet.
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the past. In a future implementation, it may be useful to investigate whether a decay
function could be used so that recent insults are considered more important than insults
that happened a long time ago.
4.2 Experimental Setup and Considerations
We now explain precise implementation details used to obtain the answers to the re-
search questions and the associated criteria for success, listed in Table 1.1 (page 16).
We begin by outlining the simulation running conditions. Then we discuss a problem
discovered during preliminary testing relating to how the somatic marker preferences
are updated in our domain. We then specify the emotionality used for all characters
as part of their personality template. To address the criteria for success, we identify
three quantitative measures that can be used to test effectiveness of the theoretical
model: behaviour, reward and individuality. We will discuss how data on each of these
measures will be gathered in our implementation. To obtain results, we used five Cases
based on varying the soft goal personalities of the characters. We present these Cases as
well as discussing how to test the effect of adaptation and context on the quantitative
measures of effectiveness. We finish this chapter by considering the expected results
from these tests in relation to the criteria.
The experiments were implemented without a (human) player and were completely
repeatable. Based on preliminary results, runtime was fixed at a time where the char-
acters appeared to be mostly in the same contexts and somatic marker preferences
were relatively stable. Behaviour and reward data is obtained based on output data
of reward and somatic marker beliefs. Every time a character evaluated its personal
reward, the value was output to a file to store the information, see Figure 4.8. At set
output times, the somatic marker beliefs of each character was dumped in separate
files, see Figure 4.9. The data is an agent’s somatic marker JACK-belief in JACOB
format1. In Figure 4.9, “preferenceValue” is the agent’s current somatic marker value
and “updatedCount” is the number of times this particular context-plan pair has been
updated so far in the simulation. The “updatedCount” represents the number of times
1See JACK documentation for details. Accessible through http://www.agent-software.com.au/
products/jack/documentation_and_instructi/index.html
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Time,EvalNum,Reward,RefReward
6057,646,0.3214285714285714,-0.2995583838991689
6066,648,-0.34523809523809523,-0.20641034060000785
6067,647,0.3214285714285714,-0.22723450379572097
6083,649,-0.34523809523809523,-0.14493504251207712
6093,650,-0.34523809523809523,-0.17498050042097985
6103,651,-0.34523809523809523,-0.20051913964354715
6109,653,-0.6785714285714286,-0.22222698298272936
6114,652,-0.34523809523809523,-0.29067864982103425
6127,655,-0.6785714285714286,-0.2988625666335934
6139,654,-0.6785714285714286,-0.3558188959242687
6150,657,-0.6785714285714286,-0.4042317758213427
6150,656,-0.6785714285714286,-0.44538272373385557
6170,658,-0.34523809523809523,-0.48036102945949155
Figure 4.8: Extract of sample output used to determine reward: every time an agent
calculates reward (when an activity is finished), it outputs its reward and reference reward
values to its own personal file. “Time” is in simulation time; “EvalNum” is the count of
the number of evaluations (activities) the agent has completed.
the plan has been chosen in the given context. This data can be used determine be-
haviour, i.e. how many times a particular plan was chosen over the last time period
and over different contexts. Considering the number of choices of a plan over a fixed
time step allows us to compare the actions most frequently chosen by the characters
during that time period.
4.2.1 Updating Somatic Marker Preferences
The update of somatic marker preferences (see Section 3.2.2.3, page 94) is achieved
by adding to the previous value of the preference. When a new plan-context pair,
< ai, s >, is found, an initial somatic marker preference, ps,0(ai), must be assigned. We
used a neutral preference, ps,0(ai) = 0, which means the character does not find the
plan either desirable or undesirable. Due to this, the character has no initial, or even
random, preference towards or away from any plan. Consequently, as a result of this,
all preferences the character generates will be entirely due to its personal experience
and not due to random initialisation.
Results from preliminary testing showed that all the characters had a clear pref-
erence against insulting others, even when soft goals were manipulated so that the
characters should have a preference towards insults. After a more thorough investiga-
tion, it was found that the equation used to update the somatic marker preference was
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<SomaticMarkers__Tuple <SomaticMarkers__Tuple
:context "HL" :context "HM"
:planName "Move" :planName "WaitAround"
:preferenceValue 0.258688 :preferenceValue 5.352875
:updatedCount 17 :updatedCount 224
> >
<SomaticMarkers__Tuple <SomaticMarkers__Tuple
:context "HM" :context "LM&Towards"
:planName "Move" :planName "MoveWRTEnemy"
:preferenceValue 2.150914 :preferenceValue -0.380345
:updatedCount 91 :updatedCount 12
> >
<SomaticMarkers__Tuple <SomaticMarkers__Tuple
:context "HM" :context "LM&Neither"
:planName "Insult" :planName "DisagreeToInsult"
:preferenceValue 0.785287 :preferenceValue -0.454140
:updatedCount 44 :updatedCount 25
> >
Figure 4.9: Extract of sample somatic marker output used to determine behaviour: for
a particular plan and context, the agent stores the number of times it has been updated
and its current somatic marker preference.
causing these problems. In Chapter 3, the equation to update preferences, Equation
3.7 (page 95) was presented as:
ps,t+1(ai) = ps,t(ai) + β · d · (rt − r¯t) (4.6)
In this equation, d is a factor calculated per plan based on the number of paths below
this plan (the one whose preference is being updated), b; the number of times this plan
could have been chosen in the last activity, c; and the total number of times the plan
could have been chosen, ctot. More exactly,
d =
c
ctot · b (4.7)
If we examine the goal/plan hierarchy for this domain (Figure 4.2, page 106), let us
consider the three top-level activities (although this analysis works for any level in the
goal/plan hierarchy) “Move”, “Insult” and “Wait”. These activities are at the same
distance from the goal at the top of the hierarchy. However, there are a varying number
of ways that each of these plans can be implemented due to the related sub-goals and
sub-paths. As a result, the number of paths below each plan, b, is not the same.
For the top-level activities, the number of paths below each plan is: for “Wait”
b = 1; for “Move” b = 6; and for “Insult” b = 15. Consider the circumstance where
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the character has chosen these activities once each and has calculated the exact same
personal reward, rt, after completion of each activity. Let us say that the personal
reward is a very high value, meaning that the character should increase its preference
for choosing that activity. However, although the reward was the same, the increase to
the preference for “Insult” will be much less than the increase for “Wait”, due to the
factor of 1b . If this situation is repeated, then, after time, the preference for “Wait” will
be sufficiently more than “Insult” so that “Insult” will not have reached the “desirable”
bucket used during appraisal of choices. The reason for including this factor was to
account for the fact that, although the chosen path of “Insult” was “good”, there are
many other paths that could have been taken that may not have been as good. This was
included to encourage the character to explore all the possible paths before deciding
that the top-level activity itself is “good”. However, given the example just described
and results from the implementation, it was found that “Wait” was being given an
unfair bias towards being chosen. The factor 1b is a pessimistic way of updating plans.
For a top-level plan to be “good”, all the plans below do not need to be good, we
should only be interested if there is at least one good path.
One way to solve this could be, during the design process, to make sure that plans in
the goal/plan hierarchy all have the same number of possible paths underneath them,
i.e. create a symmetric goal/plan hierarchy. This is probably an unreasonable chore for
the designer and also may not make sense within the domain. After all, in our domain,
waiting probably is a simpler task than insulting someone. We wanted to examine
how different personalities developed when there was no inherent bias towards any
one plan or the other, so we removed the factor of b from the update somatic marker
equation. It should be noted that, within this domain, it was not possible to execute a
plan more than once within an activity, so that the values for c and ctot were always
cancelled out. The result of this was that the final equation used to update somatic
marker preference was exactly the same as the theoretical equation for reinforcement
comparison according to Sutton & Barto (1998) (see literature survey Section 2.1.4.2,
page 40), repeated here for clarity:
pt+1(at) = pt(at) + β(rt − r¯t) (4.8)
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4.2.2 Emotionality
Emotionality is one of the three components of the personality template (see Section
3.1.3, page 78). The goal/plan hierarchy was fixed for all characters and implemented
as shown in Figure 4.2 (page 106). Preliminary testing of the final domain, where
we changed values of both emotionality and soft goal personality, showed that soft
goal personality had the greatest effect on behaviour of characters. We wanted to
minimise differences in the personality template to determine whether characters could
be different without handcrafting both emotionality and soft goal personality. So we
chose to fix emotionality. The values chosen allowed for the most stable and “realistic”
characters based on preliminary testing. In theoretical emotionality (see Section 3.1.3.3,
page 81), the positive and negative values can be different. In our implemented game,
we set the values to be the same number to limit handcrafting. The final emotionality
used was:
• Positive and Negative Uptake: u = 0.7. Used when generating an emotion
event after a personal reward calculation (see Section 3.2.2.4, page 96). If the
personal reward was rt = 0.9 (where 1 is the highest value), an emotion event
would be generated with an initial intensity of I = 0.7 × 0.9 = 0.63. This value
moderates events so that the characters did not feel them so strongly and therefore
their reactions were more smooth and less “jumpy”.
• Positive and Negative Decay: b = 0.003. Used to determine how quickly an
emotion event is forgotten (see Equation 3.10, page 96). This value was chosen
based on extensive experimental tests to make sure that events were remembered
for a reasonable amount of time for the simulation.
• Domain-dependent thresholds and soft goal achievement thresholds:
Positive and Negative Threshold set to 0.3. Used to bucket the domain-dependent
opinions (attraction to and happiness) and soft goal achievement levels into “H”,
“M” or “L”. If the opinion or achievement level is greater than 0.3 of the difference
to from the mid-level to the maximum value, then it is “H”, similarly for “L”.
That is:
– if value > mid+ 0.3(max−mid), set to “H”;
– if value < mid− 0.3(mid−min), set to “L”;
– else, set to “M”.
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For example, if the range of the value is (0, 1), then the label is “H” when it
is above 0.5 + 0.3 ∗ 0.5 = 0.65. The label is “L“ when the value is less than
0.5− 0.3 ∗ 0.5 = 0.35 and otherwise the label is “M”.
• Bucketing thresholds: Positive and Negative Desirable Range δ = 0.8. Used
during appraisal of choices when determining which bucket a plan should be in
based on its somatic marker preference, see page 88. The plan is considered
“desirable” if its somatic marker preference, p, is greater than p¯+ 0.8× σ, where
p¯ is the mean preference and σ is the standard deviation for all plans being
considered at this decision point. Based on the goal/plan hierarchy used (see
Figure 4.2, page 106), the maximum number of plans the character was choosing
between was three.
• Bucketing choice threshold: τ = 0.4. Used in appraisal of choices when
determining which bucket to use first, see page 89. A random number,  is chosen
and when this value is greater than 0.4, then the “desirable” group will be used
first (i.e. 60% of the time). When  ≤ 14b (i.e. b ≤ 0.1), the “undesirable” group
will be used first (i.e. 10% of the time). Otherwise, the “neither” group will be
used (i.e. 30% of the time).
• Step-wise learning parameters:
– β = 0.2. Used for update of somatic marker preferences in evaluation (see
Section 3.2.2.3, page 94).
– α = 0.15. Used for update of reference reward in evaluation (see Section
3.2.2.5, page 97).
– initial reference reward, r¯0 = 0.5. Used to initialise reference reward when
updating the value (see Section 3.2.2.5, page 97). Preliminary testing used
r¯0 = 1 to encourage exploration. However, this made initial personal rewards
very low and characters became so negative they were unable to make friends
or do anything other than “wait”.
4.2.3 Measures of Effectiveness
In order to measure the research sub-questions in relation to the criteria for success
(see Table 1.1, page 16) and determine the success of the theoretical model to gen-
erate individual characters using adaptation and context, we used three measures of
effectiveness: observed behaviour, reward, and individuality. Behaviour is based on the
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actions characters take in the environment over regular output time periods and reflect
the personalities of characters allowing us to test research sub-questions 1a, 1b, 2a,
and 3a. The second measure, personal reward, enables us to examine how adaptation
and context contribute to the overall performance of the characters, that is, research
sub-questions 1c, 1d and 2b. The third measure attempts to find a quantitative value
for “individuality”, also relating to research sub-questions 1d, 2b and 3b.
In this section, we examine each of the measures of effectiveness in turn. We discuss
how we obtained values from our game implementation and, for individuality, we explain
the choice of the particular quantitative measure to be used.
4.2.3.1 Behaviour as a Measure of Effectiveness
Behaviour provides the means for a (human) player to see the personality of the charac-
ter. That is, behaviour is the player’s view of the characters’ somatic marker preferences
and starting personality template. Behaviour is the number of plans executed by char-
acters over a time period that give rise to visible actions in the world. For example, in
the screenshot in Figure 4.3 (page 107), we can see that Anna and Chloe are insulting
someone, Fran is replying to an insult and since this is a still image, we are unable to
determine whether Bec, Deb, and Elle are either moving or waiting. If we watched the
game for some time we would be able to count that Anna chooses to insult people very
often whereas Fran often waits around and moves. The plans that characters can exe-
cute are shown in the goal/plan hierarchy that all characters use (see Figure 4.2, page
106). The top-level activities are moving, waiting, and insulting. Finer distinctions can
be made by considering where a character is moving to, where they are waiting, who
they are talking to and what they are saying. In our implementation, we output data
at fixed time points. From this data (see example extract of data in Figure 4.9, page
120), we can calculate the number of times each plan was chosen over the last time
period. We are also able to determine the context used by each character when choos-
ing and executing a plan. This count of action choices over a time periods represents a
character’s behaviour.
4.2.3.2 Personal Reward as a Measure of Effectiveness
After every completed activity, a character performs an evaluation of its goals and
determines a personal reward value (see Section 3.2.2, page 90). This value reflects
124
4.2 Experimental Setup and Considerations
how close a character is to achieving all its soft goals, with higher weight placed on
those goals it considers most important, according to its soft goal personality. The
range of the reward in this domain is from -1 to +1. If the characters are working well
within the environment, they should be achieving their goals and obtaining rewards
close to +1.
The theory of reinforcement learning (RL) (see literature survey Section 2.1.4.2,
page 38) has been applied to both games (e.g. Ponsen et al., 2006a) (see Section 2.2.1.2,
page 45) and intelligent virtual agents (e.g. Gadanho, 2003; Sanchez et al., 2004; Seif
El-Nasr et al., 1999) (see Section 2.2.2.2, page 56). In these applications, success
is usually based on the reward values that the character receives from the external
trainer. Another measure of the effectiveness of the model is speed of convergence to
the character’s optimal reward value and the stability of reward. Although our model
uses an internal trainer, rather than an external trainer, it is still appropriate to consider
how the reward for each character fluctuates over time as a measure of effectiveness of
our model.
Although the personal reward value appears very functional and may not on the
surface improve player immersion, it performs an important role. If characters are not
achieving their goals, they will probably look fairly “stupid” to a player. That is, ob-
served actions of the character will not appear to achieve or be related to the functional
goals of the games. For example, in the village domain, a character might make bread
and then neither sell it nor give it away. This would not contribute achievement of
either of the soft goals “have friends” or “have money”.
Further, if a character is not obtaining high personal reward values, then its actions
will not be in line with its soft goal personality. That is, the character’s soft goal may
be “have money”, but then it gives everything away. If this happens, the character loses
credibility and it becomes very difficult for a game designer to create the characters
they want. The soft goal personality needs to be followed as part of the personality
template as created by a designer. For instance, the designer may want a village full of
generous characters who are not trying to “have money”. If these characters are not
achieving a soft goal of “don’t have money”, then the characters are not exhibiting the
characteristics desired by the designer.
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Problems Affecting Reward When considering the personal reward value, we need
to consider the factors that may affect the character’s ability to calculate reward. When
a character receives an interaction request from another character, they respond im-
mediately and perform an evaluation on the choices they make, even if they are doing
something else at the same time (i.e. the character can listen while doing something
else). This may hinder the character’s learning since the personal reward may be based
on actions done for the other activity the character is doing at the same time. It is
hoped that, over time, the characters will be able to determine the difference based on
extended interaction with the simulation.
The game environment is non-deterministic, so when a character performs a par-
ticular plan, it may not always receive the same reward. For example, talking to a
neutral person may allow the character to find a new friend but not always, because
this depends on the other character as well. Further, the character’s chosen plan may
not be successful, i.e. may not achieve the hard goal it was supposed to achieve. For
example, let us say that Deb wants to move away from her enemy, Elle. Deb places a
request with the GUI-side of the simulation. The simulation will find out where Elle is
currently and then move Deb to a specific position far away from there. However, while
Deb is moving, Elle may also move, so although Deb may arrive at her “destination”,
she may not have succeeded at moving away from Elle. In such a way, the resulting
personal reward value may not reflect the chosen plans; and so the updated somatic
marker preferences may not reflect what actually happened.
4.2.3.3 Individuality as a Measure of Effectiveness
We believe that the model developed will allow for individual characters to be gen-
erated more automatically. To determine the success of our model, we need to test
to determine whether the characters generated are different from each other. In our
model, “different” means the actions that the characters have chosen and implemented
are not the same. Ideally, this would be measured based on user perception. However,
to test the model initially in a number of scenarios to determine their merit prior to
user studies, we will build a more simplistic implementation and determine whether
even simplistic implementations can generate adequate individual complexities. To ac-
complish this, a quantitative measure for individuality, based on behaviour, is needed.
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Defining a quantitative measure of “individuality” is a difficult task and in our lit-
erature survey we found no instances of any such quantitative measure. Often, when
determining “success” of virtual characters believability, is measured based on ques-
tionnaires of human participants (see Section 2.1.1.4, page 28). Tests using human
participants can be very time-consuming and yield variable results. Prior to testing
with participants, it is important to determine whether our model can create individ-
ual characters that can be computationally detected. We expect that it is easier for
computational differences in characters to be detected, compared to people being able
to distinguish distinct personalities. So if the differences between characters cannot be
computationally detected, then it is unlikely that a human participant would be able
to notice any differences in the characters.
Therefore, we propose a computational method to measure differences between char-
acters based on a quantitative measure of individuality. This will allow us to determine
whether our model begins to achieve the research question: How can personality be
implemented so that the same template can be used to create a number of distinct,
individual characters, according to their behaviour? A quantitative measure of indi-
viduality will allow us to compare values from different runs to determine the effect of
soft goal personalities in the personality template. Differences in individuality can be
established by comparing behaviour both with and without adaptation and context.
The measure will also allow us to test the model itself to identify which techniques are
most suited to achieving our goal. In this manner, by the time human participants
are involved in testing, we can be much more confident that our model will generate
characters with observably distinct personalities and know which starting conditions
will most affect results.
We begin by listing preliminary measures that were considered, but found to be
inappropriate for individuality. Then, we discuss what it means to be the “same”
or “different”, including a case study that highlights the need to use proportional
measurements. We conclude by introducing our chosen individuality measure based on
paired t-tests.
Inappropriate Measure: Somatic Marker Preferences Instead of measuring
behaviour directly, we considered measuring the characters’ somatic marker preferences.
However, in a game environment, what a player can see is more important than what
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the character would “like” to do, but cannot. The player cannot see what the character
wanted to do, only what it actually does. In other words, it is more important to look at
the actual observable behaviour of the characters, rather than their desired behaviour.
So the final measurement used the actual choices the characters made for the three
top-level activities over regular time intervals.
Inappropriate Measure: Final Behaviour We considered looking at the actions
that each character executed during the final output time step at the end of the simula-
tion. The characters are able to choose between three top-level activities (see goal/plan
hierarchy Figure 4.2, page 106). For each plan, we could specify that character x choose
a particular activity either “H”, “M” or “L” number of times in the final time period.
Therefore, each character would have a behaviour personality such as “HHL”, rep-
resenting how it chose each of the three activities. In this way, there are 27 different
personality types possible for the characters. A measure of how characters are behaving
over the final time period at the end of the simulation could show that differences have
been generated between characters and that there is a range of divergence between
characters. However, the characters change their actions over the entire simulation.
So, it is more suitable to consider how characters behave compared to each other at
each and every time point, because participants are more likely to compare characters
based on longer time periods, rather than what they are doing at the end of the game
simulation. Accordingly, the individuality measure was based on character behaviour
over the entire simulation.
Inappropriate Measure: Clustering We considered techniques to cluster char-
acters based on their top-level activity choices. In the ideal result, obtaining highest
individuality, each character would constitute its own cluster. Based on research of
available techniques it was found that, in order to do an exploratory cluster analysis,
a minimum of 50 characters would be required. The desired simplicity of our domain
would not be possible with 50 characters. Clustering techniques are unreliable when
cluster sizes are small and thus not suitable when we would expect a large number of
clusters, each containing very few or only one individual. Clustering techniques were
also found to be relatively difficult to automate. They rely on human determination
of the appropriate cut-off for the number of clusters after examination of the results.
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Figure 4.10: Two examples of how characters can be the same for one activity: based on
frequency of choice of the activity over regular time intervals. Line represents best fit line.
This makes clustering prone to human error. Given all of these factors, clustering was
excluded as a possible measure of individuality 1.
Definition of “Same” Before considering what constitutes different patterns of be-
haviour, we begin by considering what makes characters seem to be the “same”. If two
characters are very similar, it would be expected they would choose a particular activity
approximately the same number of times over a period when facing the same situations
(but also at the same time intervals). Let us examine this statement in detail. Two
ways in which characters can appear the same are shown in Figure 4.10. The graphs
represent a measure of how often the character chooses a particular activity during a
time period on the scale [-1,+1], where -1 means the activity was hardly chosen at all.
Each dot represents a time period, where the x-coordinate is the number of times char-
acter A chose the activity, and the y-coordinate is character B’s value. Figure 4.10(a)
represents the circumstance where the characters are fluctuating between choosing this
particular activity a lot (top right hand corner), or a little (bottom left hand corner).
However, the time periods during which the characters are fluctuating their choices are
very similar. Over a given time period, both characters chose this activity the same
number of times. In Figure 4.10(b), the characters are changing preferences, but they
are always choosing similar values, i.e. character A is almost equal to character B.
1These conclusions are based on research carried out specifically for this thesis by Andrew Buelke
and Kaye Marion of the RMIT Statistics Department.
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Figure 4.11: Four examples of how characters can be different for one activity: based on
frequency of choice of the activity over regular time intervals. Line represents best fit line.
Definition of “Different” Now that we have established what is meant by the
“same”, we can consider “different” as being the opposite to this. We believe there
are at least four major patterns of behaviour that show characters as “different”, as
shown in Figure 4.11. Over one time period in the simulation, Anna could choose
“move” a lot, while Bec could choose “wait” often (i.e. choose “move” less often than
Anna). Later on, this may have swapped over. This would create a difference between
characters, even though the average preference for choosing the activities “move” and
“wait” would be the same for both characters. The graph for “move” could look like
Figure 4.11(a). In this situation, every time period that Anna chooses “move” a lot,
Bec chooses it a very small amount. Figure 4.11(b) shows the circumstance where the
characters have fluctuating choices, but over time Anna is always choosing the exact
opposite to Bec.
In the examples of characters behaving in the “same” way (see Figure 4.10), we can
see that the characters have a positive gradient to their line of best fit. It is tempting to
assume that when characters are “different” they have a negative gradient. However,
Figures 4.11(c) and 4.11(d) also represent characters that are “different”. In Figure
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4.11(c), character A is consistently not choosing the activity in question and character B
is changing their choice over many time periods, without exhibiting a clear preference
towards or away from this activity. In Figure 4.11(d), character A is choosing the
activity an average amount, whereas character B is fluctuating between choosing it a
lot and not choosing it at all.
Of course, if a character’s choices are not spread over the entire range, then there
would be grouping in one corner. For example, Anna may consistently be choosing the
activity very often, while Bec is hardly be choosing it at all. These characters should be
considered different, but if their data points are clustered very close together it will be
difficult to determine whether the best fit gradient is positive or negative. Therefore,
the gradient of the line of best fit is unlikely to provide an effective mechanism for
measuring difference.
Using Proportions Rather than looking simply at the number of times an activity
is chosen, we examine whether proportions offer a useful approach. Let us consider a
time period and look at the number of times three different characters chose each of
the activities during over the interval:
Name Move Wait Insult
Anna 5 5 5
Bec 10 10 10
Chloe 5 10 5
In above example, if we compare the characters based on each individual activity using
these raw counts, we find that for “move” (for example) Anna and Chloe appear more
similar to each other than Bec. However, if we consider the percentage or proportion
of times characters choose activities, a different picture emerges as shown below.
Name Move Wait Insult
Anna 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Bec 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Chloe 25% 50% 25%
Anna and Bec are choosing each activity the same proportion of times, i.e 33.3% of the
time, and Chloe now appears different from the others.
In our domain, it was considered more important for there to be a difference between
the proportion of times an activity was chosen, rather than the just raw number of
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times chosen over the interval. That is, the proportions shown in the second table
are likely to provide a more effective representation of differences between characters.
This is because some characters may finish activities quickly and complete a larger
number of activities within the time period. However, a player watching the characters
would probably only notice that one character was choosing an activity proportionally
more often than another activity or compared to another character. If we look at the
proportion of times each activity is chosen as a percentage of total chosen, rather than
the absolute number, we only need to consider values for two of the three activities,
since the third is no longer an independent variable (it will be 100% minus the other
two).
Preliminary Individuality Tests: Normality and Chi-squared To begin test-
ing the behaviour data, the first requirement is to check that the data is normal in
order that the validity of the results of the statistical tests is not compromised. Once
normality is confirmed, we can use a chi-squared test as a preliminary test. This test
relates to the research sub-question 3a (see Section 1.1, page 16) to determine whether
our model obtains differences between characters over time. A chi-squared test for ev-
ery character in the game will determine whether the differences between the characters
are significant or not. The chi-squared test can determine whether the behaviour of a
character is actually independent from that of another. That is, if we take one char-
acter’s actual behaviour as what we expect to obtain, the chi-squared test determines
whether a different character’s behaviour matches the expectations, as based on the
other character. If the results of the chi-squared test are positive, we can say that not
all the characters are the same, some of them are “different”. That is, behaviour of
one character cannot be used to predict behaviour of another character. If character
behaviour does not pass the chi-squared test, then any apparent individuality is purely
coincidental.
Final Quantitative Individuality Measure Finally, to determine how “different”
the characters are, we use a quantitative measure of individuality. Considering two
individual characters, we can use a paired t-test to determine whether the differences
between their behaviour (proportion of times they chose a specific activity at fixed time
intervals) is significant. The paired t-test (rather than the standard t-test) is used to
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eliminate differences from sample points, in our consideration this means differences
between one time period and another. That is, we want to compare the proportion of
times a character chose an activity compared to another character at the same time
interval, rather than comparing how the sum total of how characters behave overall.
Consider again Figures 4.10(a) and 4.11(a). In both circumstances, the two characters
have the same average choice of the activity. However, at each time interval in Figure
4.11(a), they are choosing the exact opposite activities, whereas in Figure 4.10(a) they
are choosing the same. The paired t-test allows us to demonstrate the existence of this
difference. The test compares each individual time interval to determine how different
the characters are during each time period and returns a p-value indicating how likely
it is that the characters are different for the entire simulation. If the p-value is less
than 0.05, the characters can be considered significantly different.
If we use the paired t-test on each character against each of the other n−1 characters,
then the total number of possible combinations is:
Cn2 =
n!
2!(n− 2)! (4.9)
That is, the number of possible differences between characters for a particular activity is
Cn2 . Since we are looking at proportions of different actions chosen, we need look at only
two of the three top-level activities and the maximum number of differences possible is
2× Cn2 . This gives us a quantitative measure of “difference” or “individuality”. If the
individuality value is close to the maximum, then that means almost every character
is different from every other character in terms of choices for all their activities. We
can also consider individuality per character by comparing one character to all the
other characters. The maximum individuality measure for a particular character will
be 2× (n− 1). Individuality per character is a measure of how different this character
is to all other characters.
4.2.4 Cases and Modes Constructed
In this section, we examine how the different soft goal personalities can be used to form
test Cases for the model in relation to the research sub-questions. The Cases allow
us to test the characters under a number of different starting personality templates to
determine whether some starting templates generate more or less observed personalities
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and to determine the effects on behaviour and reward. We begin by outlining three
modes for running the model.
4.2.4.1 Modes
The criteria for success (see Section 1.1, page 16) concern how adaptation and context
affect behaviour. To test this, three different running modes are needed for the model
itself.
To assess whether the adaptation and context components we have built into the
model have the intended effect on characters, the operation of the model with these
mechanisms is compared. That is, we need to compare operation excluding the mech-
anisms of adaptation and context. Accordingly, we use the following three modes.
1. ‘Adaptation Off’: in this mode, characters are unable to adapt their somatic
marker preferences and therefore use random choice at every decision point.
2. ‘Context Off’: characters are able to adapt/learn, but cannot distinguish the
differences between contexts. That is, somatic markers are stored based on plan
name only.
3. ‘Normal’: this is full model as described in Chapter 3. Characters are able to
adapt and use both plan and context when storing, updating and using somatic
marker preferences.
For clarity, we place the modes within a table showing how adaptation and context
affect each mode.
Adaptation
On Off
Context
On 3. Normal N/A
Off 2. Context Off 1. Adaptation Off
Note that the mode where adaptation is off, but characters can use context, cannot
exist. If the characters cannot learn, then context has no function in our model, unless
somatic markers are handcrafted. However, we are looking to minimise handcrafting,
so this mode is considered to be outside the scope of this thesis.
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4.2.4.2 Cases
The overall goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that it is possible to generate distinct
personalities without handcrafting a template for each and every character. In our
model, a personality template includes the goal/plan hierarchy, emotionality and soft
goal personality (see Section 3.1.3, page 78). Initial testing indicated that the soft goal
personality was likely to generate the greatest number of differences between characters.
To reduce handcrafting, we fixed the goal/plan hierarchy (see Figure 4.2, page 106) and
emotionality (see Section 4.2.2, page 122).
We considered five test Cases that covered a range of possible soft goal personality
template configurations for the eight characters used in testing.
1. Clear Preference Against One Activity.
2. Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals.
3. Conflicting Goals.
4. Complex Soft Goal Personality.
5. Different Soft Goal Personalities.
For the eight characters in the domain, each Case provides a different combination of
starting soft goal personalities as detailed in Table 4.2. In each of the first four Cases,
there is only one soft goal personality template used by all characters, because the main
goal of our work is to demonstrate that a small number of personality templates can
lead to significant differences between the overall final personalities of characters. So, if
all characters have the same personality template and the model is not effective, then
all characters will be indistinguishable from each other at the end of the simulation. In
the Case 5, there are four templates, with two characters using each template.
For the soft goal personality templates listed in Table 4.2, the characters were given
the same domain-dependent default maximum and minimum soft goal achievement
values. Also, the weight that the characters placed on each soft goal was equal. That
is, each soft goal was considered just as important as every other one. Each Case was
run 10 times with a different starting random seed. After ten runs, the results showed
many similarities (based on behaviour, reward and individuality) and no further runs
were considered necessary.
The Cases were chosen because they were thought to provide a good spread over
possible starting templates in the game domain. The main reasons for choosing each
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Case Soft Goal Personality Templates Why Use This Case
1.Clear Preference
Against One
Activity
1 “Don’t be insulted” To demonstrate that the char-
acters are able to learn not to
choose a specific
activity.
“Don’t insult people”
2.Multiple Ways to
Achieve Goals
1 “Don’t be insulted” To allow more diversity for the
characters, i.e. have different
preferred plan paths, while still
achieving the same goals.
“Make friends”
3.Conflicting Goals 1 “Don’t be insulted” To examine how the characters
find a preferred path when there
is no clear path to follow.
“Insult people”
4.Complex Soft Goal
Personality
1 “Don’t be close to enemies” A more realistic Case where char-
acters have a number of complex
goals to achieve at the same time.
“Be close to friends ”
“Don’t be insulted”
“Insult enemies”
“Don’t make enemies”
“Make friends”
5.Different Soft Goal
Personalities
1 Same as Case 1 To increase the scope for more di-
verse characters.2 Same as Case 3
3 Same as Case 4
4 Single soft goal, multiple ways
to achieve it: “Make friends”
Table 4.2: Cases used with soft goal personality templates: Note: In Cases 1-4, all
characters the same soft goal personality template. Case 5 uses four templates, with two
characters per template.
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Case are listed within Table 4.2 itself. The first two Cases were to verify that, for
simple Cases, behaviour is as expected. For the other three Cases, further justification
is provided below.
Case 3: Conflicting soft goals By achieving one goal, the character is likely to be
decreasing the achievement level of the other goal. This means that characters will be
forced to find a compromise.
Case 4: Complex Soft Goal Personality Here, the characters have a larger num-
ber of goals that they are pursuing. This represents a slightly more realistic case of
the kinds of complex characters that one might want to develop for a real game. That
is, characters have many goals they to achieve at the same time. The goals themselves
are more complex. Instead of just wanting to insult “people”, the characters want to
insult only those characters they do not like.
Case 5: Different Soft Goal Personalities In some respects, this Case is a com-
bination of the previous Cases. It is used to determine how different personality types
interact with each other within the same simulation. It is also used to see how the
number of starting personality templates affects individuality of characters. The char-
acters in this Case are starting from a base where they already have some differences
in what they want to achieve.
4.2.5 Expected results
We have now introduced our game domain, explained our measures of effectiveness
and detailed the Cases and modes that we will use to test the model and determine
results for the criteria for success. Now we consider the results that we expected to
achieve across the different Cases and different modes in relation to the criteria for
success identified in the introductory chapter (see Table 1.1, page 16). We separate
the expected results according to the measures used, beginning with behaviour, then
personal reward, followed by the individuality measure.
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Research Sub-question
Case
1 2 3 4 5
1a: Behaviour Over Time Success Success Success Success Success
1b: Learning A Functional Soft Goal N/A N/A N/A Success N/A
2a: Behaviour in Different Contexts Likely Likely Success Likely Likely
Fail Success Success Success
3a: Chi-squared Test Likely Success Success Success Success
Success
Table 4.3: Expected results for criteria for success related to behaviour : Success or fail
relates to whether that particular Case is likely to satisfy or fail each criterion for success
as detailed in Table 1.1 (page 16).
4.2.5.1 Expected Behaviour
When examining the criteria for success (from Table 1.1, page 16) relating to behaviour,
we consider only the mode with the full model working with both adaptation and
context (‘normal’ mode). We do not consider the other modes since we are considering
whether our model can satisfy the required criteria, not the effect of adaptation and
context. We summarise our expected results in Table 4.3. The reasoning behind these
expectations is detailed in the next pages. That is, we now consider each of the criteria
for success in turn and consider the effect the different Cases can be expected to have
on results.
Behaviour Over Time (Research Sub-question 1a) This criterion relates to how
behaviour change over time. In all Cases, we expect behaviour to change and adapt
over time due to the adaptation process in the model (see Section 3.2, page 82). Let
us examine each Case in detail.
1. Clear Preference Against One Activity: characters should learn that the activity
they have a preference against is undesirable, and therefore should choose it less
often than the other two possible activities.
2. Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals: characters should each have their own preference
for particular activities, as seen in that activity being chosen more often.
3. Conflicting Goals: characters may alternate their chosen behaviour back and forth
between two activities.
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4. Complex Soft Goal Personality: characters will choose some plans more frequently
and these values will change steadily (rather than erratically).
5. Different Soft Goal Personalities: characters will choose plans based on their soft
goal personality templates, so not all characters will have the same preferred
plans.
Learning A Functional Soft Goal (Research Sub-question 1b) This measure
relates to whether the characters are able to learn a functional goal. It relates partic-
ularly to the Case 4, complex soft goal personality, where the characters have many
soft goals. Two of these soft goals are: “be close to friends” and “don’t be close to
enemies”. We can use this Case to see whether the characters can learn which direction
to move. For example, if they are moving with respect to a friend, they should move
closer and, if they are moving with respect to an enemy, they should move away. We
believe that the characters will be able to satisfy this criteria.
Behaviour in Different Contexts (Research Sub-question 2a) This research
sub-question relates to how one particular character reacts in different contexts. In
other words, is the observed behaviour of a character (actions it chooses over the time
intervals) different when it perceives a different context? We list how we believe the
different Cases will affect this context-aware behaviour.
1. Clear Preference Against One Activity: characters have a clear preference against
an activity regardless of the context. This means that behaviour is likely to be
similar no matter what context the character is in. This Case probably will not
satisfy the criterion.
2. Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals: characters can achieve their goals in multiple
ways, so it is completely feasible that a character may find a different solution
path.
3. Conflicting Goals: if characters are achieving one of their goals, they will not be
achieving their other goal. This means that the context of which goal is currently
being achieved most will greatly affect the character’s action choices. This Case
is the most likely to succeed at this criterion.
4. Complex Soft Goal Personality: similarly to the conflicting goals Case (Case
3), it is possible that characters will develop different preferences for different
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contexts. However, due to the number of soft goals it is attempting to achieve
simultaneously, the preferences in different contexts may not be distinct enough
to meet the test.
5. Different Soft Goal Personalities: the individuals in this Case mostly have the
same soft goal personality template as one of the other Cases. So if the other
Cases satisfy the criterion, then there is no need to test this Case as well, since
it will also satisfy the criterion.
Chi-squared Test (Research Sub-question 3a) This criterion uses the chi-squared
test to determine whether the differences between the characters are significant or not.
In Case 1 (clear preference against one activity), the characters would be likely to all
display similar behaviour, since one activity should not be preferred, they would all
prefer one of the two remaining activity choices. This means that Case 1 is the least
likely to pass the chi-squared test. All the other Cases, are expected to be able to
develop sufficient differences to pass the chi-squared test.
4.2.5.2 Expected Personal Reward
In many traditional reinforcement learning problems (see literature survey Section
2.1.4.2, 38) reward is expected to stabilise on an optimal solution. However, a game is
a non-deterministic environment that is continually changing. Characters may never
converge or have a stable reward, due to the fluctuating nature of the environment.
Let us consider the criteria for success that are based on personal reward: 1c, 1d and
2d. We will use average reward values across the entire simulation time and across the
eight characters to determine the performance of these measures.
Reward Compared to Random Choice (Research Sub-question 1c) This cri-
terion tests whether the average reward that characters obtain using the full framework
is higher than the reward they would have obtained if they had used random choice for
decisions. That is, we are comparing reward for the ‘normal’ and the ‘adaptation off’
modes. All Cases are expected to satisfy this preliminary test. To fail this test would
mean that the characters are not learning effectively at all and they would be better
off, in terms of achieving their goals, if they used random choice entirely.
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Effect of Adaptation and Context on Reward (Research Sub-questions 1d
and 2b) These criteria relate to how adaptation and context affect reward. So we
need to consider the effect across both modes and Cases.
Across the different modes, it is expected that reward values will be highest when
the characters can both adapt and distinguish contexts, i.e. the ‘normal’ mode. This
is because the characters will be able to learn highly specialised information enabling
them to make better choices based on past experience in that particular context. The
reward will be worst when adaptation is turned off, i.e. random choice. The ‘context off’
mode is expected to have higher reward values than ‘adaptation off’. This is because
it is expected that, by distinguishing context, the characters will be better able to
determine which plan is the most suitable one. We can summarise these statements
by ordering the modes based on which we believe we will achieve the highest to lowest
reward: ‘normal’; ‘context off’; and ‘adaptation off’.
Across the different Cases, it is expected that the highest reward will be for Case 1
where there is a clear preference against one activity, insults. This is likely to be due to
the fact that characters can easily learn not to choose the plan ‘insult’ and can therefore
achieve their soft goal. Lowest reward values are expected when the characters have
conflicting goals (Case 3) and when there are a number of soft goal personality types
(Case 5). In Case 3, the characters will not be able to learn any plan that achieves
both their goals, so only one goal at a time will be achieved. In Case 5, characters
will have difficulty learning due to the environment in which other characters are using
different rules to govern their behaviour. We summarise these statements by specifying
the expected ordering of Cases from highest to lowest reward:
1. Case 1 (clear preference against one activity).
2. Case 2 (multiple ways to achieve goals) and Case 4 (complex soft goal personality).
3. Case 3 (conflicting goals) and Case 5 (different soft goal personalities).
4.2.5.3 Expected Individuality
The quantitative measure of individuality is used to count how many of the characters
are different from each other based on paired t-tests (see Section 4.2.3.3, page 126). We
use this measure of effectiveness to consider the following criteria for success: 3b, 1d
and 2b. Research sub-questions 1d and 2b examine the effect of adaptation and context
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on character behaviour. Research sub-question 3b tests to see whether any characters
are obtained that are significantly different from the other characters, i.e. individual.
Effect of Adaptation and Context on Individuality (Research Sub-questions
1d and 2b) These research sub-questions consider the effect of adaptation and con-
text on individuality. We examine our expectations for these criteria both across modes
and Cases.
Across the different modes, it is expected that the highest individuality value will
occur when the characters are able to adapt and observe contexts, i.e. ‘normal’ mode.
This result is expected as a consequence of characters having more precise learning
and more ways in which they can acquire different preferences, thus leading to more
differences in observed behaviour. If the characters were unable to adapt, their choices
will effectively be random and therefore it would be expected that no discernable dif-
ference would be found across time or across the different characters within the same
simulation. We can summarise these statements by ordering the modes based on which
we believe we will achieve the highest to lowest individuality: ‘normal’; ‘context off’;
and ‘adaptation off’.
Across the different Cases, we expect the highest individuality value in Case 5, where
there are different soft goal personality types. This is because the characters are trying
to achieve different goals and so should have different preferences for the activities. We
expect the next highest individuality value will be for Case 2, where characters have
multiple ways to achieve the same goals. This is because there are a number of possible
plan paths the characters can use to improve their personal reward and each character
will find its own preferred plan path that is likely to be different from that of the other
characters. The lowest individuality value is expected for Case 1, where the characters
have a clear preference against insults. In this Case, the characters will have a smaller
number of plan paths available to them, since one out of the three top-level activities is
undesirable. The other two Cases (3 and 4) are expected to have individuality values
somewhere in between the other Cases. We summarise these statements by specifying
the expected ordering of Cases from highest to lowest individuality value:
1. Case 5 (different soft goal personalities).
2. Case 2 (multiple ways to achieve goals).
3. Case 3 (conflicting goals) and Case 4 (complex soft goal personality).
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4. Case 1 (clear preference against one activity).
Individuality per Character (Research Sub-question 3b) Are any individuals
obtained? The individuality value can be used to measure the total number of differ-
ences between all characters for a run, as was done for sub-questions 1d and 2b. The
individuality measure can also be used to determine how different one particular char-
acter is from all the other characters, i.e individuality per character. This sub-question
relates to the Cases where all characters have the same personality template, i.e. Cases
1-4.
We use the paired t-tests to count the number of significant differences each char-
acter has compared to the other characters. The criterion is satisfied if at least one
character is different from the majority of the other characters. Case 1, where each
character has the same clear preference against one activity, is the least likely to satisfy
the test, since the number of ways characters can differ from each other is reduced. All
other Cases are likely to satisfy the test.
1. Clear Preference Against One Activity: Likely Fail.
2. Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals: Likely Success.
3. Conflicting Goals: Likely Success.
4. Complex Soft Goal Personality: Likely Success.
4.3 Summary of Implementation and Experimental Setup
In this chapter, we introduced the school children related domain that was implemented
and will be used to test the model. We detailed the three measures of effectiveness
(behaviour, reward, individuality) that will be used to assess whether the model satisfies
the criteria for success. We identified how these measures could be obtained in a
quantifiable manner and predicted results we expect to obtain. We are now in a position
to analyse the results of our testing of the model.
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Chapter 5
Results and Discussion
In this chapter, we present results gathered from testing our implemented domain. For
ease of reference, we begin by repeating our initial testing-based research sub-questions
and the associated criteria for success (see Table 1.1, page 16). If the model satisfies
these criteria for our implemented domain, then the model can be said to succeed
in achieving the overall goal: to generate distinct personalities with a minimum of
handcrafting. Further, the criteria span the different ways that personality can be
measured according to Caspi & Roberts (see Section 2.3, page 66).
1. How does adaptation affect character behaviour?
(a) Does behaviour change over time? Behaviour changes over time.
(b) Can characters learn about specific, functional goals? When given a func-
tional goal to learn, the majority of characters choose the “correct” action
the majority of the time, based on behaviour.
(c) How does reward change with time? Reward values are on average higher
using our model than when random choice is used.
(d) What happens if adaptation is turned off? Compared to when adaptation
is turned off; both individuality and reward are higher when adaptation is
used.
2. How does context affect character behaviour?
(a) Does character behaviour differ in different contexts? For one character’s
behaviour, show that in different contexts the action chosen the majority of
times is different.
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(b) What happens if context is turned off? Compared to when context is turned
off; both individuality and reward are higher when context is used.
3. How can personality be implemented so that the same template can be used to
create a number of distinct, individual characters, according to their behaviour?
(a) Are the behaviours of characters different from each other over time? Char-
acter behaviour passes the chi-squared test.
(b) Are any individuals obtained? Based on their individuality, at least one
character is different from the majority of the other characters when they
are all based on the same template.
In this chapter, we address all of the above criteria for success in sections based on the
three measures of effectiveness used to calculate the results. We start addressing the
criteria for success by presenting results that relate to character behaviour (particu-
larly while using the full model, ‘normal’ mode). This is followed by personal reward,
and finally the quantitative individuality measure. We then present results relating to
personal reward and individuality which were measured across all Cases and all modes.
After presenting these results, we discuss implications of the results. The final sec-
tion identifies some extra findings and several interesting results that emerged during
testing, particularly in reference to the domain-dependent knowledge (friendships and
happiness) used by characters. We finish with a summary of results.
5.1 Behaviour
We will now look at results from the ‘normal’ mode of each Case. We examine specific
example runs to investigate in detail how the characters’ actions change over time,
how they learn about sub-plans based on their soft goals, how they behave in different
contexts; whether they are different, and how individual characters compare to each
other. That is, we are addressing the criteria for success (see Table 1.1, page 16) that
relate to character behaviour.
5.1.1 Behaviour Over Time (Research Sub-question 1a)
In this section we are testing to determine whether behaviour changes over time. We
found that for all Cases the characters’ behaviour did change over time and responded
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to their dynamic environment. We examined the number of times actions were chosen
for intervals over the entire simulation in ‘normal’ mode runs for every case. We took
a single sample run (out of the 10 possible runs) from each Case and graphed each
character on a separate graph. The full set of graphs from these sample runs can be
found in Appendix A (page 193). Here, we show two graphs for each Case from two
different characters. For example, Figure 5.1 shows the graphs for Anna (Figure 5.1(a))
and Deb (Figure 5.1(b)). In these graphs, simulation time is on the x-axis. Each line
represents a different top-level activity (“Insult”, “Move” and “Wait”), and the y-axis
shows how many times that particular plan was chosen over the data collection time
period. That is, between each data output step, we summed the number of times the
character choose each activity, and this is the value shown on the y-axis. The graphs
illustrate how each character’s most chosen activity changes over time.
Case 1: Clear Preference Against One Activity The graphs in Figure 5.1 are
taken from a single randomly chosen run of Case 1 using the ‘normal’ mode. In this
Case, the soft goal personalities all have a clear preference against one activity, insults.
We can see in the sample graphs that, after an initial period of learning, both the
characters chose “insult” the least frequently1. After this time, approximately half of
the characters learned that “wait” is the most desirable activity, while the other half
believe that “move” is the best activity. We can see that Anna chose “wait” most
frequently (Figure 5.1(a)), while Deb chose “move” most frequently (Figure 5.1(b)).
Case 2: Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals Two character graphs from Case 2
are shown in Figure 5.2. Although some characters did not have a clearly preferred
behaviour (such as Deb, Figure 5.2(a)), we also show here one character whose most
chosen behaviour stabilised to be “insult” (Gina, Figure 5.2(b)). In this Case, since
there were multiple ways to achieve the goals, some characters (such as Deb and others
shown in Figure A.2, page 195) never found a most preferred activity. These characters
changed their behaviour to match their environment, while other characters found a
stable strategy that worked for them.
1This is true for all characters, as can be seen from the full set of graphs for all characters in the
appendices, Figure A.1 (page 194)
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Figure 5.1: Sample character graphs for Case 1 of behaviour based on the individual:
Action choices for each character for a particular run of Case 1 (Clear Preference Against
One Activity) mode ‘normal’. In each graph, the number of times the character chose each
of the three top-level activities is shown on the y-axis. Each line represents a different
activity.
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Time
Nu
m
be
r o
f T
im
es
 P
lan
 C
ho
se
n
(a) Deb
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
0
5
10
15
20
25
Time
Nu
m
be
r o
f T
im
es
 P
lan
 C
ho
se
n
(b) Gina
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Figure 5.2: Sample character graphs for Case 2 of behaviour based on the individual:
Action choices for each character for a particular run of Case 2 (Multiple Ways to Achieve
Goals) mode ‘normal’. In each graph, the number of times the character chose each of the
three top-level activities is shown on the y-axis. Each line represents a different activity.
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(a) Deb
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(b) Gina
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Figure 5.3: Sample character graphs for Case 3 of behaviour based on the individual:
Action choices for each character for a particular run of Case 3 (Conflicting Goals) mode
‘normal’. In each graph, the number of times the character chose each of the three top-level
activities is shown on the y-axis. Each line represents a different activity.
Case 3: Conflicting Goals Sample graphs from Case 3 are shown in Figure 5.3.
In this Case, characters are trying to insult others, but not be insulted themselves.
The full set of graphs for the characters in Figure A.3 (page 196), shows that Anna,
Fran and Gina (also shown here in Figure 5.3(b)) all have a clear and early tendency
towards “insult”. All the other characters eventually settled on choosing “insult” most
frequently, but they have some uncertainty over longer time periods. This can be seen
for Deb in Figure 5.3(a), where she is alternating between “wait” and “insult”.
Case 4: Complex Soft Goal Personality In Case 4, none of the characters show a
clear tendency towards any of the three top-level activities, see Figure 5.4. A character’s
behaviour fluctuates while learning which plan will achieve their soft goals best for that
particular context in a changing environment. Since character behaviour is dependent
on what the other characters choose, it is possible that each individual character cannot
work out the best strategy against the other characters because those characters are
changing their strategies as well. That is, the character’s fluctuations in behaviour
could be due to the fluctuations of other characters.
Case 5: Different Soft Goal Personalities The behaviour graphs in Figure 5.5
show an example run from Case 5 where characters have different soft goal personalities.
• Anna and Bec (Figure 5.5(a)) have the same soft goal personality as Case 4, that
is, they are trying to achieve six soft goals simultaneously. As we found for the
149
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
0
5
10
15
20
25
Time
Nu
m
be
r o
f T
im
es
 P
lan
 C
ho
se
n
(a) Bec
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Time
Nu
m
be
r o
f T
im
es
 P
lan
 C
ho
se
n
(b) Elle
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Figure 5.4: Sample character graphs for Case 4 of behaviour based on the individual:
Action choices for each character for a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal Person-
ality) mode ‘normal’. In each graph, the number of times the character chose each of the
three top-level activities is shown on the y-axis. Each line represents a different activity.
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(b) Chloe
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(c) Fran
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(d) Gina
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Figure 5.5: Sample character graphs for Case 5 of behaviour based on the individual:
Action choices for each character for a particular run of Case 5 (Different Soft Goal Per-
sonalities) mode ‘normal’. In each graph, the number of times the character chose each of
the three top-level activities is shown on the y-axis.
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characters in Case 4, Bec’s behaviour fluctuates and there is no clear tendency
towards any activity.
• Chloe (Figure 5.5(b)) and Deb have the same soft goal personality as in Case
1, a clear preference against one activity, “insults”. Similarly to the characters
in Case 1, Chloe has a low tendency towards “insult”, and has a clear tendency
towards “move”.
• Elle and Fran (Figure 5.5(c)) have the same soft goal personality as Case 3,
conflicting soft goals. Fran chooses “insult” most frequently, which she must
believe will allow her to insult others, while minimising being insulted herself.
• Gina (Figure 5.5(d)) and Heidi have only one soft goal: to make friends. Gina
has a clear tendency towards “move” for the entire simulation. Heidi fluctuates
most frequently between choosing “insult’ and “move”.
5.1.1.1 Comparison to Expectations
In Section 4.2.5.1 (page 138), we outlined our expected results in response to the re-
search sub-question 1a relating to behaviour. We now consider how the model per-
formed compared to these expectations:
1. Clear Preference Against One Activity: characters did learn not to choose “insult”
as often as the other activities, as was expected.
2. Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals: some characters chose a particular activity more
often than the other activities, as was expected. However, many characters did
not have a clear tendency towards any action.
3. Conflicting Goals: several characters had a clear tendency towards “insult”. The
other characters alternated back and forth between “insult” and another activity,
as was expected.
4. Complex Soft Goal Personality: the characters’ plan choices changed so that the
characters often chose each of the activities approximately the same number of
times. This was not as expected and may mean that characters were unable to
develop clear activity preferences.
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5. Different Soft Goal Personalities: character behaviour did depend that particular
character’s soft goal personality. For example, the characters given soft goal
preferences away from “insult”, show a tendency not to choose that plan. This
means that, as expected, not all characters had the same most chosen actions.
We expected that the characters would be able to adapt to their environment and
change their behaviour. Characters did indeed change their behaviour based on the
other characters in their environment.
5.1.2 Learning A Functional Soft Goal (Research Sub-question 1b)
We now examine whether the characters are able to learn more subtle preferences
at the sub-activity level, rather than the activity level. In this section we address
the research sub-question focussing on whether characters can learn about specific,
functional goals. We consider in particular whether, when given a functional goal to
learn, the majority of characters choose the “correct” action the majority of the time,
based on behaviour. It should be remembered that in the current implementation, we
used a bucket choice threshold so that the most desirable activity group was chosen 60%
of the time (see emotionality values used in Section 4.2.2, page 122). This means that,
even if a character places its highest preference on the correct behaviour, it is likely
to choose this correct behaviour only 60% of the time. The bucket choice threshold
was intended so that characters would make a suitable trade-off between exploiting a
known successful action versus exploring other possible action.
This criterion relates specifically to Case 4, which allows the characters to learn
about functional soft goals. In Case 4, the characters had six different soft goals they
were pursuing. Two of these soft goals were: “be close to friends” and “don’t be close
to enemies”. If the characters were achieving (or learning) these goals, then they should
be choosing the actions “move towards friend’ and “move away from enemy”. That
is, the characters should be able to learn that these two plans directly achieve each of
those two soft goals respectively.
Within the goal/plan hierarchy, the characters cannot choose directly between
“move towards friend” or “move away from friend”. In the given goal/plan hierar-
chy (see Figure 4.2, page 106), the characters are able to choose first which direction
they want to move and next who they want to move with respect to. For example,
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if Deb has already chosen to “move towards” someone, she can now choose between
“move towards a friend”, “move towards an enemy” or “move towards a neutral”. Al-
though, if Deb currently has no enemies (for example), she will be unable to choose the
plan “move towards an enemy”, since the plan will not be applicable.
In Figure 5.6 we show the number of times an example character, Anna, chose each
plan over the simulation with a graph for each of the categories of ‘friend’, ‘neutral’, or
‘enemy’. Results from all characters for this particular run can be found in Appendix
B (page 199). In the graphs each line represents the number of times that Anna chose
move towards or move away.
In Figure 5.6(a), we can see that the line representing “move towards friend” is
chosen more times than “move away from friend”. This means that Anna has learned
how to achieve the soft goal “be close to friends”. This was verified in results that
showed that Anna chose “move towards friend” more frequently compared to “move
away from friend”. In Figure 5.6(b), Anna appears to have no clear tendency to move
towards or away from characters. This is most likely due to the fact that no soft goals
relate to these plans, so the character can choose any plan and it will not affect its
achievement of soft goals. Figure 5.6(c) shows the plans that relate to moving with
respect to an ‘enemy’. In this situation, Anna appears to prefer to “move towards
enemy”, which is the opposite of what she should be learning. This means that Anna
did not learn about the soft goal “don’t be close to enemies”.
We now examine the results in relation to the specific criterion. For characters to
learn this soft goal, the majority of characters should choose the “correct” action the
majority of the time (i.e. over 50% of the time). Here, there are two correct actions:
“move towards friend” and “move away from enemy”. Across the 10 runs of this Case
in ‘normal’ mode, an average of 6.1 ± 1.1 characters chose “move towards friend” the
majority of the time (compared to “move away from friend”). In some instances, a few
characters did not ever have friends, so they were never able to choose to move with
respect to a friend. An average of 5.9± 1.2 characters chose “move away from enemy”
the majority of the time (compared to “move towards enemy”).
5.1.2.1 Comparison to Expectations
It was expected that the results would satisfy this criterion. To reach a majority,
the average number of characters must be greater than 4 characters. Based on the
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(a) Move with respect to a ‘friend’
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(b) Move with respect to ‘neutral’
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(c) Move with respect to an ‘enemy’
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Figure 5.6: Anna’s Behaviour when moving for Case 4: Action choices for Anna for a
particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal Personality) ‘normal’ mode. In each graph,
the number of times the character chose each of “move towards” or “move away” over the
time interval is shown on the y-axis.
behaviour data presented above, for both possible “correct” actions, the majority of
characters did choose the correct action the majority of the time.
When we examined character behaviour over time in Figure 5.4 (page 150), we
noticed that the characters did not have clear tendencies towards any of the top-level
activities. Despite this apparent lack of learning at the top-level, reaching the criterion
has established that the characters can learn appropriately about the lower-level plans
based on their specific soft goals.
5.1.3 Behaviour in Different Contexts (Research Sub-question 2a)
This section answers the research sub-question: Does character behaviour differ in
different contexts? The criterion for this question is: for one character’s behaviour,
show that in different contexts the action chosen the majority of times is different.
To test this, we need to consider each of the Cases and determine whether any of
the characters have different behaviour. For each Case and every character from the
sample run, we looked at the actions (in particular, activities) chosen and the context
the character was in when they chose that activity. We used data counts of the number
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times each particular character was in each context. Based on this data, we choose the
top two contexts to examine in detail. For these contexts, we examined whether one
of the three top-level activities was chosen the majority of the time. That is, when
the character was in a particular context (e.g. “HH”), we examined whether any of
the activities (“move”, “insult”, “wait”) were chosen more than 50% of the time. If
an activity was chosen the majority of the time, how did this activity compare to the
choices in the second most frequently occurring context. If, in the second context, there
was no majority for any activity, or the majority activity was different; then it could
be said that the character’s behaviour was different in those two contexts. That is,
the criterion is met for that Case. It was unnecessary to test Case 5, since this Case
includes characteristics that are can be found in the other Cases.
We found that, in all of the sample runs considered, there were a few characters
whose behaviour was different in different contexts, i.e the criterion to obtain at least
one character was met. To demonstrate these results, we will present sample graphs for
four example characters from each of the four sample runs for the first four Cases. For
each character, we show two graphs of behaviour in each of its two most used contexts,
for example Figure 5.7. These graphs will indicate that for that particular character,
the action chosen the majority of times is different.
Case 1: Clear Preference Against One Activity From Table 4.2 (page 136), the
soft goals the characters are trying to achieve are:
1. “Don’t be insulted”; and
2. “Don’t insult people”.
This means that, their ideal context is when they are not being insulted, and are not
insulting others. In our domain, this is represented by the context: “HL”. Figure 5.7
shows Bec in her two most common contexts: “HH” (Figure 5.7(a)) and the ideal
context, “HL” (Figure 5.7(b)). When Bec is in the ideal context (“HL”) we can see
that the activity that she chooses the majority of the time is “wait”, see Figure 5.7(b).
In Bec’s other most visited context (when she is insulting many people), her favourite
activity is “move”, see Figure 5.7(a). We note, that in both contexts, Bec chooses
“insult” the least often. This is in line with her soft goal personality that ensures she
should have a preference against insults.
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(a) Context HH: Bec is not being insulted and
is insulting people a lot
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(b) Context HL: Bec is not being insulted, but
is hardly insulting anyone herself (ideal context)
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Figure 5.7: Sample character behaviour graphs for two contexts in Case 1: Action choices
for Bec for two contexts for a particular run of Case 1 (Clear Preference Against One
Activity) mode ‘normal’. In each graph, the number of times the character chose each of
the three top-level activities is shown on the y-axis. Note for this Case the ideal context
is: “HL”.
Case 2: Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals From Table 4.2 (page 136), the soft
goals the characters are trying to achieve are:
1. “Don’t be insulted”; and
2. “Make friends”.
This means that, in our implementation, the ideal context is “HH”, which represents
when the character is not being insulted and has many friends. The two contexts
that Chloe was in most frequently were: “HM” and “LM”. The difference between
these contexts is how frequently Chloe is being insulted. In both contexts, she has a
moderate number of friends. In “HM”, she is not being insulted much. The context
“HM” represents the closest Chloe comes to achieving her soft goals most of the time.
The graphs in Figure 5.8 show that, in the context “HM”, Chloe chooses “wait” a clear
majority of the time (Figure 5.8(a)). In the context “LM”, there is no clear majority.
Chloe’s behaviour is different because, in one context, she clearly chooses one plan
above others and in the other context she fluctuates with no clear preference.
Case 3: Conflicting Goals From Table 4.2 (page 136), the soft goals the characters
are trying to achieve are:
1. “Don’t be insulted”; and
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(a) Context HM: Chloe is not being insulted and
has a moderate number of friends
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(b) Context LM: Chloe is being insulted a lot
and has a moderate number of friends
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Figure 5.8: Sample character behaviour graphs for two contexts in Case 2: Action choices
for Chloe for two contexts for a particular run of Case 2 (Clear Preference Against One
Activity) mode ‘normal’. In each graph, the number of times the character chose each of
the three top-level activities is shown on the y-axis. Note for this Case the ideal context
is: “HH”.
2. “Insult people”.
For this Case, the ideal context is “HH”, which Deb is in very frequently. Her other
most frequent context is “LH”, which represents the Case where Deb is being insulted
frequently and is insulting others a lot. When Deb is not being insulted frequently
(“HH”), she chooses “wait” the majority of the time, see Figure 5.9(a). When Deb is
being insulted frequently (“LH”), she chooses “insult” most frequently. That is, Deb
has learnt that, when she is being insulted, her best activity is to insult others (perhaps
she has found that this stops them insulting her).
Case 4: Complex Soft Goal Personality From Table 4.2 (page 136), the soft
goals the characters are trying to achieve are:
1. “Don’t be close to enemies”;
2. “Be close to friends ”;
3. “Don’t be insulted”;
4. “Insult enemies”;
5. “Don’t make enemies”; and
6. “Make friends”.
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(a) Context HH: Deb is not being insulted and
is insulting people a lot (ideal context)
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(b) Context LH: Deb is being insulted a lot and
is insulting people a lot
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Figure 5.9: Sample character behaviour graphs for two contexts in Case 3: Action choices
for Deb for two contexts for a particular run of Case 3 (Clear Preference Against One
Activity) mode ‘normal’. In each graph, the number of times the character chose each of
the three top-level activities is shown on the y-axis. Note for this Case the ideal context
is: “HH”.
The alphabetical ordering of these contexts is important because it allows us to in-
terpret the context strings. The ideal context in this Case is: “LHHHLH”. The two
contexts that Gina was in most frequently were: “LLHLHM” and “LLLLHM”. These
two contexts differ in the amount that Gina is being insulted. In both contexts, Gina
is neither close to her enemies nor her friends, is hardly insulting her enemies, has
many enemies and a moderate number of friends. In “LLHLHM”, Gina is not being
insulted (more ideal), whereas in “LLLLHM”, Gina is being insulted a lot (not ideal).
If we examine Figure 5.10, we can notice that for Gina is rarely choosing any activity
in either context. When we examined which context Gina was in most, we found that
Gina’s context changed so frequently that she hardly had two clear contexts she was
in most. When we ran the simulation for longer, we found similar results, that is, the
characters continued to change contexts frequently. This is a problem that is addressed
in the discussion of results that follows. From the graphs presented here, we can notice
that, similarly to Deb in Case 3, Gina learns that, when she is being insulted a lot,
she should insult others, see Figure 5.10(b). This behaviour for this context is different
from Gina’s behaviour for her other context where she has no clear preference between
the activities but perhaps has a slight tendency towards “move”.
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(a) Context LLHLHM: Gina is not close to her
enemies nor her friends; she is not being insulted;
is hardly insulting her enemies; has many ene-
mies; and a moderate number of friends
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(b) Context LLLLHM: Gina is not close to her
enemies nor her friends; she is being insulted a
lot; is hardly insulting her enemies; has many
enemies; and a moderate number of friends
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Figure 5.10: Sample character behaviour graphs for two contexts in Case 4: Action
choices for Gina for two contexts for a particular run of Case 4 (Clear Preference Against
One Activity) mode ‘normal’. In each graph, the number of times the character chose each
of the three top-level activities is shown on the y-axis. Note for this Case the ideal context
is: “LHHHLH”. Also note that the difference between these contexts is the degree to which
Gina is being insulted.
5.1.3.1 Comparison to Expectations
We now compare the results to our expectations that were outlined in Section 4.2.5.1
(page 139).
1. Clear Preference Against One Activity: we believed this Case would not satisfy
the criterion since there were less ways a character could differ. However, we
did find some characters whose behaviour is different in different contexts, so the
criterion is reached.
2. Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals: we expected this Case to reach the criterion
and it did.
3. Conflicting Goals: as expected, this Case satisfied the test.
4. Complex Soft Goal Personality: we were uncertain whether this Case would suc-
ceed, but our results for Gina show that it did.
5. Different Soft Goal Personalities: since the other four Cases succeeded, this Case
will satisfy the criterion as well.
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Case
Research Sub-question 1 2 3 4 5
1a: Behaviour Over Time Success Success Success Success Success
1b: Learning A Functional Soft Goal N/A N/A N/A Success N/A
2a: Behaviour in Different Contexts Success Success Success Success Success
3a: Chi-squared Test Success Success Success Success Success
Table 5.1: Results of testing Cases for behaviour-based criteria for success: Success or
fail relates to results satisfying the criteria as detailed in Table 1.1 (page 16).
5.1.4 Chi-squared Test (Research Sub-question 3a)
The sub-question relates to whether behaviour of characters differs to other characters.
The criterion was that character behaviour passes the chi-squared test. The chi-squared
test is a standard statistical tool that establishes whether the behaviour of one character
can be used to predict behaviour of another character. If the characters pass the chi-
squared test, then the p-value confidence in the result should be < 0.05. This criterion
relates to the ‘normal’ mode, so we applied the chi-squared test to characters in every
run and every Case and found that the test was passed every time.
5.1.4.1 Comparison to Expectations
Our expectations for this criterion (see Section 4.2.5.1, page 140) were that Cases 2-
5 would succeed, but Case 1 was only ‘likely’ to satisfy the test. This means our
expectations were exceeded because all five Cases satisfied the test.
5.1.5 Summary of Behaviour Results
The results when using behaviour to asses the performance of characters in the model
are summarised in Table 5.1. Comparing this to the expected results, Table 4.3 (page
138), it is seen that our model performed better than expected on all behaviour related
criteria for success, since no Case failed any test.
5.2 Personal Reward
Every time a character completed an evaluation step, it output its personal reward
value at that time. By examining the graphs of reward versus time, we found large
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Mode
Adaptation Context Normal
Case Off Off Average
Case 1: Clear Preference Against One Activity -0.11 0.55 0.4 0.28
Case 2: Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals -0.03 0.08 0.09 0.05
Case 3: Conflicting Goals 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.31
Case 4: Complex Soft Goal Personalities 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.04
Case 5: Different Soft Goal Personalities 0.01 0.23 0.19 0.14
Table 5.2: Average reward values for test Cases: personal reward scale is [-1,+1].
Mode
Adaptation OffContext OffAdaptation Off
Case vs Context Off vs Normal vs Normal
Case 1: Clear Preference Against One Activity Yes Yes Yes
Case 2: Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals Yes Yes Yes
Case 3: Conflicting Goals No No Yes
Case 4: Complex Soft Goal Personality Yes No Yes
Case 5: Different Soft Goal Personalities Yes Yes Yes
Table 5.3: Significant differences between personal reward values for different test modes.
fluctuations in personal reward values. Due to this, we used an average of the personal
reward as the test datum and not the final reward obtained. We collated the reward
data across all the Cases and modes to generate the results shown in Table 5.2. Each
value in the table represents the average of 80 data points (based on 8 characters in 10
runs), where each data point is the average for each character of approximately 1000
reward calculations over the simulation run. Given the large amount of data, normality
tests were not considered necessary.
Since these values are averages, we examined whether these values were statistically
significantly different (p < 0.05) from each other. We found that in the ‘normal’ mode
reward average was always significantly higher than in the ‘adaptation off’ mode. The
results for statistical significance comparing the modes to each other are in shown Table
5.3. The relevance of this significance data is discussed in Section 5.2.2 (page 162).
We now discuss these results in relation to the criteria for success relating to reward
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values. We begin by comparing reward values to random choice and then examine the
effect of adaptation and context on reward values.
5.2.1 Reward Compared to Random Choice (Research Sub-question
1c)
The criterion for addressing this sub-question is that reward values are on average
higher using our model than when random choice is used. Table 5.2 shows that the
average reward values from testing across all Cases and all modes. For the mode using
our model, ‘normal’ mode, the average reward values are greater than those generated
using random choice, ‘adaptation off’ mode, in all Cases tested. Further, the differences
were significant in all Cases, meaning that the model has satisfied this test in all Cases.
5.2.1.1 Comparison to Expectations
Our expectations (see Section 4.2.5.2, page 140) were that our model would generate
higher average reward values than random choice. So our expectations have been
confirmed and the model satisfies this test.
5.2.2 Effect of Adaptation and Context on Reward (Research Sub-
questions 1d and 2b)
The criteria for 1d and 2b (as specified from Section 1.1, page 16) are:
• 1d: Compared to when adaptation is turned off, reward is higher when adaptation
is used.
• 2b: Compared to when context is turned off; reward is higher when context is
used.
We begin by considering and comparing the reward values across the modes and then
across Cases. After this we summarise the results from testing in relation to the criteria
and compare to what we expected to find.
5.2.2.1 Reward Across Modes
Effect of Adaptation on Average Reward Based on raw averages in all Cases, the
‘adaptation off’ mode, performed worse than the other two modes. The difference was
significant for all Cases except Case 3, where difference between ‘adaptation off’ and
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‘context off’ modes was not significant. This means that, in Case 3 (conflicting goals),
without the assistance of context, characters would have been better using random
choice to make decisions, rather than learn which choice to make. In Case 3, the
characters are trying to achieve two goals that are unlikely to be achieved at the same
time, “insult people” and “don’t be insulted” and are actually in conflict with each
other. In this Case, context is needed to enable the character to learn that, when one
goal is not being achieved, it should attempt to achieve the other soft goal. Although
the average for ‘normal’ was higher, it was not significantly better than ‘context off’
mode. The average reward value for ‘normal’ was significantly higher than that in
‘adaptation off’ mode.
Effect of Context on Average Reward The ‘normal’ mode produced a higher
average reward than ‘context off’ in two Cases as shown in Table 5.2, although this
difference was only significant in one Case. In the other three Cases, the ‘context
off’ mode produced a higher average reward than ‘normal’, although in one Case the
difference was not significant.
5.2.2.2 Reward Across Cases
Case 1 showed the highest reward values for the two modes ‘context off’ and ‘normal’.
This was the Case where there was a clear preference against one activity. This meant
that, at the top-level of choosing between activities, the characters had soft goals that
directly indicated that one of the activities should not be chosen. Presumably, that
meant it was easier for characters to learn which activities and plans were not good
and therefore the characters got closer to achieving their soft goals, i.e. not giving or
receiving insults.
Cases 2 and 4 with multiple ways to achieve goals and complex soft goals, respec-
tively, showed the lowest reward values. This is probably because characters found it
difficult to find a good reward path. With complex soft goals (Case 4), the characters
are trying to achieve too many goals at the same time and are unable to determine
which choice to make. The problem is hindered by the fact that reward is not guaran-
teed. So, although choosing an action like “move towards friend” should improve soft
goals, it may not always work. While the character is moving towards someone, that
someone could move as well and so the character may or may not get closer to their
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friend, thus changing the reward value so that it may not reflect the intended action. It
was hoped that over time they would learn, apparently the environment fluctuated too
much for this to happen. The implementation was run for a reasonably long period of
time and the preferences of the characters were not changing greatly towards the end
of the period, even if their rewards were fluctuating greatly.
5.2.2.3 Summary of Personal Reward Results
Across modes, actual reward values were, ranked from highest to lowest reward value:
‘context off’; ‘normal’; and ‘adaptation off’. In relation to research sub-question 1d
comparing the ‘normal’ mode with ‘adaptation off’ mode, the model satisfied the cri-
teria in all Cases. Reward was higher in ‘normal’ mode than when using adaptation.
Considering sub-question 2b, comparing the average reward in ‘normal’ mode with
‘context off’ mode, reward was higher in one Case, equal in two Cases; and less in two
Cases.
Across Cases, actual average reward values were, ranked from highest to lowest
reward value:
1. Case 3 (conflicting goals);
2. Case 1 (clear preference against one activity);
3. Case 5 (different soft goal personalities).
4. Case 2 (multiple ways to achieve goals); and
5. Case 4 (complex soft goal personality).
The average value for Case 1 ‘adaptation off’ is very low compared to ‘context off’ and
‘normal’ modes. This brings the average across modes for Case 1 down so much that
it does not produce the highest average reward value.
5.2.2.4 Comparison to Expectations
Across modes it was expected that the order would be (highest to lowest): ‘normal’;
‘context off’; ‘adaptation off’ (see Section 4.2.5.2, page 141). Actual results showed the
average reward for ‘context off’ as being higher. This could be because context does
not actually help the characters learn as effectively as was hoped.
Across Cases, we expected Case 1 to obtain the highest reward and Cases 3 and
5 to obtain the lowest reward values. Contrary to expectations, Cases 2 and 4 had
164
5.3 Individuality
the lowest reward values. This may be because the characters were not able to find
an optimal path from their many choices. The characters may have spent too long
exploring their domain and the contexts available to them without exploiting paths
that looked promising.
It was expected that Cases 3 and 5 would have the lowest reward values but this
was not found to be the result. These are the Cases where there are multiple soft goal
personalities in the model (Case 5) and where the characters have conflicting goals
(Case 3). In the actual results, these Cases had moderate to high levels of reward.
In Case 5, the higher than expected values could be because the individual characters
found their own high personal reward values and were not as reliant upon others as
expected. For Case 3 with conflicting goals, it appears that the characters were able to
find a way to achieve their goals relatively well.
5.3 Individuality
The quantitative measure for individuality used was introduced in Section 4.2.3.3 (page
126). Individuality is determined from pair-wise comparisons of the behaviour of two
characters at the same time intervals using paired t-tests. To ensure valid derivation
of individuality, the data (action counts over time intervals) must first be checked
to confirm that it is normally distributed. All the data we obtained was normally
distributed.
A chi-squared test is also required to provide a preliminary check of whether there
exists any difference between the characters. If a specific run does not pass the chi-
squared test, there are no discernable differences between characters. Individuality
gives a quantitative value to just how different the characters are, assuming that some
difference has already been detected between characters. None of the Cases in ‘adapta-
tion off’ mode passed the chi-squared test. This means that the behaviour in this mode
was not unique to a particular character. This makes sense because, in the ‘adaption
off’ modes characters were essentially using random choice to make decisions. This
would be expected to result in non-discernable differences between the characters over
time. Both ‘context off’ and ‘normal’ modes passed the chi-squared test in all Cases,
allowing us to compare their results for individuality.
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Mode
Context Statistically
Case Off Normal Different? Average
Case 1: Clear Preference
Against One Activity
20.0± 4.2 21.1± 4.3 No 20.55
Case 2: Multiple Ways to
Achieve Goals
41.7± 3.4 36.8± 6.1 Yes 39.25
Case 3: Conflicting Goals 19.3± 5.6 26.5± 4.4 Yes 22.90
Case 4: Complex Soft Goal
Personality
36.4± 4.6 14.1± 5.3 Yes 25.25
Case 5: Different Soft Goal
Personalities
42.6± 3.4 38.5± 5.5 Yes 40.55
Table 5.4: Individuality for test Cases: average number of significant differences between
individuals for test Cases. Maximum number of differences is 56.
Individuality uses paired t-tests to determine the number of significant differences
between the actual action choices that the characters made for the three top-level ac-
tivities: “move”, “wait”, “insult”. We examined the percentage of times that they
choose the plans over an interval since this is more observable to a user than the actual
number of times (see Section 4.2.3.3, page 126). The maximum number of significant
differences possible is 2× Cn2 (see Section 4.2.3.3, page 132). Since we are using eight
characters, n = 8, we can find that the maximum number of difference between our
characters is: 2 × C82 = 56. If the individuality value obtained for a particular run
was 56, it would mean that all eight characters made significantly different choices to
every other character for all three top-level activities. Keeping this maximum value in
mind we present the results across Cases and modes in Table 5.4, including whether
the difference in each Case between the two individuality values are significantly dif-
ferent. These results show that we found the differences between the two modes to be
significantly different in all but Case 1 (clear preference against one activity).
We now consider the criteria for success relating to individuality. We begin by
considering the effect of adaptation and context on individuality. Then we consider
how well our model performs in generating individual characters with behaviour that
is very different from others, research sub-question 3b.
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5.3.1 Effect of Adaptation and Context on Individuality (Research
Sub-questions 1d and 2b)
The criteria for research sub-questions 1d and 2b (as specified from Table 1.1, page 16)
are:
• 1d: Compared to when adaptation is turned off, individuality is higher when
adaptation is used.
• 2b: Compared to when context is turned off; individuality is higher when context
is used.
The ‘adaptation off’ mode did not pass the chi-squared test and therefore we can
conclude that individuality is higher when adaptation is used. We now consider the
effect of context on individuality and then how individuality varies across Cases. After
this we summarise our results for the criteria and compare them to our expected results.
5.3.1.1 Individuality Across Modes
In this section, we consider the effect of context on individuality, i.e. testing research
sub-question 2b, using Table 5.4. In Case 1 (clear preference against one activity),
neither mode was clearly better or worse. This could be because the characters all
learnt not to choose insults in both Cases, as indicated by the high reward values
(indeed these two Case-mode combinations had the highest reward). Now, if they have
learnt as they were supposed to, then they would eliminate one of the ways they can
differ from each other. This means that perhaps the maximum individuality value is
limited by the soft goals they are trying to achieve. In order words, the soft goals for
this Case effectively reduced the number of ways that characters could demonstrate
different behaviour. So, it is possible that both modes reached the limit and therefore
are approximately the same.
In Cases 2, 4 and 5, ‘context off’ mode showed significantly more differences between
characters than ‘normal’, i.e had better individuality. In Case 2 (multiple ways to
achieve the goals), it appears that context did not help the characters choose their own
different way to achieve the soft goals. We were unable to determine why this would
be so for this Case compared to others. In Cases 4 and 5, some of the characters had a
large number of contexts to learn about (all characters in Case 4 and some in Case 5).
So perhaps they were not able to learn their preferred path effectively with the extra
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contexts to learn about. Certainly, the reward values for Case 4 were very low (see
Table 5.2, page 161). This inability to learn could be due to fluctuations in calculations
of personal reward. This in turn could mean the characters ended up with no clear
preference or behaviour and so could not easily be distinguished from each other.
It is interesting to note that Case 4 had a large difference in individuality between
the modes (but curiously not between reward values). That is, when characters used
contexts to make decisions, they found it exceedingly difficult to learn a clear preferred
path, and so characters may have switched between activities (see for example the char-
acters in Figure 5.4, page 150). On the other hand, with adaptation and no contexts,
the characters could learn which plan to choose irrespective of the soft goal context,
and so learnt their own way to differ from each other.
The individuality for the ‘normal’ mode was significantly higher than in ‘context off’
mode for one Case, where the characters had conflicting goals (Case 3). This indicates
that the individuality was greater when using our full model with contexts. In Case
3, characters had conflicting soft goals, so that using context may help the characters
work out which soft goal to achieve next, e.g. the one that is failing currently. Using
context appears to have enabled the characters to build up their own unique way to
achieving soft goals depending on the context. It shows that, in at least one Case,
context-aware characters are more individual.
5.3.1.2 Individuality Across Cases
When comparing how the individuality varied across the different Cases, we use the
average across the ‘context off’ and ‘normal’ modes. Based on this, we can see in Table
5.4 (page 166) that Case 5 generated the highest individuality. In Case 5, there were
four starting soft goal personality templates used. This meant that from the beginning
of the scenario the characters already had some differences between each other. So it
makes sense that this Case produced the highest individuality. In fact, it would have
been more surprising if this Case had not achieved the highest individuality.
Case 2, where characters had many different ways to achieve their soft goals, had the
next highest individuality. In this Case, since their were so many possible optimal paths,
characters found their own solution path that was different from the other characters,
therefore providing greater potential for individuality.
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The least significant differences are in Case 1, clear preference against one activity,
and Case 3, where the characters had conflicting goals. It was expected that Case 1
would have a small number of differences between characters because the number of
optimal plan paths available to the characters was diminished, as one activity (insults)
is never desirable. Case 3, conflicting soft goals, had relatively high personal reward
values (see Figure 5.2, page 161), so characters were achieving their goals. The low
individuality value may be due to characters achieving their goals in the same way as
the other characters.
5.3.1.3 Summary
Across modes, actual individuality values were, ranked in order of highest to lowest
individuality: ‘context off’; ‘normal’; and ‘adaptation off’.
Across Cases, individuality ranking was from highest to lowest:
1. Case 5 (different soft goal personalities);
2. Case 2 (multiple ways to achieve goals);
3. Case 4 (complex soft goal personality);
4. Case 3 (conflicting goals); and
5. Case 1 (clear preference against one activity);
5.3.1.4 Comparison to Expectations
Across modes we expected the ‘normal’ would have the highest individuality values since
characters would have more dimensions in which to differ to other characters. However,
it appears when characters could learn about contexts, they were less likely to have
stable behaviour and therefore less likely to clearly differ from each other according to
the individuality value. Across Cases, the actual ranking of individuality was exactly
as expected (see Section 4.2.5.3, page 142).
5.3.2 Individuality per Character (Research Sub-question 3b)
The criterion for this test is: based on their individuality, at least one character is
different from the majority of the other characters when they are all based on the same
template. That is, we are considering each character’s personal individuality measure,
rather than the entire run’s individuality measure.
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Here, we are investigating individual characters who begin with the same template,
i.e. Cases 1-4. In the previous section, we established that the characters are different
from each other. However, if the characters are all only slightly different from each
other, then perhaps the differences will not be obvious to an observer. If at least one
character is significantly different from the majority of the other characters, then it
is much more likely that there is at least one observable personality. For example,
if the individuality value is 14, then there are 14 differences between the characters.
This could mean that most characters are different from one of the characters on two
dimensions (ie each character has almost 2 significant differences). On the other hand,
it could mean that one character is different from every other character, and therefore
that particular character has 14 differences. The second type of differences are probably
easier for an observer or player to notice.
In order to consider the individuality value for each character, we separated out
the paired t-tests for each character. This allowed us to count for each particular char-
acter how many differences existed between it and each of the other characters. The
maximum is 14 differences, two for each of the 7 other characters. Remember that
characters can only differ from each other on two dimensions, since we use the percent-
age of times each of the three top-level activities can be chosen (see Section 4.2.3.3,
page 131). So, for a character to be different from the majority of the other characters,
then that character would have more than 7 differences to the other characters. We
then count the number of characters whose behaviour is different from the majority,
giving us a value out of 8 (since there are eight characters). Table 5.5 shows the results
for the average (across runs) of the number of characters whose behaviour is different
from that of the majority of the other characters for both modes. The criterion states
that at least one character should be different from the majority of other characters.
So, to satisfy the criterion, the average number of characters should be greater than or
equal to 1.
5.3.2.1 Comparison to Expectations
Our expectations for our model (i.e. ‘normal’ mode) (see Section 4.2.5.3, page 143)
were that Case 1 was likely to fail and Cases 2 to 4 were likely to succeed. As seen in
Table 5.5, Case 1 did fail the test, since the average was less than 1 character (0.7±0.8),
although some specific runs did satisfy the criteria. Cases 2 and 3 in ‘normal’ mode
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Context Similar
Case Off Normal Value
Case 1: Clear Preference Against One Activity 0.7± 1.2 0.7± 0.8 Yes
Case 2: Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals 7.7± 0.9 6.0± 2.2 Yes
Case 3: Conflicting Goals 1.0± 0.9 2.4± 1.4 Yes
Case 4: Complex Soft Goal Personality 6.4± 1.8 0.5± 0.5 No
Table 5.5: Average number of characters who are different from the majority: maximum
number is 8 meaning that all eight characters are different from the majority of other
characters.
passed the criterion with values of 6.0± 2.2 and 2.4± 1.4 respectively. Case 4 did not
succeed for in ‘normal’ mode (0.5 ± 0.5). However, for the ‘context off’ mode Case 4
did succeed the test well (6.4 ± 1.8). This could be due to the characters in Case 4
‘normal’ never having clear tendencies towards certain activities.
5.4 Discussion
Based on the results presented, it is possible to draw some conclusions about our the-
oretical model and consider whether divergences from expectations were due to the
implementation or the model itself. We now detail some key problems that were de-
tected and some possible explanations and solutions, the ideal conditions for improving
individuality and several interesting results that emerged during testing.
Number of Soft Goals In order to permit behaviour that shows more than one
dimensional (simplistic personality) a large number of soft goals (probably at least six)
were deemed necessary. However, with n soft goals, for example, the number of contexts
that the character can be in is 4n (given that each soft goal achievement level can take on
one of four values: ‘H’, ‘M’, ‘L’, or ‘-’). This creates a very large number of contexts to
be learning about, especially when the reward is non-deterministic. In order to remedy
this situation, it seems that the current context should be something other than the
soft goals. Some trials were run in which the characters used their current happiness
as their context. This resulted in fast learning, but behaviour was too similar and
the learning was not situated enough to fulfill the personality requirements of having
context-aware behaviour.
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Context Ideally, it was thought that the characters would use their soft goals as
context so that they would be able to learn that, when the value for soft goal x was
low, they would need to do some particular activity to increase the value of that goal.
In our implementation, we found that the characters often switched between approxi-
mately two contexts during the same time period. This meant that characters were not
experiencing the full range of contexts available to them. This could be due to the soft
goal achievement level buckets not being complex enough to capture all information.
For example, it may be virtually impossible for any character to obtain any more than
a “moderate” number of friends, and hence all characters will appear to achieve “make
friends” to a level of “M”. The cut-offs for the achievement level buckets are based on
the entire range that the achievement level can take and the ideal value of the soft goal.
So future work, may consider changing the ideal value within the soft goal personality.
Another hindrance to character learning in any context in our implementation is the
fact that the reward values were found to fluctuate greatly, based on fluctuations in
the environment.
Relationship Between Reward and Individuality The results seem to indicate
that high individuality can lead to lower personal reward values. For example, Case 4
with ‘context off’ and Case 2 in both modes show very high individuality and yet very
low reward. High individuality, such as in Case 4, means the characters are choosing
very different activities at the top-level. However, the different activity choice could be
because the characters have not learned how to consistently improve their reward values
and are still attempting non-optimal plans. If there is one clear “optimal” path for all
characters, then they should all discover this and get higher personal reward values.
However, if they have all discovered the same optimal path, then the individuality
will decrease. To address these issues, it would be necessary to create more paths
that are optimal in the design process. The domain we used was relatively simplistic
and therefore the number of possible paths was not as deep as would be likely in a
commercial game.
Although it is difficult to draw a conclusion from only five Cases, it seems that if the
characters are achieving high reward values, they become more similar and individuality
decreases. To confirm this, more Cases with different soft goal personality types within
the same Case and across all Cases would need to be used.
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Summary Despite these issues, the model does show some promise. Character be-
haviour does change over time (see Section 5.1.1, page 146); and characters can learn
about functional soft goals (see Section 5.1.2, page 152). Also the characters are able to
exhibit different behaviour in different contexts (see Section 5.1.3, page 154). Further,
we found that characters did choose activities in their own unique manner, based on
the individuality measure used. The model was certainly better than random choice
of the activities, both in terms of reward and individuality. Although there was no
clear distinction between whether the use of contexts improved personal reward and
individuality, this may be a consequence of the problems listed above. With further
work, it is envisaged that context would emerge as being suitable for many domains,
especially domains more complex than the implementation used for our testing.
5.5 Extra Results: Domain-dependent Measures
The results presented so far relate directly to the testing-based research sub-questions
and criteria posed in the introductory chapter and are based on the generic model
presented in Chapter 3 (page 69). When implementing the characters in our game
domain, the characters needed some domain-dependent knowledge, see Section 4.1.2.2
(page 110). This knowledge was divided into opinions and facts. Facts are aspects of
this particular world that the character can perceive and do not have a judgement value
attached to them, for example, my location1. Opinions are facts with a judgement value
attached to them, for example, a character may store: ‘I like Bec’. In our domain,
the characters stored two types of opinions: attraction towards others, and personal
happiness.
Based on attraction towards others, characters were able to build friendships that
were relatively stable. Although how friendships are developed is based on domain-
dependent equations, whether they wanted to make friends was part of their soft goals
and therefore somewhat dependent on the stability of the model. The characters also
had a happiness value that represented how close they were to achieving all of their
soft goals.
1In some domains, location may need a judgement value attached to it. For example, the character
may need to store: ‘the location I am in currently is bad’
173
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this final section of this chapter, we discuss some interesting findings that relate
to the opinion-based domain-dependent knowledge. This thesis did not aim to consider
the effects of friendship and happiness on our characters. However, these results rep-
resent interesting ways that the characters could interact in the social game that was
implemented. These results demonstrate the complexity of our model in generating
complex characters and indicate possible future avenues of study. The results them-
selves are presented in Appendix C (page 205) and show graphs of how happiness and
friendships fluctuate over time, and friendship networks generated. We now discuss the
implications of these extra results.
5.5.1 Happiness
Happiness was found to fluctuate rapidly from very positive to very negative. However,
perhaps this is understandable. The characters are rarely achieving their soft goals and
if they do suddenly achieve them, it is often for a reason that they seem incapable of
learning. Characters are constantly being insulted and have no direct way to stop this
behaviour. In fact, it emerged that the potentially best way to avoid being insulted is to
insult other people so that the character can make friends, in the hope that these friends
will not turn around and insult them. The domain fluctuates because all the characters
are all trying to learn what they should be doing. This means that no character can
learn a strategy against a particular character because that character may change their
strategy as well. However, these problems are problems that we, as humans, face every
day. They are also problems that occur in gaming. Human players will not always play
consistently and the character needs to be able to adapt to these changes. So, if we
can design characters that can cope with constant changes, then they will be able to
function better within games. Fluctuating happiness values indicate that the character
was changing to match its environment.
Although no players were used for testing, the model (and implementation) are
intended for final use in a game for people to play. When watching the game, players
are able to observe whether the characters were “happy”, “sad”, or “neutral” based
on their smile (for example see the character images in Figure 4.1 on page 105). In
our domain, “be happy” could be used as a soft goal based on happiness levels and
would then contribute to a character’s context. This soft goal was not used for any
of the Cases presented in this thesis. However, if it was used in a future study, the
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player would be able to see a factor that relates directly to the character’s context. If
players cannot see which context (or at least partial context) a character is in when
it makes a decision, then the decisions that the characters make may seem erratic or
unrealistic. Using happiness may be a potential way to make character behaviour more
understandable to a player.
5.5.2 Friendships
We found that characters formed stable friendships, even in their changing domain.
This is promising given the difficultly of making friends in our model. Characters could
not directly make friends. For example, let us examine how Bec and Gina could become
friends. Bec could tell Gina an insult about Heidi, and Gina may like Bec more as a
result, but only if Gina does not already like Heidi. Bec was unable to store information
on who Gina liked or did not like. If Gina agrees with whatever Bec says, then Bec
may like Gina more. However, neither Bec nor Gina can do something ‘nice’ in order
to become friends more quickly. Our implemented game was designed specifically to be
difficult to make friends, in order to test the characters and force them to try more ways
to make friends and to force them to choose who to be friends with. The (intentional)
construction of the domain made it nearly impossible for one character to be friends
with everyone; they had to choose. In some Cases (such as Case 1), the characters had
no soft goals relating to making friends, so it is not surprising that they only made
enemies.
It is very promising that, despite these impediments, the characters were still able
to form stable and complex friendships. Further, it is interesting that the complex
and relatively stable networks that developed can be related to real world friendships.
For example, some of the girls were very popular and formed a sort of ‘clique’, other
girls were happy to be on their own and still other girls were trying to get into the
clique (that is, they liked the members of the girls in the clique, but they were not
liked by the clique). In our domain, there were only eight characters and yet there still
existed a large number of possible friendship networks that could be generated. These
networks are dynamic and can change if a new character or a human player enters
the environment. It would probably be interesting to investigate how the friendship
networks change over longer time periods. In summary, this domain-dependent game
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application shows that complex friendships can be easily generated and allow each
character’s experience to differ from other characters.
5.6 Summary
The results from using the criteria to answer the testing-based research sub-questions
can be seen in Table 5.6. Adaptation was found to change behaviour over time, allow
characters to learn specific soft goals, and, compared to decisions made using random
choice (null hypothesis), adaptation improves both reward and individuality. Charac-
ters chose different actions in different contexts. Context was not found to improve
individuality and reward in all Cases. Characters were found to be different from each
other and, in half the Cases, at least one character was different from the majority
of the other characters. Happiness and reward were found to fluctuate greatly over
time in response to the dynamic environment. Complex friendship networks were de-
veloped showing that our simplistic model was able to generate complex effects. By
meeting some of the criteria, the model can be seen to addressing our research goals
and questions. We consider the greater meaning of these results in the next chapter as
we conclude this thesis.
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Research Questions, Testing-based Sub-questions
and Criteria for Success
Criteria Satisfied?
1. How does adaptation affect character behaviour?
1.(a) Does behaviour change over time?
Behaviour changes over time. Yes
1.(b) Can characters learn about specific, functional
goals?
When given a functional goal to learn, the majority of
characters choose the “correct” action the majority of
the time, based on behaviour.
Yes
1.(c) How does reward change with time?
Reward values are on average higher using our model
than when random choice is used.
Yes
1.(d) What happens if adaptation is turned off?
Compared to when adaptation is turned off; both indi-
viduality and reward are higher when adaptation is used.
Individuality: Yes
Reward: Yes
2. How does context affect character behaviour?
2.(a) Does character behaviour differ in different con-
texts?
For one character’s behaviour, show that in different con-
texts the action chosen the majority of times is different.
Yes
2.(b) What happens if context is turned off? Individuality:
Compared to when context is turned off; both individ-
uality and reward are higher when context is used.
Yes in 1/5 Cases
Reward:
Yes in 1/5 Cases
3. How can personality be implemented so that the same
template can be used to create a number of distinct,
individual characters, according to their behaviour?
3.(a) Are the behaviours of characters different from each
other over time?
Character behaviour passes the chi-squared test. Yes
3.(b) Are any individuals obtained?
Based on their individuality, at least one character is
different from the majority of the other characters when
they are all based on the same template.
Yes in 2/4 Cases
Table 5.6: Summary of results of testing-based research sub-questions based on criteria
for success (as introduced in Table 1.1, page 16). Words in italics are the measures of
effectiveness.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The main aim of our research was to develop a method of generating individual char-
acters with a minimum of handcrafting so as to populate virtual environments with
large numbers of interactive characters. We have developed a model that generates
individual characters with the same initial personality template. The results showed
that the personalities generated were adaptive, characters developed different activity
preferences for different contexts, and the characters were distinctly individual (in a
computational sense). In this chapter, we begin by discussing the research questions in
relation to our final model. Next, we discuss further testing and future work that could
improve the model. This is followed by the implications of this model for the games
industry and some final words to conclude the thesis.
6.1 Addressing the Research Questions
The major research questions presented in the introduction (see Section 1.2, page 14)
relate to building and testing a model of personality so that the characters generated
are adaptive, context-aware and individual. We consider each of the research questions
in turn and address the related model-based and testing-based sub-questions.
6.1.1 Research Question 1: Adaptation
How can a model of personality be created that uses adaptation? How
does adaptation affect character behaviour? Personality can be seen in the
actions taken by characters. Characters choose which actions to execute based on their
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preferences (implemented as somatic markers). So, to include adaptation in personality,
the model needs to adapt the preferences. This can be done by updating the preferences
after execution of actions within a feedback loop. Self-reinforcement (personal reward)
learning (from cognitive-social theories) can be used so that the preferences learnt are
based on the personal soft goals of the character. Which soft goals a character is trying
to achieve (and the importance of each soft goal) is part of the character’s personality
template. So the personality template affects how the character learns the adaptive part
of its overall personality. We now consider the model and testing-based sub-questions
relating to adaptation.
• Model-based sub-questions:
– What aspects of personality can adapt? Somatic marker preferences,
which are used to make decisions, can change based on experience and are
part of an character’s personality.
– How are decisions made? Decisions are made by following the appraisal
of coping choices process (inspired by the somatic marker hypothesis) that
uses somatic markers to place preferences on available plans in the current
context.
– How can characters calculate reward? Reward can be calculated based
on a weighted sum of an individual’s current achievement levels of its soft
goals (based on its soft goal personality).
– How can characters use reward to change behaviour? Personal re-
ward can update somatic markers according to the reinforcement compari-
son technique. Somatic markers affect behaviour by changing the character’s
preferences towards or away from choosing certain actions.
• Testing-based sub-questions:
1.(a) Does behaviour change over time? According to our results, the charac-
ters were able to change which actions they executed most frequently based
on feedback from the environment and their personal goals. This means
that characters can change to suit different players or design changes to the
environment. We met this criterion because the character’s somatic mark-
ers adapted over time, so that the preferences for action changed, based on
personal reward.
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1.(b) Can characters learn about specific, functional goals? Our results
showed that characters could. This means that a designer can give a char-
acter a goal to achieve in the world or a role to play in the game and the
character will be able to automatically learn how to do this (i.e. without
further external intervention). Further, it means that the overall charac-
ter personality that is generated can still fulfil functional requirements. We
met this criterion because characters learn based on personal reward and
personal reward is based on the soft goals the character is trying to achieve.
1.(c) How does reward change with time? Reward fluctuates greatly in
response to fluctuating environmental feedback. The reward values that
the character calculates are higher over time when the character can use
adaptation. This means that adaptation improves achievement of soft goals.
1.(d) What happens if adaptation is turned off? The personal reward and
the individuality of characters decreases. In terms of reward, this means
that adaptation helps characters learn how to achieve their soft goals, which
improves their reward. In terms of individuality, the results indicate that
characters are more different from each other when they can adapt. Charac-
ters who are choosing actions randomly may appear different over one time
period but, over an entire game, these characters will not be significantly dif-
ferent from each other. Characters who can learn their own preferred actions
to achieve their soft goals will become different from the other characters
over the entire game.
6.1.2 Research Question 2: Context
How can a model of personality be created that uses context? How does con-
text affect character behaviour? Characters execute different actions depending
on their context. Characters choose which actions to execute based on their prefer-
ences (somatic markers). So, the character’s preferences need to be based on context
as well. In our model, we choose context to relate to the soft goals the character is
trying to achieve (part of its personality template). To know what to do in a specific
context, the character learns, via adaptation, their preference for that particular action
and context (rather than hard-coding the preference). We now consider the model and
testing-based sub-questions relating to context.
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• Model-based sub-questions:
– How can context be represented? Context is a string representing a
discrete version of the achievement level of each of a character’s soft goals
from its soft goal personality.
– How can context information be provided? Characters update their
somatic markers based on the context they were in when they made the
decision they are evaluating.
• Testing-based sub-questions:
2.(a) Does character behaviour differ in different contexts? We found
that the most preferred action was different for a character in their two
most frequently used contexts. This means that characters can learn which
action they personally consider most suitable according to whether specific
soft goals are or are not currently being achieved. This results in more
complex and realistic behaviour and therefore overall personality. We met
this criterion because, when characters learn somatic markers, they link their
reward to the action and the context in which the action is chosen.
2.(b) What happens if context is turned off? When context is turned off,
reward and individuality are likely to improve, according to our results. This
is the opposite of what was expected. In terms of individuality, this means
that being able to learn about different contexts did not allow characters
to consistently find a clear solution path that is different from the other
characters. In terms of reward, this means that characters are less likely
to learn how to achieve their soft goals when they have many soft goals to
achieve simultaneously. This could be because there were too many contexts
in some Cases or the way contexts operated within the specific implemented
domain.
6.1.3 Research Question 3: Individuality
How can personality be implemented so that the same template can be
used to create a number of distinct, individual characters, according to
their behaviour? Personality is made up of a fixed template and an aspect based
on individual personal experience. Different personal experiences will result in different
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preferences for actions, and therefore different actions executed, leading to different
observed personality, even when the template is the same. We now consider the model
and testing-based sub-questions relating to individuals.
• Model-based sub-questions:
– What is an individual within our model? An individual is comprised of
a number of components and beliefs including personality template, somatic
markers and domain-dependent knowledge. Individuality is distinguished
based on observable behaviour, in particular the actions that a character
executes over a time period.
– What is a personality template? A personality template guides the
character’s learning and decision-making. In our model, it is made up of a
goal/plan hierarchy, a soft goal personality and emotionality.
– How does personality change over time (i.e. how can a charac-
ter be different from another character with the same template)?
Personality changes over time by adapting somatic marker preferences. So-
matic markers are adapted based on personal reward experience, so no two
characters will have exactly the same somatic markers, even if they began
with the same initial personality template.
• Testing-based sub-questions:
3.(a) Are the behaviours of characters different from each other over
time? Characters were different at the level of the actions they executed.
Results showed that characters do not have the same most frequently chosen
actions as other characters over an entire run. We found that the behaviour
of one character cannot be used to predict the behaviour of another over a
run. We obtained this because the learnt somatic markers allowed the char-
acter to find stable ways to achieve their goals in a different way compared
to other characters.
3.(b) Are any individuals obtained? We found that in half the Cases, we were
able to obtain at least one character that was significantly different from the
majority of the other characters. This means that some characters are more
different from others and are therefore more likely to have an observably
different personality. We obtained this result because characters had their
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own unique experiences, which changed the somatic markers they obtained,
which in turn changed the actions that character preferred to execute.
6.1.4 Implications Arising from Research Questions
Our results indicate that our model can achieve our aim to build individual, adaptive
and context-aware characters from the same template. This means that individual pref-
erences for every character for every context do not need to be hard-coded, they can be
learnt based on an automatic processes and their personality template. Traditionally
in personality research for virtual characters, it is very difficult to quantify results. We
have used a set of criteria for success for our model to satisfy prior to user feedback
questionnaires and studies. These criteria allow us to determine the areas of our model
that are in need of improvement, in this circumstance, context-aware behaviour. That
is, the benefits of context were not as clear as was expected. Satisfying the criteria
does not mean that the model can necessarily produce characters that are distinct to
human observers. However, satisfying many of the criteria indicates that the model has
promise. The model did not fully satisfy all criteria, so further testing is needed. In
future testing, it might be possible to determine a value above which the individuality
measure should be in order for characters to be observably different according to play-
ers. That is, players could be presented with several versions of the same game, but
with different character individuality measures, and, based on feedback, a minimum
individuality value may be discovered. The implemented domain was relatively simple
domain, yet it could generate complex friendship networks and obtain distinct differ-
ences between the characters. The results showed that adaptation allowed characters
to learn their own unique way of achieving their personal goals. However, there is
scope for improvement in the level of individuality and the spread of differences across
characters, particularly compared to when context is not used.
6.2 Potential for Future Research
The model presented in this thesis shows some promise as a method for generating
many complex personalities from a single personality template. However, the results
indicate that further work is needed to resolve some of the problems that emerged during
testing, particularly relating to context and improving individuality per character. We
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begin by discussing tests that could be done on the model as it is now relating to
personality templates and input parameters. Next, we investigate how the model could
be improved or extended, based on current results. Then, we consider visualisation of
some of the complex components from our implementation. Finally, we discuss several
different qualitative tests with humans that could be performed to test the model (or
future models) further.
6.2.1 Personality Templates and Input Parameters
For our testing, we choose a small variety of Cases to demonstrate that the basic prin-
ciples of our model were effective. When choosing the Cases, we fixed many parameters
so that we could use simple Cases to test the model extensively for those Cases. How-
ever, there will always be more Cases and further tests that could be completed on
the current implementation of the model. By investigating the current model and im-
plementation with more Cases, we may be able to establish more precisely the effect
of context on reward and individuality and whether high individuality always leads to
low reward values. This process will allow us to pinpoint which areas of the model or
implementation need more work, and which areas are already suitable.
Although we have validated the model against the criteria for success relating to
our testing-based sub-questions, more stringent levels for the criteria could allow fur-
ther benefits and problems to emerge. Characters had the same soft goal personality,
meaning they had the same weights and ideal values for the soft goals to be pursued.
It would be interesting to compare Cases where the soft goals were the same but the
weights and/or ideal values were different for each character. Part of emotionality is the
trade-off between exploration and exploitation, which was not fully investigated in the
implemented domain. A more thorough investigation into the influence of the learning
parameters (α, β and bucketing-related values) may give more stable learning and less
abrupt changes in preferences. One possibility would be to change this parameter over
time so that initial values encourage the character to explore its world and later en-
courage the character to stay with its preferred choices. The results from the current
Cases indicate that there was a trade-off between individuality and personal reward.
That is, some Cases that showed high individuality also had characters generating low
personal reward values. This could have been a side-effect of the specific Cases chosen
so more Cases would need to be constructed to resolve this. With different Cases it
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could be necessary to investigate extending runtime and changing output time steps
further.
6.2.1.1 Testing Adaptation Further
In our testing, we compared characters using our model in modes where adaptation
was turned off. Turning off adaptation meant that the characters were effectively using
random choice to make decisions. In order to further test the effect of adaptation, a
method would be to run the simulation for a specified duration. After this, character
data could be collected, that is, the character’s somatic marker preferences that were
developed. Then, the simulation should be run again twice: firstly where the characters
can continue to adapt, and secondly where the characters cannot change their somatic
marker preferences any further. We could then test each run against the criteria. This
test would allow us to determine whether the benefit from adaptation is only during
the development of character personality, or whether continued adaptation improves or
stabilises behaviour, reward and individuality.
6.2.1.2 Designing Specific Characters
Although high individuality was one of our goals, if there is too much individuality
within the same personality template the designer will lose control over the types of
characters generated. There is obviously a trade-off between the amount of handcrafting
of a character and the predictability of their behaviour. On the one hand, if a character
is required to fulfil a specific, high-profile, role within the game, then its behaviour
and personality probably need handcrafting. On the other hand, for the background
characters who contribute to the overall feel of the world, high diversity or individuality
with a minimum of time-consuming handcrafting would be more desirable. However,
even with background characters a designer does not want them acting in entirely
unpredictable ways. That is, a designer may want a number of characters who are
“greedy” and some who are “friendly”. In our model, these personality types can be
set up using a different personality template for each major group. We have shown
from our results that, within the same personality template, a number of different
characters can be generated based on their preferences for different activities. We
need to investigate further whether, after time, the range of characters generated still
fit within the overall personality template they were given. That is, if a number of
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characters are given a “greedy” personality template, then we need to check whether
all the eventual personalities generated remain reflective of how a “greedy” character
should act. Although testing would be needed for confirmation, given the way that the
soft goal personality has been implemented to constrain characters to achieve specific
goals, it is not envisioned that there would be any significant problems in relation to
this question.
6.2.2 Model
When designing the model and testing it, a number of ideas emerged as worthy of
further investigation. We considered how a somatic marker should be updated if the
chosen plan or activity failed. For example, the character wants to talk to someone,
but is unable to find someone to talk to. Initially, we decreased the preference value
for such failed plans. This led to many plans having a negative preference and the
characters did not want to choose any of the plans. In the final implementation, there
was no penalty for failing to complete execution of a plan. However, it seems that
the characters should be able to learn which plans are difficult to execute and that
there should be a better method of adjusting the somatic marker value to reflect this.
One possible method would be the redistribution of reward system proposed by Ponsen
et al. (2006a) (see literature survey Section 2.2.1.3, page 46).
The results show that adaptation in our model improves personal reward and indi-
viduality but indicate that the use of context does not consistently improve either of
these measures. Does this mean that context is only appropriate in certain domains?
Or that the manner in which we implemented context was not appropriate? Perhaps
context should relate to something other than goal achievement. Certainly, it was clear
that even with only six soft goals there were a large number of contexts the character
could be in. This means it is very difficult for characters to learn which action to choose
in each context. One solution to this could be to determine a similarity measure across
contexts, so that characters could use information from similar contexts to make a de-
cision about their current context. One method is that adopted by Bakkes & Spronck
(2006) (see literature survey Section 2.2.1.3, page 48). In this method, the characters
can use preferences from similar contexts when encountering a new context. Another
method is that every time the character makes a decision, it could use a weighted
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function to use preferences not just from its current context but also from similar con-
texts. A final method is to allow characters to learn for some period of time without
context, and then use this learning as a baseline for future learning including context
information. We found that reward values fluctuated frequently and did not stabilise
or converge. This may be desirable in some game applications, but if it is found to be a
problem, then techniques to improve convergence of the learning could be considered,
such as those presented by Matignon et al. (2006) (see literature survey Section 2.2.2.2,
page 57).
6.2.3 Visualisation of Personality, Context and Friendship Networks
The implemented game could generate fairly complex personalities, contexts and friend-
ship networks, despite the simplicity of the actual game structure. However, these three
aspects were not directly observable to a player. We now consider some possible games
or domains that could exploit further these aspects.
In our implementation, character personality was only visible in the number of
times they choose each activity. The characters were only able to choose three obviously
different activities and it was questionable whether a player watching a character would
be able to distinguish the fact that one character chose a particular activity more
frequently than any other activity and, as a result, link this to a different underlying
personality. However, it is unclear how to make personality more explicitly obvious. A
more in-depth game scenario would give the characters more observably different ways
to achieve plans and to allow their personality to be expressed, which would hopefully
result in more explicit personalities. The village example from the introduction could
be a good starting point.
If contexts are confirmed to be a useful construct for learning personality, there
needs to be a better way to enable the player to distinguish that a particular character
is in a particular context. The characters were able to smile or frown to indicate their
happiness, but this discrete indication cannot convey the complexity obtained when
the context is based on many soft goals, such as “LLHLHM” or even “HM”. If the
domain leads to characters choosing very different activities in different contexts, then
the player must be able to distinguish at least some of the different contexts so that
the player can understand (and therefore believe) the behaviour of the character.
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The domain-dependent friendship networks generated are interesting to examine
from a real-world perspective to consider how these networks would be generated or
function. For example, in some Cases there was a clear clique of popular characters.
It would be interesting to design a game, that exploited these friendship networks in a
more visible manner, so that players could notice how the friendships change and alter
over time. Perhaps the friendship network could play an explicit role in the player’s
game, so that the changing network could be monitored and the player could attempt
to put themselves at the centre of the network.
6.2.4 Qualitative Testing
In order to determine the success of the model in improving individuality and believ-
ability, it will eventually be necessary to use human participants to play the game and
answer questionnaires. Although we determined a quantitative measure of individual-
ity, the measure loses significance if the measured differences are unable to be detected
by a human participant. The game scenario was chosen to be simplistic, due to time
and resource constraints, and also in the hope that personalities would be easier to
distinguish in a simple environment. However, to distinguish personalities, a human
participant would need to play the game for a long period of time, something that is
perhaps undesirable for such a simple game.
Ideally, we would like to measure the coherence of the characters. That is, determine
whether their behaviour is stable, identifiable as uniquely theirs and not erratic across
time and contexts. It is likely that this can also only be measured using questionnaires
of participants. The problem with developing questionnaires is that some participants
may be likely to notice differences where there are none and vice versa. To reduce this
effect, it would be necessary to ensure that some of the participants are also given a
version of the game without our model being utilised fully, i.e blind tests. In this way,
participants could compare characters between the Cases.
Ruttkay, Dormann & Noot (2002) proposed a framework to compare embodied
conversational agents (ECAs) to each other and to traditional input methods (see
literature survey Section 2.1.1.4, page 28). However, this framework still relied on
many subjective questions based on the opinions of individuals. To test for different
personalities, we would need to attempt to answer such questions as: “how many
different characters did you notice in the game?” What one participant uses to measure
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“different” may be nothing like another participant’s measure. Determining whether
the model quantifiably “improves” believability and individuality may not be achievable
depending on the robustness of the questionnaires used, the method and the number of
participants in the study. We propose another method of determining whether distinct
personalities are generated in any simulation: the personality guessing game.
6.2.5 The Personality Guessing Game
The original Turing test proposed by Alan Turing (Turing, 1950) in 1950 related to dis-
tinguishing a woman from a man and further whether a machine could be distinguished
from a woman (see literature survey Section 2.1.1.4, page 30). Imagine a similar test
where you are at a terminal typing to two of your friends. If they change their names,
are you able to distinguish the two from each other? If they are good friends, you
probably can.
Imagine a game world populated with some fixed number of characters. The inter-
rogator (a player) watches and interacts with the characters for some amount of time
to “get to know” who is who and what the characters like to do. That is, the inter-
rogator attempts to observe each character’s personality. After some time, we stop the
simulation. We change the names and physical appearance of the characters in some
way, but do not change their underlying personality and reasoning. That is, although
the characters visibly look different, the control of their behaviour is unchanged. The
interrogator now watches the characters again. If the interrogator is able to correctly
guess which character matches to which original character name then the test would
be said to be satisfied. This test gives the interrogator a quantifiable score for the test.
This quantifiable value can then be used to measure the effectiveness of the model.
This personality guessing game represents an ideal test of personality in a simulation
since it eliminates much of the subjectivity of standard questionnaires. If the underlying
personalities are strong enough, they will be observable even when the virtual appear-
ance of the character has changed. If we performed this test using characters that were
all generated from the same personality template, we would be able to demonstrate
more strongly that our model does automatically generate individual personalities for
each character. That is, if the participants are able to distinguish the individual char-
acters better than by random chance, then we can be confident that the personality of
each character is individual.
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6.3 Implications for Games
The implementation presented in this thesis was of a more academic nature (compared
with commercial games), so as to test the model itself. In this section, we consider the
model and results obtained and how these pertain more broadly to the games indus-
try. The model developed is generic and can therefore be applied to a large number of
different domains, unlike some models that require a complex domain-dependent ap-
praisal of choices. To apply our model to a particular domain, the available personality
templates and the equations to determine soft goal achievement levels must be created.
The characters developed using our model are adaptive, context-aware and indi-
vidual. Adaptation improves the number of distinct individual characters, compared
to randomising behaviour. Adaptation means that the characters can learn functional
goals within the environment, can change automatically to match a new or changing
environment, and will automatically learn about the player. The designer does not need
to predict all the situations a character will be exposed to because the character can
adapt automatically. Furthermore, the character cannot learn entirely new behaviour
and become a liability to the game due to its personality template (in particular the
goal/plan hierarchy) which limits the behaviour it can exhibit. In this way, characters
are not themselves unpredictable, it is the actions they choose to execute that differ.
The instability noticed in reward and character behaviour may be well suited to a dy-
namic game environments. In a dynamic environment, the character would need to be
changing their strategies constantly, something the characters generated in our imple-
mentation do without effort by the designer. Some game applications take a personality
template and use this combined with a new random factor for every decision. However,
our results showed that random behaviour does not give distinct individuals over time.
Context allows characters to choose behaviour that is appropriate to the situation
the character is in. By combining context with adaptation, the designer can allow the
characters to learn what to do in every situation. Our results indicate that context may
not be as useful as originally expected. Without further research, it may be simpler to
remove contexts from characters in a game environment.
Individual characters are generated from a single personality template. This means
that a designer can handcraft a small number of personality templates or archetypes
to be used by a large number of characters. Although characters within an archetype
will have some similar behaviour, each will be a distinct individual in their own right.
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The player feels that they are continually meeting new characters, rather than the
same character with the same archetype. This adds to the immersion and depth of
the virtual world generated. In order to test our model, we developed a quantitative
measure of individuality. This measure is useful in itself so that a designer can test
character personality prior to obtaining potentially costly and lengthy player feedback
via questionnaires and playtests.
Our model is intended for use in games needing many background characters. Since
we sought to analyse characters in detail, we limited testing so that only eight different
characters were considered for our illustrative Cases. However, in four of our Cases, all
eight characters had the same starting template and yet they developed so that there
were measurable differences between the characters in all Cases. Our implementation
could easily be scaled to generate more characters from the same template since, once a
personality template has been designed, only a single number in the input text file needs
to be changed so that the implementation instantiates fifty characters of a particular
template, compared to eight.
6.4 Final Words
The model we have designed and implemented shows some promise as a method of de-
veloping complex character preferences or personality without handcrafting behaviour
for each character in every situation. One of the main technical contribution of this
research is the inclusion of soft goals and somatic markers in a BDI architecture. As
noted in this conclusion, further research is required to improve the implementation
domain and contexts within the model, since the domain was found to be too simplistic
and contexts did not clearly improve the characters. In the introduction, we presented
an ideal game world that would benefit from our model, the village example. At the end
of this thesis, we believe that an implementation of the village example would benefit
from using our existing model. This thesis has shown that, through using soft goals
and somatic markers to allow adaptation and to perceive contexts, we have developed
a model that enables personality to influence decision-making and evaluation for char-
acters in a virtual world. It demonstrates that it is possible to automatically generate,
from a single personality template, multiple characters that are unique, adaptive and
context-aware, without handcrafting all behaviour.
192
Appendix A
Behaviour Over Time
This appendix contains graphs for each sample run of each Case (for every character) in
relation to the testing research sub-question 1a: does behaviour change over time? In
other words, do the activities that the characters choose change over time? Each graph
shows how a specific character’s behaviour changes over time during the simulation for
each Case when using our model. In this instance, we are only considering ‘normal’
option runs, where the model is being used with both adaptation and context.
We take a sample run from each Case and plot each of the eight characters on a
separate graph. For example, in Figure A.1 we see the graphs for Anna (Figure A.1(a))
and Bec (Figure A.1(b)) from Case 1. In these graphs, simulation time is on the x-axis.
Each line represents a different activity (“Insult”, “Move” and “Wait”), and the y-axis
shows how many times that particular plan was chosen over each data collection time
interval. The graphs can be used to see how each character’s most chosen activity
changes over time.
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Figure A.1: Case 1 behaviour based on the individual: Action choices for each agent for
a particular run of Case 1 (Clear Preference Against One Activity) option ‘normal’. In
each graph, the number of times the agent chose each of the three top level activities is
shown on the y-axis. Each line represents a different activity.
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Figure A.2: Case 2 behaviour based on the individual: Action choices for each agent
for a particular run of Case 2 (Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals) option ‘normal’. In each
graph, the number of times the agent chose each of the three top level activities is shown
on the y-axis. Each line represents a different activity.
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Figure A.3: Case 3 behaviour based on the individual: Action choices for each agent for
a particular run of Case 3 (Conflicting Goals) option ‘normal’. In each graph, the number
of times the agent chose each of the three top level activities is shown on the y-axis. Each
line represents a different activity.
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Figure A.4: Case 4 behaviour based on the individual: Action choices for each agent for
a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal Personality) option ‘normal’. In each graph,
the number of times the agent chose each of the three top level activities is shown on the
y-axis. Each line represents a different activity.
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Figure A.5: Case 5 behaviour based on the individual: Action choices for each agent
for a particular run of Case 5 (Different Soft Goal Personalities) option ‘normal’. In each
graph, the number of times the agent chose each of the three top level activities is shown
on the y-axis. Each line represents a different activity.
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Appendix B
Learning A Functional Soft Goal
In this appendix we have further sample graphs for research sub-question 1b: Can
characters learn about specific, functional goals? The graphs show how characters
learn about two specific goals: “be close to friends” and “don’t be close to enemies”.
Characters should be learning to move towards ‘friends’ and away from ‘enemies’.
In Figure B.1, for example, we show the number of times an example character,
Anna, choose each of the six plans:
• Move towards friend;
• Move away from friend;
• Move towards neutral;
• Move away from neutral;
• Move towards enemy;
• Move away from enemy.
In the figures each line represents the number of times that Bec chose that particular
plan: “move towards” or “move away”. There is a figure for each of the categories of
‘friend’, ‘neutral’, or ‘enemy’.
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Figure B.1: Action choices for Anna for a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal
Personality) mode ‘normal’.
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Time
Nu
mb
er
 of
 Ti
me
s P
lan
 Ch
os
en
(a) Move with respect to a ‘friend’
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Time
Nu
mb
er
 of
 Ti
me
s P
lan
 Ch
os
en
(b) Move with respect to a ‘neutral’ person
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Time
Nu
mb
er
 of
 Ti
me
s P
lan
 Ch
os
en
(c) Move with respect to an ‘enemy’
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Towards Away
Time
N
um
be
r 
of
 T
im
es
 P
la
n 
C
ho
se
n
Figure B.2: Action choices for Bec for a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal
Personality) mode ‘normal’.
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Figure B.3: Action choices for Chloe for a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal
Personality) mode ‘normal’.
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Figure B.4: Action choices for Deb for a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal
Personality) mode ‘normal’.
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Figure B.5: Action choices for Elle for a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal
Personality) mode ‘normal’.
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Figure B.6: Action choices for Fran for a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal
Personality) mode ‘normal’.
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Figure B.7: Action choices for Gina for a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal
Personality) mode ‘normal’.
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Figure B.8: Action choices for Heidi for a particular run of Case 4 (Complex Soft Goal
Personality) mode ‘normal’.
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Appendix C
Domain-dependent Results
In the domain used for implementation, characters used two main opinions as part of
their domain-dependent knowledge, attraction towards others and happiness. Based on
attraction towards others, characters were able to build friendships that were relatively
stable. Although how friendships are developed is based on domain-dependent equa-
tions, whether they wanted to make friends was part of their soft goals and therefore
somewhat dependent on the stability of the model. The characters also had a happiness
value that represented how close they were to achieving all of their soft goals.
In this appendix, we begin by examining happiness and then friendships as gener-
ated in the ‘normal’ mode when characters were able to adapt and use contexts. We
finish by discussing the implications of these domain-dependent results.
C.1 Happiness
Happiness is closely related to reward values, since happiness is updated every time the
character calculates a personal reward value (see evaluation process Section 3.2.2, page
90). By looking at the happiness graphs, we can also consider how personal reward
fluctuated over time during the simulation. We consider two representative Cases as
shown in Figure C.1 (page 206). These graphs show happiness intensity as a dot at
each time tick. The reference reward is shown as the line, where reference reward is a
reflection of all past rewards. Happiness fluctuates from high to low levels often and
very quickly over time. The reference reward is also fluctuating, but not as severely.
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(b) Case 4 ‘normal’ for Gina.
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Figure C.1: Happiness and reference reward for two example runs for two example char-
acters. Horizontal lines are cutoffs for being “happy” and “sad”.
In Case 1 (Figure C.1(a)), the average reference reward is higher than Case 4 (Figure
C.1(b)). This was discussed in the results presented in Section 5.2 (page 160).
These results indicate that the personal reward and happiness fluctuate a lot, which
is perhaps why the characters found it so difficult to learn. Even when the simulation
was run for longer periods of time, the reward does not stabilise. We tried changing
parameters within the learning function to improve stability but this seemed to have
little effect. At the start of the simulation, the characters seemed to “learn” quickly
since time steps allowed the character to complete each activity multiple times. These
results show that the learning function needs significant work if it is considered desirable
for reward and happiness to be more stable. However, how happy someone is can change
throughout the day and so perhaps an unstable happiness value could be more realistic
than a stable fixed happiness, depending on the domain and the intended use.
C.2 Friendships
In this section, we examine the results based on opinions the character stored relating to
each other character, attraction towards others. In our domain, friendships were formed
based on insults given and received. The equations that generate attraction towards
others are given earlier (see Section 4.1.2.2, page 111). The key ways that characters
changed opinions of others was based on not liking people who insult you, liking people
who agree with you, liking people talking to you, and liking people who insult people
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you do not like. In an effort to simplify the complexity of these relationships, all
characters used the same methods to determine how to update opinions.
Attraction towards others allowed characters to classify the other characters as
‘friends’, ‘enemies’ or ‘neutral’. These values were used when the characters decided
who they wanted to move towards (or away from), who they wanted to talk to and
who they wanted to insult. We will look at five sample runs for each of the five Cases
for the ‘normal’ mode (i.e. using our full model with adaptation and contexts). By
examining attraction towards others, we can consider how stable the friendships were
between characters. We examine graphs of the attraction values held by each individual
character towards the others, and also the friendship networks. We begin by explaining
how to read the figures.
In this section, we show a graph for each of the eight characters of attraction towards
others for each of the five Cases, taken from a single, sample run . For example, Bec’s
attraction towards others over time is shown in Figure C.2(b). Each of the seven
lines represents a different character, for example, Heidi. The attraction towards that
character is on a scale of [−1,+1], with −1 being the worst value, and +1 the highest.
If the attraction towards others goes over the threshold of +0.3 (as set by the domain-
dependent threshold from emotionality, Section 4.2.2, page 122), then Heidi will be
considered a ‘friend’ by Bec. If the attraction value goes below -0.3, then Heidi will be
considered an ‘enemy’.
We also show a friendship network representing a snapshot in time of how the
characters feel towards each other. In particular, we show the friendship network as it
stands at the end of the simulation. In these diagrams, (such as in Figure C.2(k)) an
arrow from one character to another indicates that the originating character considers
the other to be a ‘friend’.
207
C. DOMAIN-DEPENDENT RESULTS
Areas
Page 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Time
At
tra
cti
on
 T
ow
ar
ds
 O
th
er
s
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
(a) Anna’s attraction towards others
Areas
Page 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Time
At
tra
cti
on
 T
ow
ar
ds
 O
th
er
s
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
(b) Bec’s attraction towards othersAreas
Page 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Time
At
tra
cti
on
 T
ow
ar
ds
 O
th
er
s
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
(c) Chloe’s attraction towards others
Areas
Page 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Time
At
tra
cti
on
 T
ow
ar
ds
 O
th
er
s
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
(d) Deb’s attraction towards othersAreas
Page 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Time
At
tra
cti
on
 T
ow
ar
ds
 O
th
er
s
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
(e) Elle’s attraction towards others
Areas
Page 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Time
At
tra
cti
on
 T
ow
ar
ds
 O
th
er
s
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
(f) Fran’s attraction towards othersAreas
Page 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Time
At
tra
cti
on
 T
ow
ar
ds
 O
th
er
s
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
(g) Gina’s attraction towards others
Areas
Page 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Time
At
tra
cti
on
 T
ow
ar
ds
 O
th
er
s
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
(h) Heidi’s attraction towards others
Areas
Page 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
upper lower Friend Enemy
Time
At
tra
ct
io
n 
To
w
ar
ds
 O
th
er
s
Legend
Page 1
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Anna Bec Chloe Deb Elle Fran Gina Heidi
(k) Friendship Network
Figure C.2: Friendship network and attraction levels for Case 1 ‘normal’.
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C.2.1 Case 1: Clear Preference Against One Activity
We start by considering the Case where there was a clear preference against one activity,
insults. Our domain was set up so that it would be difficult to make friends directly.
Therefore, in our domain, generating or listening to insults were the only ways that
characters could make friends, since these plans are the only ones that update the
attraction towards others value (see Section 4.1.2.2, page 111). In Figure C.2, we see
the graphs from one example run (the friendship networks generated were fairly similar
in all ten runs). The characters did not make very many ‘friends’ and, in almost all
runs, there were no mutual friendships generated (where both characters consider the
other to be a ‘friend’). For example, the network in this single run (Figure C.2(k)),
shows arrows (i.e. friendships) in only one direction. Only Anna and Bec consider
someone to be their friend. The low number of friendships in Case 1 is likely due to
the clear preference against insults, and consequently against making friends.
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Figure C.3: Friendship network and attraction levels for Case 2 ‘normal’.
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C.2.2 Case 2: Multiple Ways to Achieve Goals
The sample graphs for Case 2 are shown in Figure C.3. Here, the friendship network
generated at the end of the simulation (Figure C.3(k)) is more complex than in Case
1. Three mutual friendships are formed and overall more characters have “friends”.
For example, as seen in Figure C.3(b), Bec considers Fran to be a ‘friend’ beginning
near the start of the simulation and does not change her opinions very much. In Figure
C.3(f) Fran also becomes friends with Bec early in the simulation and this opinion
remains fairly stable. However, Fran also changes her attraction to Chloe and Elle as
the simulation continues, so that she becomes friends with both of them by the end.
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Figure C.4: Friendship network and attraction levels for Case 3 ‘normal’.
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C.2.3 Case 3: Conflicting Goals
The attraction values and friendship networks for Case 3 are shown in Figure C.4. The
final network shows four characters (Deb, Elle, Gina and Heidi) as a core group who
mostly like each other and who are liked by other characters. Bec, Chloe and Fran are
outsiders who like other individual characters, but whom no one likes. Anna considers
no one her friend, neither does anyone consider her their friend. When we examine what
activities the characters preferred to do (Figure 5.3, page 149), there does not appear
to be a correlation meaning that, characters who always prefer to insult others are
sometimes popular, like Gina, and sometimes unpopular, like Anna. If we examine the
actual fluctuations of their attraction levels over time (for example, Figures C.4(e) and
C.4(h)), we see that the levels are fairly constant. Once one character “likes” another
character, they continue to do so and do not change their mind often. However, this
is not as true for Elle and Fran who change their opinions slightly throughout the
scenario.
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(k) Friendship Network
Figure C.5: Friendship network and attraction levels for Case 4 ‘normal’.
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C.2 Friendships
C.2.4 Case 4: Complex Soft Goal Personality
The graphs from Case 4, where characters are pursuing many soft goals, are shown
in Figure C.5. The characters are trying to achieve “make friends” and “don’t make
enemies” as well as four other soft goals. The friendship network (as shown in Figure
C.5(k)) and the individual character graphs show that, although some friendships were
formed, the characters were not very successful at their goals. That is, in most Cases,
the characters had more ‘enemies’ than friends. It is interesting that, according to the
friendship network, two groups of friends were formed. Also, Fran appears to be the
most popular girl, since three other characters like her, and yet she only likes Anna.
These apparent abnormalities happen in the real world as well.
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Figure C.6: Friendship network and attraction levels for Case 5 ‘normal’.
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C.2 Friendships
C.2.5 Case 5: Different Soft Goal Personalities
In Case 5, characters with different soft goal personalities, a relatively complex friend-
ship network was generated (see Figure C.6(k)). In this network, we see that Gina
and Heidi are the two most popular girls. Interestingly, the only soft goal that both
Gina and Heidi were attempting to achieve was “make friends”. So, according to the
friendship network both girls achieved their goal quite well, even though Heidi consid-
ered only Gina to be her friend. The friendship network shows that there are some
characters, such as Elle and Deb, who like three other characters but are liked by no
one. This can happen in the real world, particularly with girls of school age.
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